Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Barrowgreen2 sentences2010Defendant argues that “[evidence] is not proper at the sentencing hearing if it does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors, the circumstances of the offense or the character or rehabilitative potential of the particular defendant,” citing People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 280 (1989). 2010Defendant argues that “[evidence] is not proper at the sentencing hearing if it does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors, the circumstances of the offense or the character or rehabilitative potential of the particular defendant,” citing People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 280 (1989). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Freegreen2 sentences1988(People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 433 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).) I can only repeat what I said in the original Free case, and urge this court to adopt the following rules of evidence for capital sentencing hearings: “If the evidence offered is extraneous to the facts and circumstances of the case or the character of the defendant, it is not admissible; if it would tend to divert the jury’s attention from the aggravating or mitigating factors before them, it should be excluded; and if the evidence impinges upon any fundamental constitutional guarantee, it can 1988(People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 433 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).) I can only repeat what I said in the original Free case, and urge this court to adopt the following rules of evidence for capital sentencing hearings: “If the evidence offered is extraneous to the facts and circumstances of the case or the character of the defendant, it is not admissible; if it would tend to divert the jury’s attention from the aggravating or mitigating factors before them, it should be excluded; and if the evidence impinges upon any fundamental constitutional guarantee, it can | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Rileygreen2 sentences1984People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 366-67 ; People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 502, 515 ; see also People v. Riley (1941), 376 Ill. 364, 367-68 . 1984People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 366-67 ; People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill.2d 502, 515 ; see also People v. Riley (1941), 376 Ill. 364, 367-68 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Szabo
green
2 sentences1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin ( 1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin ( | 3 | 1983–1989 |
People v. Walker
green
2 sentences1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin ( 1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin (198 | 2 | 1983–1984 |
People v. Holman
green
1 sentence1989(People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133, 163 ; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 366-67 .) The court, relatively, has held that comment on the possibility of the defendant’s obtaining parole, to implicitly persuade the jury to impose the death penalty, is improper and prejudicial. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Gleckler
green
2 sentences1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin ( 1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin (198 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gardner v. Florida
green
2 sentences1983The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated that “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” (Gardner v. Florida (1977), 430 U.S. 349, 358 , 51 L. 1983The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated that “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” (Gardner v. Florida (1977), 430 U.S. 349, 358 , 51 L. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Carlson
green
2 sentences1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin ( 1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin (198 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Devin
green
2 sentences1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin ( 1983I, sec. 11; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 352-53 ; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 162 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 590 ), and that trial courts do not have the discretion to admit evidence at sentencing hearings which does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors alleged to exist in a given case or on the circumstances of the offense or the character and rehabilitative potential of the defendant, or the probative value of which in this regard is outweighed by its prejudicial effect ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 363-68 ; People v. Devin (198 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.