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7 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Marcus Canadygreen1 sentence2024Canady rejected the government’s argument that the defendant’s presence at a pronouncement hearing would have been useless, finding a “useful purpose in ensuring that the pronouncement of the defendant’s guilt or innocence by the court is both face-to-face and public.” Id. at 361. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2013See People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 359 (2010). -11- that would prevent me from joining in it even if I were to conclude that Morgan’s independent felonious purpose rule was constitutionally derived and retroactive to cases on collateral review. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ellis
green
2 sentences1975In People v. Ellis, 53 Ill.2d 390, 394 , we considered whether “a new pronouncement or standard for testing the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures” was to apply retroactively or only prospectively, and set forth the criteria for deciding the question. 1975In the opinion, the supreme court pointed out that although the procedural change effected in the Wills case involves no constitutional issue or standard, the same criteria apply as had been applied in People v. Ellis, 53 Ill.2d 390, 394 , since the court was making a new pronouncement or standard. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Gage v. Cummings
neutral
2 sentences1964Although the original pronouncement of this doctrine in Gage v. Cummings, 209 Ill 120, 70 NE 679 , stated that such mutuality must exist at the time the contract was executed, this rule has since been modified in subsequent decisions so as to require such mutuality, not at the outset of the initial obligation, but only upon commission of subsequent acts. 1958Although the original pronouncement of this doctrine in Gage v. Cummings, 209 Ill. 120 , stated that such mutuality must exist at the time the contract was executed, this rule has since become modified in subsequent decisions so as to require such mutuality, not at the outset of the initial obligation, but only upon commission of subsequent acts. | 2 | 1958–1964 |
Desist v. United States
yellow
2 sentences1973Desist v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 244, 249-253 , 22 L. 1973Desist v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 244, 249-253 , 22 L. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Kuhn v. Eppstein
neutral
2 sentences1958Thus it has been held that specific performance may be demanded where a loan contingency was involved (Kovacs v. Krol, 385 Ill. 592 ), where the original contract has been assigned (Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264 ), where the vendor’s title was originally incomplete (Kuhn v. Eppstein, 219 Ill. 154 ), or where the unbound party submits to the jurisdiction of the court so as to create mutuality. 1958Thus it has been held that specific performance may be demanded where a loan contingency was involved ( Kovacs v. Krol, 385 Ill. 592 ), where the original contract has been assigned ( Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264 ), where the vendor's title was originally incomplete ( Kuhn v. Eppstein, 219 Ill. 154 ), or where the unbound party submits to the jurisdiction of the court so as to create mutuality. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Lewis v. McCreedy
green
2 sentences1958Thus it has been held that specific performance may be demanded where a loan contingency was involved (Kovacs v. Krol, 385 Ill. 592 ), where the original contract has been assigned (Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264 ), where the vendor’s title was originally incomplete (Kuhn v. Eppstein, 219 Ill. 154 ), or where the unbound party submits to the jurisdiction of the court so as to create mutuality. 1958Thus it has been held that specific performance may be demanded where a loan contingency was involved ( Kovacs v. Krol, 385 Ill. 592 ), where the original contract has been assigned ( Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264 ), where the vendor's title was originally incomplete ( Kuhn v. Eppstein, 219 Ill. 154 ), or where the unbound party submits to the jurisdiction of the court so as to create mutuality. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.