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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ferrell v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Ferrell v. State, 653 So.2d 367, 370 (Fla.1995) (declining to adopt a rule that would require the appointment of two attorneys in all capital cases); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 , 975 n. 3 (Fla.1994) (noting that while trial judges may appoint two attorneys in capital cases under appropriate circumstances, dual representation is not mandated in every situation), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995). [8] While it is possible that additional counsel may be warranted, there is *302 little in the record before this court to indicate whether such an appointment wa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ora Lee Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, William Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company
green
2 sentences2014Certainly, the original pronouncement of this doctrine from our Court and the modern enunciation from Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d at 449 , do not view unconscionability as a rigid construct composed of two separate, unrelated elements. 2014Certainly, the original pronouncement of this doctrine from our Court and the modern enunciation from Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d at 449 , do not view unconscionability as a rigid construct composed of two separate, unrelated elements. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sponga v. Warro
green
1 sentence2010We agree with the reasoning in Sponga , as did the JCC, that “cases settled in mediation are especially unsuited for the liberal application of a rule allowing rescission of a settlement agreement based on a unilateral mistake.” 698 So.2d at 625 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Thompson v. State
green
1 sentence1996See Ferrell v. State, 653 So.2d 367, 370 (Fla.1995) (declining to adopt a rule that would require the appointment of two attorneys in all capital cases); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 , 975 n. 3 (Fla.1994) (noting that while trial judges may appoint two attorneys in capital cases under appropriate circumstances, dual representation is not mandated in every situation), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995). [8] While it is possible that additional counsel may be warranted, there is *302 little in the record before this court to indicate whether such an appointment wa | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Jones v. Love
green
1 sentence1996See Ferrell v. State, 653 So.2d 367, 370 (Fla.1995) (declining to adopt a rule that would require the appointment of two attorneys in all capital cases); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 , 975 n. 3 (Fla.1994) (noting that while trial judges may appoint two attorneys in capital cases under appropriate circumstances, dual representation is not mandated in every situation), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995). [8] While it is possible that additional counsel may be warranted, there is *302 little in the record before this court to indicate whether such an appointment wa | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Grimm v. Angelone
green
1 sentence1996See Ferrell v. State, 653 So.2d 367, 370 (Fla.1995) (declining to adopt a rule that would require the appointment of two attorneys in all capital cases); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 , 975 n. 3 (Fla.1994) (noting that while trial judges may appoint two attorneys in capital cases under appropriate circumstances, dual representation is not mandated in every situation), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995). [8] While it is possible that additional counsel may be warranted, there is *302 little in the record before this court to indicate whether such an appointment wa | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Harriss
green
2 sentences1973That court stated in Papachristou et al. v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 162-163 of 405 U.S. at 843 -844 of 92 S.Ct., the following: "This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it `fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. 1973That court stated in Papachristou et al. v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 162-163 of 405 U.S. at 843 -844 of 92 S.Ct., the following: "This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it `fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
green
1 sentence1973That court stated in Papachristou et al. v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 162-163 of 405 U.S. at 843 -844 of 92 S.Ct., the following: "This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it `fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Henderson v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences1967This rule, however, is subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence then on appeal they may be considered as error even in the absence of an objection in the trial court." (Emphasis added.) The rule and its exception were similarly stated in Carlile v. State, supra. As thus stated, the Court was paraphrasing the original pronouncement of the exception to the rule as follows: "This rule is, however, subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neith 1967This rule, however, is subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence then on appeal they may be considered as error even in the absence of an objection in the trial court." (Emphasis added.) The rule and its exception were similarly stated in Carlile v. State, supra. As thus stated, the Court was paraphrasing the original pronouncement of the exception to the rule as follows: "This rule is, however, subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neith | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Livingston v. State
green
2 sentences1967This rule, however, is subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence then on appeal they may be considered as error even in the absence of an objection in the trial court." (Emphasis added.) The rule and its exception were similarly stated in Carlile v. State, supra. As thus stated, the Court was paraphrasing the original pronouncement of the exception to the rule as follows: "This rule is, however, subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neith 1967This rule, however, is subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence then on appeal they may be considered as error even in the absence of an objection in the trial court." (Emphasis added.) The rule and its exception were similarly stated in Carlile v. State, supra. As thus stated, the Court was paraphrasing the original pronouncement of the exception to the rule as follows: "This rule is, however, subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neith | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Fast v. State
neutral
1 sentence1967This rule, however, is subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence then on appeal they may be considered as error even in the absence of an objection in the trial court." (Emphasis added.) The rule and its exception were similarly stated in Carlile v. State, supra. As thus stated, the Court was paraphrasing the original pronouncement of the exception to the rule as follows: "This rule is, however, subject to the exception that if the improper remarks are of such character that neith | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.