instrument intend every clause in Texas

56 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1957–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co.green tex · 1968 · cited in 16 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1972–2026 2 sentences 2026Generally[,] the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and[,] in some measure[,] to evidence their agreement.’” Id. (quoting City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968)). “[A]ll the usual ‘rules of construction’ apply, like the familiar presumptions favoring consistent usage, disfavoring surplusage, and using the plain meaning of undefined terms.” Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234 , 257 (Tex. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Labs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 228 , 17 236 (Tex. 2022) 2018Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some *701 effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement." City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co. , 432 S.W.2d 515 , 518 (Tex. 1968) (citations omitted).	11	16
Woods v. Simsgreen tex · 1954 · cited in 17 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1957–2017 2 sentences 2017See Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (1954), In Woods , the court stated, Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary repugnance. 2017See Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (1954), In Woods , the court stated, Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary repugnance.	10	17
Luckel v. Whitegreen tex · 1992 · cited in 12 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2009–2026 2 sentences 2026“We harmonize all parts of the deed, understanding that the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.” Graham, 429 S.W.3d at 655 (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 ). 2018Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 (“[T]the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.”); Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d at 655 .	7	12
Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crewsgreen tex · 1995 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64 , 273 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1954); see Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex.1995). 2010Woods v. Sims , 154 Tex. 59, 64 , 273 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1954); see Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews , 898 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1995).	3	3
Coker v. Cokergreen tex · 1983 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2009–2015 2 sentences 2015The court should “not strike down any part of the deed, unless there is an irreconcilable conflict wherein one part of the instrument destroys in effect another part thereof.” Page 20 of 36 Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Tex. 1991)(citations omitted); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex. 1983); (CR at 416). 2009See Luckel , 819 S.W.2d at 461 ; see also Coker , 650 S.W.2d at 393 .	2	2
Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co.yellow tex · 1951 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1985–1988 2 sentences 1985In so doing, we must recognize that “the parties to-an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement,” id. and that “[a] reasonable interpretation [of an agreement] will be preferred to one which is unreasonable.” Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., 150 Tex. 533 , 243 S.W.2d 823, 824 (1951). 1985In so doing, we must recognize that “the parties to-an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement,” id. and that “[a] reasonable interpretation [of an agreement] will be preferred to one which is unreasonable.” Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., 150 Tex. 533 , 243 S.W.2d 823, 824 (1951).	2	2
Alford v. Krumred tex · 1984 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1985–1987 2 sentences 1987Ironically, Woods was also cited by the majority as authority for the rule of construction which required the Court to "attempt to harmonize all parts of a deed, since the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.” Id. at 872. 1986Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d at 872 .	1	3
Tawes v. Barnesgreen tex · 2011 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2026 2 sentences 2026Generally[,] the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and[,] in some measure[,] to evidence their agreement.’” Id. (quoting City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968)). “[A]ll the usual ‘rules of construction’ apply, like the familiar presumptions favoring consistent usage, disfavoring surplusage, and using the plain meaning of undefined terms.” Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234 , 257 (Tex. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Labs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 228 , 17 236 (Tex. 2022) 2016Therefore, we “examine the entire agreement and give effect to each provision so that none is rendered meaningless.” Craig Sessions, M.D., P.A., 412 S.W.3d at 745 (citing Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. 2011)).	1	2
Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeleygreen tex · 1981 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017Id.; see Magee v. Hambleton, No. 02-08-00441-CV, 2009 WL 2619425 , at 3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Woods to recite that the court attempts harmonization because “the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect”); see also Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Tex. 1981) (stating that in construing an instrument, the court’s task is to seek the parties’ intention “as that intention is expressed” in the document). 2017Id.; see Magee v. Hambleton, No. 02-08-00441-CV, 2009 WL 2619425 , at 3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Woods to recite that the court attempts harmonization because “the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect”); see also Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 , 727–28 (Tex. 1981) (stating that in construing an instrument, the court’s task is to seek the parties’ intention “as that intention is expressed” in the document).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
Altman v. Blake green tex · 1986 2 sentences 2015Altman v. Blake, 712 S. W.2d at 118 . “[T]he parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.” Id. 2015Altman v. Blake, 712 S. W.2d at 118 . “[T]he parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.” Id.	6	1992–2015
Graham v. Prochaska green texapp · 2013 2 sentences 2026“We harmonize all parts of the deed, understanding that the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.” Graham, 429 S.W.3d at 655 (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 ). 2018Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 (“[T]the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.”); Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d at 655 .	2	2018–2026
Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. and Mosaic Baybrook Two, L.P. v. Paul Simien green tex · 2023 1 sentence 2026Generally[,] the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and[,] in some measure[,] to evidence their agreement.’” Id. (quoting City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968)). “[A]ll the usual ‘rules of construction’ apply, like the familiar presumptions favoring consistent usage, disfavoring surplusage, and using the plain meaning of undefined terms.” Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234 , 257 (Tex. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Labs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 228 , 17 236 (Tex. 2022)	1	2026–2026
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Energen Resources Corporation green tex · 2020 1 sentence 2026Corp., 615 S.W.3d 144 , 148 (Tex. 2020)).	1	2026–2026
Thomas Brandon Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Laboratories, Llc green tex · 2022 2 sentences 2026Generally[,] the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and[,] in some measure[,] to evidence their agreement.’” Id. (quoting City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968)). “[A]ll the usual ‘rules of construction’ apply, like the familiar presumptions favoring consistent usage, disfavoring surplusage, and using the plain meaning of undefined terms.” Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234 , 257 (Tex. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Labs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 228 , 17 236 (Tex. 2022) 2026Generally[,] the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and[,] in some measure[,] to evidence their agreement.’” Id. (quoting City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968)). “[A]ll the usual ‘rules of construction’ apply, like the familiar presumptions favoring consistent usage, disfavoring surplusage, and using the plain meaning of undefined terms.” Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien, 674 S.W.3d 234 , 257 (Tex. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Labs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 228 , 17 236 (Tex. 2022)	1	2026–2026
Petrohawk Properties, L.P., and P-H Energy, L.L.C. v. Noel Diane Jones green texapp · 2015 1 sentence 2017Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.’” Petrohawk Props., L.P., 455 S.W.3d at 765 (quoting City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968) (citations omitted)).	1	2017–2017
Craig Sessions, M.D., P.A. and Craig Sessions, M.D. v. TH Healthcare, Ltd., D/B/A Nacogdoches Medical Center green texapp · 2013 1 sentence 2016Therefore, we “examine the entire agreement and give effect to each provision so that none is rendered meaningless.” Craig Sessions, M.D., P.A., 412 S.W.3d at 745 (citing Tawes v. Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. 2011)).	1	2016–2016
Benge v. Scharbauer green tex · 1953 2 sentences 2015Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447 , harmonize all parts of a deed, since the 259 S.W.2d 166 , 167–68 (Tex.1953). parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some [2] In construing a deed, the court endeavors to measure to evidence their agreement. carry into effect the intent of the parties as ex- Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d pressed therein. 2015Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447 , harmonize all parts of a deed, since the 259 S.W.2d 166 , 167–68 (Tex.1953). parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some [2] In construing a deed, the court endeavors to measure to evidence their agreement. carry into effect the intent of the parties as ex- Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d pressed therein.	1	2015–2015
Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Savings Ass'n green tex · 1985 1 sentence 1988Ass’n, 696 S.W.2d at 382 (citing Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., 150 Tex. 533, 535 , 243 S.W.2d 823, 824 (1951)).	1	1988–1988
Smith v. Liddell green tex · 1963 1 sentence 1988Smith v. Liddell, 367 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1963).	1	1988–1988
Baylor University v. Carlander green texapp · 1958 1 sentence 1968Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d 617 ,. 620 (1954) : “Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some-effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case-of necessary repugnance.” In our opinion the cases of Baylor University v. Carlander, 316 S.W.2d 277 (Dallas.Civ.App.1958, ref. n. r. e.); and Chenault v. County of Shelby, 320 S.W.2d 431 (Austin Civ.App.1959, ref. n. r. e.), relied upon by the appellee, have no application to the facts of this case.	1	1968–1968
Chenault v. County of Shelby green texapp · 1959 1 sentence 1968Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d 617 ,. 620 (1954) : “Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some-effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case-of necessary repugnance.” In our opinion the cases of Baylor University v. Carlander, 316 S.W.2d 277 (Dallas.Civ.App.1958, ref. n. r. e.); and Chenault v. County of Shelby, 320 S.W.2d 431 (Austin Civ.App.1959, ref. n. r. e.), relied upon by the appellee, have no application to the facts of this case.	1	1968–1968
General American Indemnity Company v. Pepper green tex · 1960 2 sentences 1967In General American Indemnity Company v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263 , 339 S.W.2d 660 (1960), the Supreme Court said: “Ordinarily, all parts of the contract are to be taken together, and such meaning shall be given to them as will carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties. * * * It is well established that a contract is to be construed in accordance with its plain language. * * * The words used in this clause are not susceptible of two meanings. 1967In General American Indemnity Company v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263 , 339 S.W.2d 660 (1960), the Supreme Court said: “Ordinarily, all parts of the contract are to be taken together, and such meaning shall be given to them as will carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties. * * * It is well established that a contract is to be construed in accordance with its plain language. * * * The words used in this clause are not susceptible of two meanings.	1	1967–1967
The Texas Company v. Davis green tex · 1923 2 sentences 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary	1	1957–1957
Texas Co. v. Davis green tex · 1923 1 sentence 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary	1	1957–1957
Guerra v. Chancellor green texapp · 1937 2 sentences 1957App., 1937, 103 S.W. 2d 775 , wr. ref. “* * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary repugnance. 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary	1	1957–1957
Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co. green tex · 1923 2 sentences 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary	1	1957–1957
Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co. green tex · 1929 2 sentences 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary	1	1957–1957
Watson v. Rochmill green tex · 1941 2 sentences 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary 1957Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 1929, 118 Tex. 509 , 19 S.W.2d 27 ; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 1923, 113 Tex. 160 , 254 S.W. 290 , 29 A.L.R. 566 ; Texas Company v. Davis, 1923, 113 Tex. 321 , 254 S.W. 304 , 255 S.W. 601 ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783 , 176 137 A.L.R. 1032 ; Guerra v. Chancellor, Tex.Civ.App.1937, 103 S.W.2d 775 , wr. ref. " * * Generally the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary	1	1957–1957

Where else courts name it

TX 56 (1957–2026) CA 3 (1987–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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instrument intend every clause in Texas

Followed or applied (9)

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Also cited on this issue (19)

Where else courts name it