no-evidence summary judgment standard in Texas

2015Under the no-evidence summary judgment standard, "the party with the burden of proof at trial will have the same burden of proof in a summary judgment proceeding." Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v. Norris, 981 S. W.2d 797,799 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied), citing Esco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Sooner Pipe & Supply Cmp., 962 S.W.2d 193 ,197 n. 3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (commenting that under Rule 166a(i), "the plaintiff as the non-movant [has] the burden to raise a triable issue on each element essential to the plaintiffs case against each defendant").

2012See, e.g. , Esco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Sooner Pipe & Supply Corp. , 962 S.W.2d 193 , 197 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).

2020First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont, d/b/a the Anchor of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017) (when party moves for both traditional and no-evidence summary judgments, reviewing court first considers no-evidence motion); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

2015If the nonmovant fails to meet its burden under the no-evidence summary judgment standard, there is no need to analyze the traditional summary judgment. 6 2485742.1 See Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600 , Kalyanaram, 230 S.W.3d at 925 .

2007Claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty require expert testimony on the issues of breach and causation of damages where the determination of those issues “is not one that lay people would ordinarily be competent to make.” Arce v. Burrow , 958 S.W.2d 239, 252 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d in part , rev’d in part on other grounds , 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.1999); Alexander v. Turtur & Associates , Inc. , 146 S.W.3d 113, 199-20 (Tex. 2004).

2007Having properly pleaded a no-evidence summary judgment claim, the burden shifted to Kothmann to show a scintilla of summary judgment evidence raising a genuine fact issue as to each of these elements.           Claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty require expert testimony on the issues of breach and causation of damages where the determination of those issues “is not one that lay people would ordinarily be competent to make.†Arce v. Burrow , 958 S.W.2d 239, 252 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d in part , rev’d in part on other grounds , 997 S.W.2d 229 (Te

2007Claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty require expert testimony on the issues of breach and causation of damages where the determination of those issues “is not one that lay people would ordinarily be competent to make.” Arce v. Burrow , 958 S.W.2d 239, 252 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d in part , rev’d in part on other grounds , 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.1999); Alexander v. Turtur & Associates , Inc. , 146 S.W.3d 113, 199-20 (Tex. 2004).

2007Having properly pleaded a no-evidence summary judgment claim, the burden shifted to Kothmann to show a scintilla of summary judgment evidence raising a genuine fact issue as to each of these elements.           Claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty require expert testimony on the issues of breach and causation of damages where the determination of those issues “is not one that lay people would ordinarily be competent to make.†Arce v. Burrow , 958 S.W.2d 239, 252 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d in part , rev’d in part on other grounds , 997 S.W.2d 229 (Te

2023See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 825 (Tex. 2005) (“The standards for taking any case from the jury should be the same, no matter what motion is used.”).

2023See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 825 (Tex. 2005) (“The standards for taking any case from the jury should be the same, no matter what motion is used.”).

2019In addition, McKinney’s reliance on her verified motion to continue the trial and on the trial court’s trial-continuance ruling to preserve her issue is misplaced. “[A] motion for continuance of a trial setting does not preserve error for our review of the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment motion when no continuance of the no-evidence summary judgment hearing was sought.” Murtha, 2019 WL 2432150 , at *3 (citing Chamie v. Memorial Hermann Health Sys., 561 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)).

2019In addition, McKinney’s reliance on her verified motion to continue the trial and on the trial court’s trial-continuance ruling to preserve her issue is misplaced. “[A] motion for continuance of a trial setting does not preserve error for our review of the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment motion when no continuance of the no-evidence summary judgment hearing was sought.” Murtha, 2019 WL 2432150 , at *3 (citing Chamie v. Memorial Hermann Health Sys., 561 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.)).

2015Under the no-evidence summary judgment standard, "the party with the burden of proof at trial will have the same burden of proof in a summary judgment proceeding." Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v. Norris, 981 S. W.2d 797,799 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied), citing Esco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Sooner Pipe & Supply Cmp., 962 S.W.2d 193 ,197 n. 3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (commenting that under Rule 166a(i), "the plaintiff as the non-movant [has] the burden to raise a triable issue on each element essential to the plaintiffs case against each defendant").

2000Under the no-evidence summary judgment standard, “the party with the burden of proof at trial will have the same burden of proof in a summary judgment proceeding.” Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v. Norris, 981 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, petdenied).

2002Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).

2002Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).

2025Compare King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (“Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion’ of a fact.” (citation omitted)); with O’Hern v. Mughrabi, 579 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“However, conclusory statements are not probative evidence and accordingly will not suffice to establish a prima facie case.” (citation omitted)). 35 contract with C necessarily depends upon the prior performance by A of his contract with B and A fails to perform in order t

2025Compare King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (“Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion’ of a fact.” (citation omitted)); with O’Hern v. Mughrabi, 579 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“However, conclusory statements are not probative evidence and accordingly will not suffice to establish a prima facie case.” (citation omitted)). 35 contract with C necessarily depends upon the prior performance by A of his contract with B and A fails to perform in order t

2025Compare King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (“Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion’ of a fact.” (citation omitted)); with O’Hern v. Mughrabi, 579 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“However, conclusory statements are not probative evidence and accordingly will not suffice to establish a prima facie case.” (citation omitted)). 35 contract with C necessarily depends upon the prior performance by A of his contract with B and A fails to perform in order t

2020First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont, d/b/a the Anchor of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017) (when party moves for both traditional and no-evidence summary judgments, reviewing court first considers no-evidence motion); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

2017Tel, Inc. v. USLD Commc’ns, Inc., 291 S.W.3d 518, 532 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).

2016See Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); Similarly, the no-evidence summary judgment rule “requires that the moving party identify the grounds for the motion.” Timpte, 286 S,W.3d at 310.

2013Green v. McKay, 376 S.W.3d 891, 898-99 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied).

2008See id. at rule 166a(i).

2007Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006).

2005Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

2004"After the defendant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a fact issue." Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996). *490 Under the no-evidence summary judgment rule, the movant may move for summary judgment if there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial.

2004See McClure, 95 S.W.3d at 623 .