Wisconsin defendant in Illinois

2006The defendant in Adams , a Missouri casino, maintained a "gold card holder" program ( Adams, 338 Ill.App.3d at 748-49 , 273 Ill.Dec. 536 , 789 N.E.2d at 440 ), which presumably encouraged customers to maintain a continuing relationship with the Missouri gaming facility.

2006The defendant in Adams , a Missouri casino, maintained a "gold card holder" program ( Adams, 338 Ill.App.3d at 748-49 , 273 Ill.Dec. 536 , 789 N.E.2d at 440 ), which presumably encouraged customers to maintain a continuing relationship with the Missouri gaming facility.

1989Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court (1983), 99 Nev. 93, 97 , 658 P.2d 422, 424 .

1989Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court (1983), 99 Nev. 93, 97 , 658 P.2d 422, 424 .

1989Cir.1984), 738 F.2d 1352, 1357 .) Also, in Struebin v. State , wherein the Iowa Supreme Court refused to recognize the sovereign immunity of the State of Illinois, the supreme court of Iowa noted that the State of Iowa permits suits against Iowa under similar circumstances and permits full compensation. ( Struebin v. State (Iowa 1982), 322 N.W.2d 84, 86 .) Likewise, in Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court , wherein the Nevada Supreme Court would not recognize Wisconsin's claim of sovereign immunity, the court pointed out that had the same acts been committed in the State of Nevada, sover

1989(Struebin v. State (Iowa 1982), 322 N.W.2d 84, 86 .) Likewise, in Mianeeki v. Second Judicial District Court, wherein the Nevada Supreme Court would not recognize Wisconsin’s claim of sovereign immunity, the court pointed out that had the same acts been committed in the State of Nevada, sovereign immunity would not bar suit against that State.

1989Cir.1984), 738 F.2d 1352, 1357 .) Also, in Struebin v. State , wherein the Iowa Supreme Court refused to recognize the sovereign immunity of the State of Illinois, the supreme court of Iowa noted that the State of Iowa permits suits against Iowa under similar circumstances and permits full compensation. ( Struebin v. State (Iowa 1982), 322 N.W.2d 84, 86 .) Likewise, in Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court , wherein the Nevada Supreme Court would not recognize Wisconsin's claim of sovereign immunity, the court pointed out that had the same acts been committed in the State of Nevada, sover

1988Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Giliberto (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 90, 109-10 , 383 N.E.2d 977, 984-85 (a court may decline jurisdiction even though it may have proper jurisdiction over all parties and subject matter involved); Silversmith v. Kenosha Auto Transport (Iowa 1981), 301 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa plaintiff, Wyoming accident, Wisconsin defendant corporation registered to do business in Iowa).) In addition, the question whether Illinois has a significant relationship with a case’s subject matter may be considered in assessing a defendant’s jurisdictional challenge that involves the issue of doing

1988App. 3d at 843 , 453 N.E.2d at 1371 ), and in any event Bynum’s activities in Illinois are close to the doing-business borderline.

1988Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Giliberto (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 90, 109-10 , 383 N.E.2d 977, 984-85 (a court may decline jurisdiction even though it may have proper jurisdiction over all parties and subject matter involved); Silversmith v. Kenosha Auto Transport (Iowa 1981), 301 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa plaintiff, Wyoming accident, Wisconsin defendant corporation registered to do business in Iowa).) In addition, the question whether Illinois has a significant relationship with a case’s subject matter may be considered in assessing a defendant’s jurisdictional challenge that involves the issue of doing

1986The thrust of Wimmer is that the Act imposes a duty only on Illinois dramshops, and since Wisconsin dramshops are not “subject to the Act” ( 108 Ill. 2d 435, 443 ), the Act imposed no duty on the Wisconsin defendant and therefore no liability.

1986The thrust of Wimmer is that the Act imposes a duty only on Illinois dramshops, and since Wisconsin dramshops are not "subject to the Act" ( 108 Ill.2d 435, 443 ), the Act imposed no duty on the Wisconsin defendant and therefore no liability.

1978In Pedrick our supreme court declared that judgments n.o.v. should only be entered “in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” ( 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 .) In our view, the evidence in the instant case satisfactorily mandates that Hyster’s motion for a judgment n.o.v. was properly denied even under the Pedrick standard.

1978In Pedrick our supreme court declared that judgments n.o.v. should only be entered “in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” ( 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 .) In our view, the evidence in the instant case satisfactorily mandates that Hyster’s motion for a judgment n.o.v. was properly denied even under the Pedrick standard.

1973Some, of course, would go farther and adopt the Wisconsin rule (Jensen v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co. (1964), 23 Wis. 2d 344 , 127 N.W.2d 228 ) which holds remarriage or the possibility of it are proper factors for the jury’s consideration in assessing damages in a wrongful death action.

1973Some, of course, would go farther and adopt the Wisconsin rule (Jensen v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co. (1964), 23 Wis. 2d 344 , 127 N.W.2d 228 ) which holds remarriage or the possibility of it are proper factors for the jury’s consideration in assessing damages in a wrongful death action.

1973(See, also, Campbell v. Schmidt (Miss. 1967), 195 So. 2d 87 .) Conversely, plaintiffs, generally, urge that such revelation inevitably results in a greater likelihood of a not guilty verdict, or, at the very least, a diminution of the damages which would otherwise have been awarded, and that this occurs despite cautionary instructions by the judge that the plaintiff’s remarriage is totally irrelevant to the issues of liability and damages.

1973(See, also, Campbell v. Schmidt (Miss. 1967), 195 So. 2d 87 .) Conversely, plaintiffs, generally, urge that such revelation inevitably results in a greater likelihood of a not guilty verdict, or, at the very least, a diminution of the damages which would otherwise have been awarded, and that this occurs despite cautionary instructions by the judge that the plaintiff’s remarriage is totally irrelevant to the issues of liability and damages.