Wisconsin rule in California

2009(See State v. Klessig (1997) 211 Wis.2d 194 [ 564 N.W.2d 716, 723-724 ]; Brooks v. McCaughtry (7th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3d 1009, 1012-1013 [agreeing Wisconsin rule does not violate Godinez].) 12 In its recognition of the very different capacities needed to assist defense counsel and to act as one’s own counsel, the Edwards court echoes the Godinez dissent’s critique of equating competence to stand trial with competence to represent oneself: “A person who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin.” (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 413 (dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.)

2009(See State v. Klessig (1997) 211 Wis.2d 194 [ 564 N.W.2d 716, 723-724 ]; Brooks v. McCaughtry (7th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3d 1009, 1012-1013 [agreeing Wisconsin rule does not violate Godinez].) 12 In its recognition of the very different capacities needed to assist defense counsel and to act as one’s own counsel, the Edwards court echoes the Godinez dissent’s critique of equating competence to stand trial with competence to represent oneself: “A person who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin.” (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 413 (dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.)

2009(See State v. Klessig (1997) 211 Wis.2d 194 [ 564 N.W.2d 716, 723-724 ]; Brooks v. McCaughtry (7th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3d 1009, 1012-1013 [agreeing Wisconsin rule does not violate Godinez].) 12 In its recognition of the very different capacities needed to assist defense counsel and to act as one’s own counsel, the Edwards court echoes the Godinez dissent’s critique of equating competence to stand trial with competence to represent oneself: “A person who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin.” (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 413 (dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.)

2009Co. (1977) 77 Wis.2d 537, 544 [ 253 N.W.2d 512, 515 ] as not considering new “net whole” Wisconsin rule.) By contrast, Michigan includes “costs and expenses” in calculating whether an insured has been made whole, although an insurer that benefits by virtue of a subrogation clause may be required to deduct from its reimbursement claim a pro rata share of attorney fees under the common fund doctrine.

2009Co. (1977) 77 Wis.2d 537, 544 [ 253 N.W.2d 512, 515 ] as not considering new “net whole” Wisconsin rule.) By contrast, Michigan includes “costs and expenses” in calculating whether an insured has been made whole, although an insurer that benefits by virtue of a subrogation clause may be required to deduct from its reimbursement claim a pro rata share of attorney fees under the common fund doctrine.

1995The decision reversed an opinion by a New York appellate court that, relying on Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738 , held otherwise. [16] McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, supra, 486 U.S. 429 upheld the constitutionality of a Wisconsin rule of appellate procedure that "merely requires [an appointed attorney who has concluded any appellate issues would be without arguable merit and frivolous to] go one step further" ( id. at p. 442 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 455]) and file "a brief in which is stated anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal and a discussion of why *847

1995The decision reversed an opinion by a New York appellate court that, relying on Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738 , held otherwise. [16] McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, supra, 486 U.S. 429 upheld the constitutionality of a Wisconsin rule of appellate procedure that "merely requires [an appointed attorney who has concluded any appellate issues would be without arguable merit and frivolous to] go one step further" ( id. at p. 442 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 455]) and file "a brief in which is stated anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal and a discussion of why *847

1989Each, we think, is a governmental agency, which to fulfill its statutory function must be able to spend money on controversial matters. 16 In Lathrop v. Donohue, supra, 367 U.S. 820, 864-865 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 1191, 1217-1218 ], Justice Harlan, supporting the use of dues to finance lobbying by the Wisconsin bar, wrote: “I had supposed it beyond doubt that a state legislature could set up a stalf or commission to recommend changes in the more or less technical areas of the law into which no well-advised laymen would venture without the assistance of counsel. ...

1989Each, we think, is a governmental agency, which to fulfill its statutory function must be able to spend money on controversial matters. 16 In Lathrop v. Donohue, supra, 367 U.S. 820, 864-865 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 1191, 1217-1218 ], Justice Harlan, supporting the use of dues to finance lobbying by the Wisconsin bar, wrote: “I had supposed it beyond doubt that a state legislature could set up a stalf or commission to recommend changes in the more or less technical areas of the law into which no well-advised laymen would venture without the assistance of counsel. ...

1976The court in Templeton, though not ruling on this precise matter, did note the Wisconsin rule allowing a remitting plaintiff to appeal the issue of damages when the defendant has first appealed from the judgment. ( 69 Cal.2d at p. 469, fn. 5 , citing Plesko v. Milwaukee, supra.) The Wisconsin court fully discussed the situation posed by the instant case in explicating the basis for its decision: “The objective underlying the recommended procedure for granting an option to accept judgment for a reduced amount of damages in lieu of having a new trial, where the damages awarded by the jury are de

1976The court in Templeton, though not ruling on this precise matter, did note the Wisconsin rule allowing a remitting plaintiff to appeal the issue of damages when the defendant has first appealed from the judgment. ( 69 Cal.2d at p. 469, fn. 5 , citing Plesko v. Milwaukee, supra.) The Wisconsin court fully discussed the situation posed by the instant case in explicating the basis for its decision: “The objective underlying the recommended procedure for granting an option to accept judgment for a reduced amount of damages in lieu of having a new trial, where the damages awarded by the jury are de