Wisconsin rule in Oregon

1989In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 US 429 , 108 S Ct 1895 , 100 L Ed2d 440 (1988), the Court upheld a Wisconsin rule of appellate procedure that requires court-appointed counsel moving to withdraw to file a brief identifying anything in the record arguably supporting the appeal and “a discussion of why the issue lacks merit.” Counsel for the defendant on appeal had filed a brief containing a statement of facts, four arguments for reversal, a prayer for reversal, a statement that further appellate proceedings on behalf of the defendant would be frivolous and without any arguable mer

1989In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 US 429 , 108 S Ct 1895 , 100 L Ed2d 440 (1988), the Court upheld a Wisconsin rule of appellate procedure that requires court-appointed counsel moving to withdraw to file a brief identifying anything in the record arguably supporting the appeal and “a discussion of why the issue lacks merit.” Counsel for the defendant on appeal had filed a brief containing a statement of facts, four arguments for reversal, a prayer for reversal, a statement that further appellate proceedings on behalf of the defendant would be frivolous and without any arguable mer

1966In a similar case, a California court commented on the Wisconsin rule: “* * * The reasoning upon which the above doctrine is based is obviously sound, and there would appear to be no sufficient legal ground upon which its rejection here could reasonably be justified.” Nelson v. Superior Court, 26 Cal App2d 119, 122, 78 P2d 1037, 1038 .

1966In a similar case, a California court commented on the Wisconsin rule: “* * * The reasoning upon which the above doctrine is based is obviously sound, and there would appear to be no sufficient legal ground upon which its rejection here could reasonably be justified.” Nelson v. Superior Court, 26 Cal App2d 119, 122, 78 P2d 1037, 1038 .

1939Co., 216 Wis 265, 257 N. W. 140 , .the court, in explanation of the Wisconsin rule, said: “If the obligation to institute a diligent search were required, it could only be upon some ground of policy. ” Virtually all of the courts, however, deem search and inquiry indispensable elements of the presumption rule.

1939Co., 216 Wis 265, 257 N. W. 140 , .the court, in explanation of the Wisconsin rule, said: “If the obligation to institute a diligent search were required, it could only be upon some ground of policy. ” Virtually all of the courts, however, deem search and inquiry indispensable elements of the presumption rule.

1939The Wisconsin rule had its inception with Cowan v. Lindsay, 30 Wis. 586 , wherein Greenleaf’s early explanation of the rule was accepted literally.

1939The Wisconsin rule had its inception with Cowan v. Lindsay, 30 Wis. 586 , wherein Greenleaf’s early explanation of the rule was accepted literally.

1939The *71 extreme of the Wisconsin rule developed in Ewing v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 191 Wis. 299 , 210 N. W. 819 , wherein it appeared that the missing person, a Mrs. Ewing, left her home because conditions there were unsatisfactory.

1939The *71 extreme of the Wisconsin rule developed in Ewing v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 191 Wis. 299 , 210 N. W. 819 , wherein it appeared that the missing person, a Mrs. Ewing, left her home because conditions there were unsatisfactory.

1915An offer requiring the payment of $1 for each ton of rock treated was sustained in Perine etc. Co. v. Quackenbush, 104 Cal. 684 ( 38 Pac. 533 ), although that court had previously adopted what has commonly been known as the "Wisconsin rule: See Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 .

1915Offers made by patentees to all contractors and requiring the payment of a royalty only have been sustained in the following cases: State ex rel. v. Shawnee County, 57 Kan. 267 ( 45 Pac. 616 ); Lacoste v. City of New Orleans, 119 La. 470 ( 44 South. 267 ); Dillingham v. Spartanburg, 75 S. C. 549 ( 56 S. E. 381 , 117 Am.

1915Offers made by patentees to all contractors and requiring the payment of a royalty only have been sustained in the following cases: State ex rel. v. Shawnee County, 57 Kan. 267 ( 45 Pac. 616 ); Lacoste v. City of New Orleans, 119 La. 470 ( 44 South. 267 ); Dillingham v. Spartanburg, 75 S. C. 549 ( 56 S. E. 381 , 117 Am.

1915There are two rules: One is known as the Wisconsin rule, as found in Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590 ( 99 Am.

1915There are two rules: One is known as the Wisconsin rule, as found in Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590 ( 99 Am.

1915Dec. 205 ), while Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 246 ( 97 Am.

1915Dec. 205 ), while Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 246 ( 97 Am.

1915Offers made by patentees to all contractors and requiring the payment of a royalty only have been sustained in the following cases: State ex rel. v. Shawnee County, 57 Kan. 267 ( 45 Pac. 616 ); Lacoste v. City of New Orleans, 119 La. 470 ( 44 South. 267 ); Dillingham v. Spartanburg, 75 S. C. 549 ( 56 S. E. 381 , 117 Am.

1915Law, 351; Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 ; Fishburn v. Chicago, 171 Ill. 338 ( 49 N. E. 532 , 63 Am.

1915Law, 351; Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 ; Fishburn v. Chicago, 171 Ill. 338 ( 49 N. E. 532 , 63 Am.

1915An offer requiring the payment of $1 for each ton of rock treated was sustained in Perine etc. Co. v. Quackenbush, 104 Cal. 684 ( 38 Pac. 533 ), although that court had previously adopted what has commonly been known as the "Wisconsin rule: See Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699 .

1915The plaintiffs herein contend that this court is committed to the Wisconsin rule, and cite Terwilliger Land Co. v. Portland, 62 Or. 101 ( 123 Pac. 57 ), to verify their claim.

1915The plaintiffs herein contend that this court is committed to the Wisconsin rule, and cite Terwilliger Land Co. v. Portland, 62 Or. 101 ( 123 Pac. 57 ), to verify their claim.

1915Offers made by patentees to all contractors and requiring the payment of a royalty only have been sustained in the following cases: State ex rel. v. Shawnee County, 57 Kan. 267 ( 45 Pac. 616 ); Lacoste v. City of New Orleans, 119 La. 470 ( 44 South. 267 ); Dillingham v. Spartanburg, 75 S. C. 549 ( 56 S. E. 381 , 117 Am.