Wisconsin rule in Texas

2008App. 43.3, which authorizes a court of appeals, when reversing a trial court's judgment, to "render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered." See Collier , 784 S.W.2d at 784 (Keasler, J., concurring) ("judgment that the trial court should have rendered" under Rule 43.3 can only be a judgment that trial court was capable of rendering, given the jury instructions, and if jury is only instructed on one offense, then trial court can render only judgment on that offense or a judgment of acquittal) and at 785 (rendering judgment on lesser-included offense is not simply "modifying" jud

2008APP . 43.3, which authorizes a court of appeals, when reversing a trial court’s judgment, to “render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered.” See Collier, 784 S.W.2d at 784 (Keasler, J., concurring) (“judgment that the trial court should have rendered” under Rule 43.3 can only be a judgment that trial court was capable of rendering, given the jury instructions, and if jury is only instructed on one offense, then trial court can render only judgment on that offense or a judgment of acquittal) and at 785 (rendering judgment on lesser-included offense is not simply “modifying” jud

2017June 27, 2016) (holding that even after Obergefell , the "fundamental right to marry" does not include "the right to obtain a visa for an alien spouse"); Solomon v. Guidry , 155 A.3d 1218 , 1221 (Vt. 2016) ("[B]ecause civil marriage and civil unions remain legally distinct entities in Vermont and because Obergefell mandated that states recognize only same-sex marriage , uncertainty remains as to whether Obergefell requires other states to recognize and dissolve civil unions established in Vermont."); In re P.L.L.-R. , 366 Wis.2d 134 , 876 N.W.2d 147 , 153 (2015) (" Obergefell did not answer qu

2017June 27, 2016) (holding that even after Obergefell , the "fundamental right to marry" does not include "the right to obtain a visa for an alien spouse"); Solomon v. Guidry , 155 A.3d 1218 , 1221 (Vt. 2016) ("[B]ecause civil marriage and civil unions remain legally distinct entities in Vermont and because Obergefell mandated that states recognize only same-sex marriage , uncertainty remains as to whether Obergefell requires other states to recognize and dissolve civil unions established in Vermont."); In re P.L.L.-R. , 366 Wis.2d 134 , 876 N.W.2d 147 , 153 (2015) (" Obergefell did not answer qu

2015Finally, the Canterbury court's decision--which, as the Martin court underscored last term, provides the basis for Wisconsin's doctrine of informed consent, Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 173 --states explicitly that under the doctrine of informed consent, "there is no bright line separating the significant from the insignificant." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788 .

2015Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 172-73 ; Platta, 68 Wis. 2d at 60 ; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788 .

1984Minnesota has adopted the "Wisconsin rule." See Busch v. Busch Construction Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn.1977); see also Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 723, 748-51 (1974); Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1 comment (1977).

1984Minnesota has adopted the “Wisconsin rule.” See Busch v. Busch Construction Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn.1977); see also Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 723, 748-51 (1974); Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1 comment (1977).

1984In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Company, 81 N.J. 150 , 406 A.2d 140, 145-46 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court also applied its comparative negligence statute to strict liability in tort.

1984In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Company, 81 N.J. 150 , 406 A.2d 140, 145-46 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court also applied its comparative negligence statute to strict liability in tort.