thrust defense in Massachusetts

2023See Caruso, supra. At sidebar before Nunez testified, the judge stated that "the entire thrust of the defense here . . . is fabrication" and that Nunez's testimony about the victim's disclosure "rebuts the accusation of fabrication, particularly given the fact that [the victim] did not remember mentioning any sexual assault until years after it had occurred." The judge thus determined that Nunez's testimony was "relevant to the jury's determination of the weight that they should give the evidence in light of the defense of fabrication." This was within the judge's discretion.

2023See id. at 285 ("trial judges have broad discretion to determine whether circumstances warrant the admission of prior consistent statements to rebut a claim of a recent fabrication"). 13 3.

2005Although the entire thrust of the defense was that the husband, rather than the defendant, had committed the crimes, and substantial third-party culprit evidence developed during both the case-in-chief as well as the defendant’s case, the judge never instructed the jury that, “[w]ith respect to the critical issue of identification, the Commonwealth has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the [crimes alleged in the indictments].” Commonwealth v. Farley, 443 Mass. 740 , 745- 746 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 396 Mass. 702, 709 (1

2005The court may direct that books, papers, documents, or objects designated in the summons be produced before the court within a reasonable time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents, objects, or portions thereof to be inspected and copied by the parties and their attorneys if authorized by law.” Although the Lampron and Lam courts cited United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974), and the four factors set forth in that case as providing interpretative guidance for the standards w

2005Although the entire thrust of the defense was that the husband, rather than the defendant, had committed the crimes, and substantial third-party culprit evidence developed during both the case-in-chief as well as the defendant’s case, the judge never instructed the jury that, “[w]ith respect to the critical issue of identification, the Commonwealth has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the [crimes alleged in the indictments].” Commonwealth v. Farley, 443 Mass. 740 , 745- 746 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 396 Mass. 702, 709 (1

2000See Commonwealth v. Dunn, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 58, 60 (1997) (a consensual entry does not fall within the purview of G.

1995Commonwealth v. Gould, 413 Mass. 707, 712 (1992).

1992See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 370-372 (1985) (inappropriate characterization of core of defense strategy did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice).