bail hearing in Maryland

2004Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman, the intermediate appellate court held that an independent bail hearing was not, in and of itself, a “critical stage of the criminal proceedings within the constitutional concept of that term contemplated by Coleman.” Hebron, 13 Md.App. at 140 , 281 A.2d at 550 .

2004Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman, the intermediate appellate court held that an independent bail hearing was not, in and of itself, a “critical stage of the criminal proceedings within the constitutional concept of that term contemplated by Coleman.” Hebron, 13 Md.App. at 140 , 281 A.2d at 550 .

2014Cf. DeWolfe v. Richmond, 434 Md. 444 , 76 A.3d 1019 (2013) (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled, under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, to State-furnished counsel at an initial bail hearing before a District Court commissioner without deciding whether that right also emanates from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

2014Cf. DeWolfe v. Richmond, 434 Md. 444 , 76 A.3d 1019 (2013) (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled, under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, to State-furnished counsel at an initial bail hearing before a District Court commissioner without deciding whether that right also emanates from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

2013In Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347 , 464 A.2d 228 (1983), this Court stated: A defendant’s actual incarceration in a jail, as a result of a proceeding at which he was unrepresented by counsel and did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, is fundamentally unfair.

2013In Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347 , 464 A.2d 228 (1983), this Court stated: A defendant’s actual incarceration in a jail, as a result of a proceeding at which he was unrepresented by counsel and did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel, is fundamentally unfair.

2013That probable cause was established 1) by the arrest warrant issued on February 16, 2011; 2) confirmed by the bail hearing on February 23, 2011; 3) reconfirmed by the Grand Jury indictment filed on April 6, 2011, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 119 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854 ; and 4) confirmed again by the arrest warrant issued on April 15, 2011.

2013That probable cause was established 1) by the arrest warrant issued on February 16, 2011; 2) confirmed by the bail hearing on February 23, 2011; 3) reconfirmed by the Grand Jury indictment filed on April 6, 2011, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 119 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854 ; and 4) confirmed again by the arrest warrant issued on April 15, 2011.

2006That holding, 355 Md. at 426 , 735 A.2d 1003 , established that although the District Court is an appropriate forum for satisfying Rule 4-215(a) in a case in which the District Court has jurisdiction to try the case, but when the defendant demands a jury trial, the District Court is not the appropriate forum for satisfaction in a case in which exclusive jurisdiction is in the circuit court and the District Court is simply engaged in the preliminary skirmish of conducting a bail hearing. [A] circuit court judge with exclusive original jurisdiction may not determine that Johnson waived counsel b

2006That holding, 355 Md. at 426 , 735 A.2d 1003 , established that although the District Court is an appropriate forum for satisfying Rule 4-215(a) in a case in which the District Court has jurisdiction to try the case, but when the defendant demands a jury trial, the District Court is not the appropriate forum for satisfaction in a case in which exclusive jurisdiction is in the circuit court and the District Court is simply engaged in the preliminary skirmish of conducting a bail hearing. [A] circuit court judge with exclusive original jurisdiction may not determine that Johnson waived counsel b

2004If an accused who is represented by counsel and who is made aware of his fifth amendment right volunteers a statement deemed helpful to his position at a bail hearing, there is no logical reason why that statement could not be used against him at trial.” Schmidt, 60 Md.App. at 95 , 481 A.2d at 245 .

2004If an accused who is represented by counsel and who is made aware of his fifth amendment right volunteers a statement deemed helpful to his position at a bail hearing, there is no logical reason why that statement could not be used against him at trial.” Schmidt, 60 Md.App. at 95 , 481 A.2d at 245 .

1984Former *96 Md.Rule 736 a 4 [see new Rule 4-252(a)(4) ]; Kohr v. State, 40 Md.App. 92 , 388 A.2d 1242 (1978).

1984Former *96 Md.Rule 736 a 4 [see new Rule 4-252(a)(4) ]; Kohr v. State, 40 Md.App. 92 , 388 A.2d 1242 (1978).

1972In Billings v. State, 10 Md.