bail hearing in Rhode Island

1978I, §9; he was, after all, granted bail on both the November and December 1977 charge. 5 The question in Massey v. Mullen, 117 R.I. 272 , 366 A.2d 1144 (1976), was whether a confession obtained in violation of the Miranda guidelines could be used in an initial bail hearing to establish that “proof of guilt [of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment] is evident or the presumption great”; upon such a showing by the state in the case of such a crime, R.I.

1978I, §9; he was, after all, granted bail on both the November and December 1977 charge. 5 The question in Massey v. Mullen, 117 R.I. 272 , 366 A.2d 1144 (1976), was whether a confession obtained in violation of the Miranda guidelines could be used in an initial bail hearing to establish that “proof of guilt [of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment] is evident or the presumption great”; upon such a showing by the state in the case of such a crime, R.I.

1973Because the Superior Court is in a better position than Supreme Court to conduct a proper bail hearing, the instant petition is denied without prejudice and it together with the papers in the case are transmitted to that court with direction that it consider the petition as if originally filed therein, and that it forthwith hold a hearing thereon for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner, under the guidelines enunciated in Quattrocchi v. Langlois, supra, is entitled to be admitted to bail pending hearing on his appeals.

1973I. 741, 219 A.2d 570 (1966) is entitled to be admitted to bail pending hearing on his appeal.

2021Arguably, one of these “constitutional danger zones” is implicated in the case at bar, because defendant had argued that, at the time of Gonzalez’s identification at the bail hearing, defendant was the “only African American male at the [defense] table, and was shackled in handcuffs.”8 Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the in-court identification here was impermissibly suggestive, that does not necessarily render the identification inadmissible, because “admission of tainted identification testimony does not violate a defendant’s due process rights, so long as the identificatio

2021Having thoroughly reviewed Gonzalez’s testimony, we hold that the trial justice did not err in finding that the identification had “sufficient aspects of reliability.” Franco, 750 A.2d at 420 (quoting Vanover, 721 A.2d at 436 ).

2021Arguably, one of these “constitutional danger zones” is implicated in the case at bar, because defendant had argued that, at the time of Gonzalez’s identification at the bail hearing, defendant was the “only African American male at the [defense] table, and was shackled in handcuffs.”8 Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the in-court identification here was impermissibly suggestive, that does not necessarily render the identification inadmissible, because “admission of tainted identification testimony does not violate a defendant’s due process rights, so long as the identificatio

2021Having thoroughly reviewed Gonzalez’s testimony, we hold that the trial justice did not err in finding that the identification had “sufficient aspects of reliability.” Franco, 750 A.2d at 420 (quoting Vanover, 721 A.2d at 436 ).

2021In fact, [defendant] capitalized her [sic] in cross-examination on her misidentification of two other individuals, knowing that she had previously misidentified other individuals.” 6 Although the trial justice referred to the case as “United States v. Thompson,” it is clear from his recitation of the facts, issue, and holding that he was referring to United States v. Thomas, 849 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2017). -9- Next, the trial justice examined the reliability of Gonzalez’s testimony utilizing the factors set out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

2021In ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial justice rejected defendant’s argument that Gonzalez’s identification was impermissibly suggestive due to the fact that defendant was the “only African American male at the [defense] -8- table, and was shackled in handcuffs.” The trial justice explained that most federal circuit courts have rejected similar arguments and discussed United States v. Thomas, 849 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2017),6 as one such example.

2021In fact, [defendant] capitalized her [sic] in cross-examination on her misidentification of two other individuals, knowing that she had previously misidentified other individuals.” 6 Although the trial justice referred to the case as “United States v. Thompson,” it is clear from his recitation of the facts, issue, and holding that he was referring to United States v. Thomas, 849 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2017). -9- Next, the trial justice examined the reliability of Gonzalez’s testimony utilizing the factors set out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

2009Notably, this witness first testified that they studied a map right before trial, two years after the death of Andrews, but subsequently testified that it was around the time of the bail hearing. 4 .Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 5 .

2009Notably, this witness first testified that they studied a map right before trial, two years after the death of Andrews, but subsequently testified that it was around the time of the bail hearing. 4 .Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 5 .

2000As the First Circuit observed in the case of United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.1985): "Long ago the courts rejected the notion that the testimony of co-defendants and other interested witnesses was so likely to be unreliable that it should be excluded. * * * Recognizing that such individuals were frequently the most knowledgeable witnesses available, the courts have chosen to allow them to testify and to rely upon cross-examination to ferret out any false testimony they might give." Id. at 196 .

2000As the First Circuit observed in the case of United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.1985): "Long ago the courts rejected the notion that the testimony of co-defendants and other interested witnesses was so likely to be unreliable that it should be excluded. * * * Recognizing that such individuals were frequently the most knowledgeable witnesses available, the courts have chosen to allow them to testify and to rely upon cross-examination to ferret out any false testimony they might give." Id. at 196 .

1995He cites State v. Wiggs, supra, and State v. Chase, 588 A.2d 120 (R.I.1991), in support of the proposition that if the state presents insufficient evidence to support a violation charge in respect to a matter for which a defendant has been indicted and the hearing justice finds that the offense has not been established, this collaterally estops the state from attempting to prove the charges at a plenary trial.

1995He cites State v. Wiggs, supra, and State v. Chase, 588 A.2d 120 (R.I.1991), in support of the proposition that if the state presents insufficient evidence to support a violation charge in respect to a matter for which a defendant has been indicted and the hearing justice finds that the offense has not been established, this collaterally estops the state from attempting to prove the charges at a plenary trial.

1989Id.

1988In State v. Lewis, 467 A.2d 1387 (R.I.1983), we emphasized that the prosecution is obligated to preserve discoverable evidence, but we also emphasized that a failure to do so does not necessarily warrant the imposition of sanctions.

1979On December 14, 1978, defendants were afforded a bail hearing in accordance with the principles enunciated in Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 R.I. 596 , 253 A.2d 609 (1969), and were committed without bail.

1979On December 14, 1978, defendants were afforded a bail hearing in accordance with the principles enunciated in Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 R.I. 596 , 253 A.2d 609 (1969), and were committed without bail.

1978Cf. State v. Skirvin, 113 R.I. 443, 448 , 322 A.2d 297, 300 (1974) (“there was nothing informal in the manner in which the bail hearing was conducted”). 6 We realize, as did the court in State v. Spratt, 120 R.I. 192 , 386 A.2d 1094 (1978), that specific instances of police misconduct may arise that will force us to reassess the need for application of the exclusionary rule.

1978Cf. State v. Skirvin, 113 R.I. 443, 448 , 322 A.2d 297, 300 (1974) (“there was nothing informal in the manner in which the bail hearing was conducted”). 6 We realize, as did the court in State v. Spratt, 120 R.I. 192 , 386 A.2d 1094 (1978), that specific instances of police misconduct may arise that will force us to reassess the need for application of the exclusionary rule.

1976State v. Tucker, 101 N.J.

1975He points out that futile acts by the moving party to establish due diligence are not required citing People v. Horn, 225 Cal. App.2d 1 , 36 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1964); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 506 , 247 S.W. 373 (1923).

1975He points out that futile acts by the moving party to establish due diligence are not required citing People v. Horn, 225 Cal. App.2d 1 , 36 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1964); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 506 , 247 S.W. 373 (1923).

1975He points out that futile acts by the moving party to establish due diligence are not required citing People v. Horn, 225 Cal. App.2d 1 , 36 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1964); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 506 , 247 S.W. 373 (1923).

1975He points out that futile acts by the moving party to establish due diligence are not required citing People v. Horn, 225 Cal. App.2d 1 , 36 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1964); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 506 , 247 S.W. 373 (1923).