bail hearing in Massachusetts

2010In Torres, supra at 507 , after evaluating these three factors, we concluded that “[cjonducting a bail hearing for a defendant found incompetent to stand trial does not per se violate that defendant’s due process rights,” but recognized that “each case may require some assessment by the hearing judge of whether the defendant’s mental condition prevents any meaningful communication with counsel, such that the court will be unable to obtain the information necessary to set a proper bail.” We recognized in Torres that a defendant’s interest in a bail proceeding — his freedom from restraint pendin

2010As to this factor, we considered both “the specific nature of the inquiry undertaken at a bail hearing, as well as the extent and nature of the incompetency.” Id. at 504 .

2020As we observed in Querubin, 440 Mass. at 118 , in most bail proceedings, 41 "[t]he necessary determination can be adequately presented and decided based on documents (e.g., police reports, witness statements, letters from employers and others, and probation records) and the representations of counsel." The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at a bail hearing, see Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 234 , and counsel should be given the opportunity to address (1) the defendant's CARI report, including especially the nature of any defaults; (2) the police report, or the prosecution's versio

2010With respect to the nature of the inquiry, we noted that “the factors that a judge is to consider when conducting a bail hearing are ‘(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, (2) the accused’s family ties, (3) his financial resources, (4) his length of residence in the community, (5) his character and mental condition, (6) his record of convictions and appearances at court proceedings or of any previous flight to avoid prosecution or (7) any failure to appear at any court proceedings.’ ” Id., quoting Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108 , 115 n.6 (2003).

1999This court has, however, inferred from the six-hour limit on police questioning, see Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996), that bail hearings should be held within roughly six hours of booking.

1997In Commonwealth v. Chistolini, 422 Mass. 854, 856 (1996), however, the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the bright line six-hour limit on police questioning, see Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996), as suggestive of the permissible outer limit of confinement prior to. a bail hearing.

2004Hinnant is not able to communicate with his lawyer and is unable to comprehend the charges against him; he presents just such a claim.” Torres contends finally that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), eviscerates any legitimate interest the Commonwealth might otherwise have in holding a bail hearing, because it forbids the indefinite commitment of an incompetent defendant “solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial.” Id. at 731 .

2004Hinnant is not able to communicate with his lawyer and is unable to comprehend the charges against him; he presents just such a claim.” Torres contends finally that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), eviscerates any legitimate interest the Commonwealth might otherwise have in holding a bail hearing, because it forbids the indefinite commitment of an incompetent defendant “solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial.” Id. at 731 .

2010The juvenile, however, has not identified any case where we have equated a defendant’s right to be physically present at all critical stages of the criminal process with an incompetent defendant’s due process rights. 8 In contrast, the petitioner in Hinnant, petitioner, 424 Mass. 900 (1997), where we concluded that a hearing on rendition could not proceed while the petitioner was incompetent, had a closed head injury that rendered him “literally unable to communicate with counsel.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 505 (2004) (Torres'). 9 The judge at a dangerousness hearing may also cons

2010As in Torres and in contrast to Hinnant, petitioner, 424 Mass. 900 (1997), the judge found that the juvenile, “with his somewhat limited abilities, can participate in the [§ 58A] hearing.” The risk of strategic error is no greater at a dangerousness hearing than a bail hearing, because the defendant’s or juvenile’s interests are clear (to obtain his release on conditions and avoid a finding of dangerousness), the hearing cannot be waived (because the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence), and the defendant or juvenile almost never testifies.

1999Chistolini, supra at 857 .

1997In Commonwealth v. Chistolini, 422 Mass. 854, 856 (1996), however, the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the bright line six-hour limit on police questioning, see Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996), as suggestive of the permissible outer limit of confinement prior to. a bail hearing.

1999There has been no allegation in this case that the bail magistrate’s delay in conducting the bail hearing was based on his belief that the defendant could not understand the proceedings, and the evidence does not suggest that the defendant was unable to do so. 4 Because the bail magistrate was not justified in refusing on public safety grounds to come to the barracks to conduct a bail hearing, he failed to fulfil his obligations under § 58, which states that he “shall” conduct such a hearing on being notified of the individual’s arrest, see Hampe, supra at 519 , and under Rule 14 of the Rules

1999There has been no allegation in this case that the bail magistrate’s delay in conducting the bail hearing was based on his belief that the defendant could not understand the proceedings, and the evidence does not suggest that the defendant was unable to do so. 4 Because the bail magistrate was not justified in refusing on public safety grounds to come to the barracks to conduct a bail hearing, he failed to fulfil his obligations under § 58, which states that he “shall” conduct such a hearing on being notified of the individual’s arrest, see Hampe, supra at 519 , and under Rule 14 of the Rules

2025See id. at 698 , citing Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 504 (2004) (relevant bail factors include defendant's criminal record and prior defaults, family and residential ties to community, financial resources, character and mental condition, as well as nature and circumstances of offense).

2025See Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 289 (1983) ("When a claim is raised under rule 36, the docket and minutes of the clerk are prima facie evidence of the facts recorded therein").

2019See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), quoting Carlson v. Landon , 342 U.S. 524 , 545, 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) ("The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.

2019See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), quoting Carlson v. Landon , 342 U.S. 524 , 545, 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) ("The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.

2019See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), quoting Carlson v. Landon , 342 U.S. 524 , 545, 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) ("The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.

2019See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), quoting Carlson v. Landon , 342 U.S. 524 , 545, 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) ("The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.

2019See United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), quoting Carlson v. Landon , 342 U.S. 524 , 545, 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) ("The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.

2017So ordered. 2 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial.

2010Cf. Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 375 (2008) (sexual dangerousness).

2005Compare Commonwealth v. King, 429 Mass. 169, 174-76 (1999) (noting that a clerk-magistrate was not justified in refusing on public safety grounds to come to the police barracks to conduct a bail hearing).

2005See also Commonwealth v. Rosewarne, 410 Mass. 53, 55-56 (1991) (police violated rights of defendant in custody for operating under the influence of alcohol when they obstructed his efforts to secure his release on bail).

2005With respect to bail issues, a Superior Court judge “has the inherent authority to deny a defendant’s motion for admittance to bail where bail will not reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance before the court,” Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 114 (2003), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 276, 282 (1981); and a Juvenile Court judge has inherent power to revoke a juvenile’s bail for his violation of his conditions of release, see Jake J. v. Commonwealth, supra at 78.

2004“Minimum due process varies with context.” Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 274 (1982).

2004L. c. 276, § 57, provides in relevant part: “A justice of the . . . superior court . . . may inquire into the case and admit [a] prisoner or witness to bail if he determines that such release will reasonably assure the appearance of the person before the court and will not endanger the safety of any other person or the community While this section of the bail statute makes no mention of a bail hearing or a defendant’s right to participate in such a hearing, 2 it has long been the law in the Commonwealth that a “defendant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the matter of bail

2004Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319-20 (1991); Hartford v. Hartford, 60 Mass.App.Ct. 446, 451-52 (2004).

2004See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (preliminary hearing at which defendant held over for prosecution and bail is set is “critical stage” at which defendant entitled to counsel); Commonwealth v. Priestley, 419 Mass. 678 , 682 n.5 (1995) (“The opportunity to be admitted to bail protects an arrestee’s liberty interest”); McClain v. Swenson, 435 F.2d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1970) (“Coleman [v. Alabama, supra,] stands for the proposition that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage and that counsel is essential at that proceeding to protect the accused against any er

2004See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (preliminary hearing at which defendant held over for prosecution and bail is set is “critical stage” at which defendant entitled to counsel); Commonwealth v. Priestley, 419 Mass. 678 , 682 n.5 (1995) (“The opportunity to be admitted to bail protects an arrestee’s liberty interest”); McClain v. Swenson, 435 F.2d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1970) (“Coleman [v. Alabama, supra,] stands for the proposition that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage and that counsel is essential at that proceeding to protect the accused against any er

2004See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (preliminary hearing at which defendant held over for prosecution and bail is set is “critical stage” at which defendant entitled to counsel); Commonwealth v. Priestley, 419 Mass. 678 , 682 n.5 (1995) (“The opportunity to be admitted to bail protects an arrestee’s liberty interest”); McClain v. Swenson, 435 F.2d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1970) (“Coleman [v. Alabama, supra,] stands for the proposition that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage and that counsel is essential at that proceeding to protect the accused against any er

2004Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319-20 (1991); Hartford v. Hartford, 60 Mass.App.Ct. 446, 451-52 (2004).