bail hearing in Texas

2010One of our sister courts has extended Simmons to hold that “a defendant may testify in a bail hearing regarding his ability to make bail without subjecting himself to cross-examination on the nature and circumstances of the offense with which he is charged.” Ex Parte Homan, 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 962 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim.

2010One of our sister courts has extended Simmons to hold that “a defendant may testify in a bail hearing regarding his ability to make bail without subjecting himself to cross-examination on the nature and circumstances of the offense with which he is charged.” Ex Parte Homan, 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996), pet. dism’d, im,providently granted, 962 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Avila v. State, 856 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, pet. ref'd) (citing Simmons for the proposition that a person may not be required to surrender one constitutional right to assert another wi

1998The "substantial showing" burden of the accused's guilt at the bail hearing is far less than the trial burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. Crim.App.1985). *658 The State must also establish that the jury will assess appellant the death penalty.

1998The burden of a “substantial showing” of the accused’s guilt at the bail hearing is far less than the trial burden of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

2010App. 1998); see also Avila v. State, 856 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, pet. ref’d) (citing Simmons for the proposition that a person may not be required to surrender one constitutional right to assert another with regard to testifying about the voluntariness of her statement outside the jury’s presence).

2010One of our sister courts has extended Simmons to hold that “a defendant may testify in a bail hearing regarding his ability to make bail without subjecting himself to cross-examination on the nature and circumstances of the offense with which he is charged.” Ex Parte Homan, 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996), pet. dism’d, im,providently granted, 962 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Avila v. State, 856 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, pet. ref'd) (citing Simmons for the proposition that a person may not be required to surrender one constitutional right to assert another wi

2008See Faheem-El v. Klincar , 841 F.2d 712 , 728-29 (7th Cir. 1988). 5 Although Code of Criminal Procedure article 15.21 uses the term "office," this appears to be a typographical error, because the bill adopting this provision uses the term "officer." See Act of May 27, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 722 , 1965 Tex. Gen.

2008See Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1988).

2006In doing so, the court quoted the Washington Supreme Court: “[T]o find that [the defendant] invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on the present charges merely by requesting the appointment of counsel at his arraignment on the unrelated charge is to disregard the ordinary meaning of that request.” Id. at 178-79 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 (quoting State v. Stewart, 113 Wash.2d 462 , 780 P.2d 844, 849 (1989)).

2006In doing so, the court quoted the Washington Supreme Court: “[T]o find that [the defendant] invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on the present charges merely by requesting the appointment of counsel at his arraignment on the unrelated charge is to disregard the ordinary meaning of that request.” Id. at 178-79 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 (quoting State v. Stewart, 113 Wash.2d 462 , 780 P.2d 844, 849 (1989)).

2005See Lape v. State , 893 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence of previous false accusation against defendant admissible to show witness’s bias); Thomas v. State , 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (same).

2005See Lape v. State, 893 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence of previous false accusation against defendant admissible to show witness’s bias); Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (same).

2005See Lape v. State , 893 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence of previous false accusation against defendant admissible to show witness’s bias); Thomas v. State , 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (same).

2005See Lape v. State, 893 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence of previous false accusation against defendant admissible to show witness’s bias); Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (same).

2024JOHNSON — 9 such as a matter of sound policy.”29 In answering that question “no,” the Court observed, “If a suspect does not wish to communicate with the police except through an attorney, he can simply tell them that when they give him the Miranda warnings.”30 The Supreme Court found it significant that the interrogations in McNeil were about offenses other than the one on which the bail hearing was held because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific while the Miranda right to counsel is not.31 Under Michigan v. Jackson,32 an attempt to interrogate McNeil on the offense that

2024JOHNSON — 9 such as a matter of sound policy.”29 In answering that question “no,” the Court observed, “If a suspect does not wish to communicate with the police except through an attorney, he can simply tell them that when they give him the Miranda warnings.”30 The Supreme Court found it significant that the interrogations in McNeil were about offenses other than the one on which the bail hearing was held because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific while the Miranda right to counsel is not.31 Under Michigan v. Jackson,32 an attempt to interrogate McNeil on the offense that

1997Id.; accord Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d at 556 (rejecting Robinson’s proffer of collateral estoppel since, among other things, he was not previously placed in jeopardy via an examining trial); Ex parte Lane, 806 S.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) (rejecting the claim of collateral estoppel because, among other things, the prior bail hearing did not involve punishment); 2 W.

1996Furthermore, the suspension levied, if any, is brief, see Tex.Transp.Code Ann. § 524.022; Ex parte Tharp, supra (calling the suspension a “relatively mild sanction”); Ex parte Lane, 806 S.W.2d at 340 (noting that the “result of a bail hearing is limited in time” as basis to reject the defense of collateral estop-pel), and dissipates if and when the defendant is acquitted after the actual criminal trial.

2026See, e.g., Evans v. State, Nos. 05-20-00972- CR & 05-20-00973-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2340 , at **2-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail under section 44.04(c) when no evidence was presented at the bail hearing but the parties made arguments as to bail on appeal based on the trial court’s previous history with the defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred from the defendant’s past history that

2026See, e.g., Evans v. State, Nos. 05-20-00972- CR & 05-20-00973-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2340 , at **2-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail under section 44.04(c) when no evidence was presented at the bail hearing but the parties made arguments as to bail on appeal based on the trial court’s previous history with the defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred from the defendant’s past history that

2026See, e.g., Evans v. State, Nos. 05-20-00972- CR & 05-20-00973-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2340 , at **2-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail under section 44.04(c) when no evidence was presented at the bail hearing but the parties made arguments as to bail on appeal based on the trial court’s previous history with the defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred from the defendant’s past history that

2026See, e.g., Evans v. State, Nos. 05-20-00972- CR & 05-20-00973-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2340 , at **2-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail under section 44.04(c) when no evidence was presented at the bail hearing but the parties made arguments as to bail on appeal based on the trial court’s previous history with the defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred from the defendant’s past history that

2024See Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“The ability or inability of an accused to make bail, however, even indigency, does not alone control in determining the amount of bail.”).

2022The “strength attributable to [a defendant’s] family ties in the area . . . [is] weakened by evidence of his struggles with suicidal ideations.” Hammond, 2021 WL 2373467 , at *4; see Rotter, 2021 WL 2006313 , at *3–4 (noting that the trial court could have found that defendant’s suicide attempts minimized the importance of defendant’s family ties); Ex parte Garner, No. 10-18-00129-CR, 2018 WL 3469834 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco July 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting testimony that defendant’s “threats of suicide rendered her a flight risk and a danger to the com

2021See Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 429-30 (Tex. Crim.

2016Ex parte Garcia, 100 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

2010But see United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir.1987) (describing bail hearings as “a fundamentally different breed of cat” from suppression hearings in that the accused’s bail rights are not so contingent on his ability to speak without fear of the future use of his testimony that he must be granted a blanket immunity from use of all statements made during an initial hearing, particularly as the information may in large part be concerned with the accused’s employment record, family status, ties to the community, and information about the charged crime can usually be obtained fro

2000See Dees v. State, 722 S.W.2d 209, 216 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, pet. ref'd) (per curiam) (considering punishment assessed in setting bail after reversal of conviction).

2000See Dees v. State, 722 S.W.2d 209, 216 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, pet. ref'd) (per curiam) (considering punishment assessed in setting bail after reversal of conviction).

1997Id.; accord Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d at 556 (rejecting Robinson’s proffer of collateral estoppel since, among other things, he was not previously placed in jeopardy via an examining trial); Ex parte Lane, 806 S.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) (rejecting the claim of collateral estoppel because, among other things, the prior bail hearing did not involve punishment); 2 W.

1991See Showery, 704 S.W.2d at 156 .