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8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kastanisgreen2 sentences2008“Although a person charged with these offenses may be granted bail if the State cannot successfully satisfy its burden of proof, it is not feasible for the bail hearing to take place at the time of the initial hearing if for no other reason than that the accused ‘must be given adequate notice to prepare for the hearing.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Kastanis, 848 P.2d 673, 676 (Utah 1993)). 2004Kastanis, 848 P.2d at 676 (citations omitted); see In re Haynes, 619 P.2d at 642 ("[T]he bail hearing is not for a determination of guilt or innocence, but rather a determination of the preliminary issue of the right to bail.... [T]he evidence adduced at the hearing as precluding pretrial release must be sufficient to support a finding that the `proof' is `evident' or gives rise to a `strong' presumption of guilt." (Citation omitted.)). ¶ 43 Simpson maintains that all evidence produced at the bail hearing must comport with the rules of evidence. | 2 | 2 |
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. County of Maricopagreen2 sentences2017Simpson II, 241 Ariz. at 348-49, ¶¶ 24-30 , 387 P.3d at 1277-78 . 2017Simpson II, 241 Ariz. at 348-49, ¶¶ 24-30 , 387 P.3d at 1277-78 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Swinburnegreen2 sentences2013In State v. Swinburne, this court clarified that when an accused is released without authority, the bond is void ab initio and a surety is not estopped to assert its invalidity. 121 Ariz. 404, 405 , 590 P.2d 943, 944 (App.1979) (forfeiture improper where trial court had no authority to release capital defendant when proof evident and presumption great). ¶ 9 Azteca argues article II, § 22, as interpreted by Garrett , “impose[d] a duty on the ... [trial] court[ ] to determine [whether Kendrick was] on release for a felony offense before setting bail” and suggests the court was required to hold h 2013In State v. Swinburne, this court clarified that when an accused is released without authority, the bond is void ab initio and a surety is not estopped to assert its invalidity. 121 Ariz. 404, 405 , 590 P.2d 943, 944 (App.1979) (forfeiture improper where trial court had no authority to release capital defendant when proof evident and presumption great). ¶ 9 Azteca argues article II, § 22, as interpreted by Garrett , “impose[d] a duty on the ... [trial] court[ ] to determine [whether Kendrick was] on release for a felony offense before setting bail” and suggests the court was required to hold h | 1 | 1 |
Segura v. Cunanangreen1 sentence2011Id. at 232, 238-39, ¶¶ 13, 46 , 196 P.3d at 835, 841-42 . | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004Id. at 1141-42 (citations omitted); see also Pope v. United States, 739 A.2d 819, 825-26 (D.C.1999) (discussing the standard of proof for the statutory phrase "reason to believe" and finding that the measure should not be probable cause because such a level would substantially undermine the constitutional safeguards guaranteed the accused). ¶ 32 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected an earlier holding that, to deny bail to a capital defendant, "the evidence must show `a fair likelihood' that defendant would be convicted." In re Haynes, 619 P.2d at 636. 2004Id. at 1141-42 (citations omitted); see also Pope v. United States, 739 A.2d 819, 825-26 (D.C.1999) (discussing the standard of proof for the statutory phrase “reason to believe” and finding that the measure should not be probable cause because such a level would substantially undermine the constitutional safeguards guaranteed the accused). ¶ 32 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected an earlier holding that, to deny bail to a capital defendant, “the evidence must show ‘a fair likelihood’ that defendant would be convicted.” In re Haynes, 619 P.2d at 636. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Ex parte Gragg, 149 Tex.Crim. 10 , 191 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1945). [20] Nonetheless, the *491 Texas court held, contrary to the Florida court, that this degree of proof at a bail hearing "requires a `substantial showing,' which is far less than the trial burden of `beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Espinoza, 90 S.W.3d at 908 (citation omitted); see Angleton, 955 S.W.2d at 657; Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Moore, 594 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). [21] ¶ 38 Similar to the progression of the Texas definition, in 1988, the voters of Utah amended the language of their st 2004Ex parte Gragg, 149 Tex.Crim. 10 , 191 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1945). 20 Nonetheless, the Texas court held, contrary to the Florida court, that this degree of proof at a bail hearing “requires a ‘substantial showing,’ which is far less than the trial burden of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Espinoza, 90 S.W.3d at 908 (citation omitted); see Angleton, 955 S.W.2d at 657; Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Moore, 594 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). 21 ¶ 38 Similar to the progression of the Texas definition, in 1988, the voters of Utah amended the language of their statute re | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Mooregreen2 sentences2004Ex parte Gragg, 149 Tex.Crim. 10 , 191 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1945). [20] Nonetheless, the *491 Texas court held, contrary to the Florida court, that this degree of proof at a bail hearing "requires a `substantial showing,' which is far less than the trial burden of `beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Espinoza, 90 S.W.3d at 908 (citation omitted); see Angleton, 955 S.W.2d at 657; Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Moore, 594 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). [21] ¶ 38 Similar to the progression of the Texas definition, in 1988, the voters of Utah amended the language of their st 2004Ex parte Gragg, 149 Tex.Crim. 10 , 191 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1945). 20 Nonetheless, the Texas court held, contrary to the Florida court, that this degree of proof at a bail hearing “requires a ‘substantial showing,’ which is far less than the trial burden of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Espinoza, 90 S.W.3d at 908 (citation omitted); see Angleton, 955 S.W.2d at 657; Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Moore, 594 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). 21 ¶ 38 Similar to the progression of the Texas definition, in 1988, the voters of Utah amended the language of their statute re | 1 | 1 |
Calik v. Kongablegreen2 sentences2004Simpson requested a bail hearing, but it was denied, and Simpson was jailed. ¶ 11 Simpson filed a petition for special action in this court. [3] He argues that Arizona voters intended that an evidentiary hearing be held regarding whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the offenses charged before bail can be denied. ¶ 12 A court must "effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of [a referendum], the intent of the electorate that adopted it." Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496 , 498 ¶ 10, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) (quoting Je 2004Simpson requested a bail hearing, but it was denied, and Simpson was jailed. ¶ 11 Simpson filed a petition for special action in this court. [3] He argues that Arizona voters intended that an evidentiary hearing be held regarding whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the offenses charged before bail can be denied. ¶ 12 A court must "effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of [a referendum], the intent of the electorate that adopted it." Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496 , 498 ¶ 10, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) (quoting Je | 1 | 1 |
State v. Passinogreen2 sentences2004Id. 2004See Passino, 577 A.2d at 285 . | 1 | 1 |
Fountaine v. Mullengreen2 sentences2004Id. at 1140-41. ¶ 31 We adopt our second and the Rhode Island Supreme Court's third category of the quantum of proof necessary for the State. 2004Id. at 1141-42 (citations omitted); see also Pope v. United States, 739 A.2d 819, 825-26 (D.C.1999) (discussing the standard of proof for the statutory phrase "reason to believe" and finding that the measure should not be probable cause because such a level would substantially undermine the constitutional safeguards guaranteed the accused). ¶ 32 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected an earlier holding that, to deny bail to a capital defendant, "the evidence must show `a fair likelihood' that defendant would be convicted." In re Haynes, 619 P.2d at 636. | 1 | 1 |
Jett v. City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2004Simpson requested a bail hearing, but it was denied, and Simpson was jailed. ¶ 11 Simpson filed a petition for special action in this court. [3] He argues that Arizona voters intended that an evidentiary hearing be held regarding whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the offenses charged before bail can be denied. ¶ 12 A court must "effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of [a referendum], the intent of the electorate that adopted it." Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496 , 498 ¶ 10, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) (quoting Je 2004Simpson requested a bail hearing, but it was denied, and Simpson was jailed. ¶ 11 Simpson filed a petition for special action in this court. [3] He argues that Arizona voters intended that an evidentiary hearing be held regarding whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that the accused committed the offenses charged before bail can be denied. ¶ 12 A court must "effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of [a referendum], the intent of the electorate that adopted it." Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496 , 498 ¶ 10, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) (quoting Je | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Gragggreen2 sentences2004Ex parte Gragg, 149 Tex.Crim. 10 , 191 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1945). [20] Nonetheless, the *491 Texas court held, contrary to the Florida court, that this degree of proof at a bail hearing "requires a `substantial showing,' which is far less than the trial burden of `beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Espinoza, 90 S.W.3d at 908 (citation omitted); see Angleton, 955 S.W.2d at 657; Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Moore, 594 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). [21] ¶ 38 Similar to the progression of the Texas definition, in 1988, the voters of Utah amended the language of their st 2004Ex parte Gragg, 149 Tex.Crim. 10 , 191 S.W.2d 32, 33 (1945). [20] Nonetheless, the *491 Texas court held, contrary to the Florida court, that this degree of proof at a bail hearing "requires a `substantial showing,' which is far less than the trial burden of `beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Espinoza, 90 S.W.3d at 908 (citation omitted); see Angleton, 955 S.W.2d at 657; Lee v. State, 683 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ex parte Moore, 594 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). [21] ¶ 38 Similar to the progression of the Texas definition, in 1988, the voters of Utah amended the language of their st | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carlson v. Landon
green
2 sentences1972In Rendel the court cited Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 , 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) which contained the following analysis of the bail provision in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution: “The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. 1972In Rendel the court cited Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 , 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) which contained the following analysis of the bail provision in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution: “The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. | 2 | 1970–1972 |
State v. Garrett
green
1 sentence2013We reasoned that allowing the trial court to release the defendant after the state had proven the bail exception would “completely subvert [the provision’s] purpose and relegate bail determination to the conditions that existed prior to the time that the constitutional provision was approved by the people.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gusick v. Boies
green
2 sentences2011Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 22(B); Gusick, 72 Ariz. at 236 , 233 P.2d at 448 . 2011Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 22(B); Gusick, 72 Ariz. at 236 , 233 P.2d at 448 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Simpson v. Owens
green
2 sentences2008Tovar was not represented by counsel. ¶ 5 One week later, after counsel was appointed, Tovar requested a bail hearing pursuant to Simpson v. Owens, 207 Ariz. 261 , 85 P.3d 478 (App.2004). 2008Tovar was not represented by counsel. ¶ 5 One week later, after counsel was appointed, Tovar requested a bail hearing pursuant to Simpson v. Owens, 207 Ariz. 261 , 85 P.3d 478 (App.2004). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ex Parte Wheeler
green
2 sentences2004A fixed rule cannot be formulated." In re Wheeler, 406 P.2d at 716 . [23] ¶ 49 Simpson argues that, in a bail hearing, the court should not only determine whether the proof is evident or presumption great that the accused committed the crime but also whether there is compelling evidence that the accused is a flight risk or a risk to recidivate. 2004A fixed rule cannot be formulated.” In re Wheeler, 406 P.2d at 716 . 23 ¶49 Simpson argues that, in a bail hearing, the court should not only determine whether the proof is evident or presumption great that the accused committed the crime but also whether there is compelling evidence that the accused is a flight risk or a risk to recidivate. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.