Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allstate Insurance v. Freemangreen1 sentence1995Thus, construing ambiguous language against the insurer, see DiCicco, supra at 665, we find that the injured person's standpoint controls when determining whether an accident occurred. | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. MUT. BEN. H. & A. ASSN.green2 sentences1995Accordingly, I submit that instead of creating a "principled distinction," Justice GRIFFIN's test is clearly unprincipled, contrary to traditional interpretations of insurance policies, and obviously contrary to the stricture of the policy itself. [14] See also Reed v Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 345 Mich 586, 590-591 ; 76 NW2d 869 (1956); Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384, 390-391 ; 28 NW2d 331 (1947). [15] See, generally, 72 ALR3d 1090; Rynearson, n 12 supra at 521-522; see also Ashland Oil, supra at 1320. [16] We again note that the insurer could have explicit 1995Accordingly, I submit that instead of creating a "principled distinction," Justice GRIFFIN's test is clearly unprincipled, contrary to traditional interpretations of insurance policies, and obviously contrary to the stricture of the policy itself. [14] See also Reed v Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 345 Mich 586, 590-591 ; 76 NW2d 869 (1956); Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384, 390-391 ; 28 NW2d 331 (1947). [15] See, generally, 72 ALR3d 1090; Rynearson, n 12 supra at 521-522; see also Ashland Oil, supra at 1320. [16] We again note that the insurer could have explicit | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abernathygreen2 sentences1974We *541 agree with defendant and with the panel of this Court which decided People v Abernathy, 29 Mich App 558, 561 ; 185 NW2d 634, 636 (1971), that the decision to give or withhold the Griffin instruction belongs to the defendant and his counsel. 1974We *541 agree with defendant and with the panel of this Court which decided People v Abernathy, 29 Mich App 558, 561 ; 185 NW2d 634, 636 (1971), that the decision to give or withhold the Griffin instruction belongs to the defendant and his counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1971"In Lane v. Brown, supra, at 483 , the Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle of Griffin v. *343 Illinois (1956), 351 US 12, 19 ( 76 S Ct 585 , 100 L Ed 891 , 55 ALR2d 1055), that `Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.' The Court in Lane went on to observe that Smith had established `that these principles were not to be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions, but extended alike to state post-conviction proceedings.'" Thus, the United States Supreme Court in Lane and Long has extended the Griff 1971"In Lane v. Brown, supra, at 483 , the Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle of Griffin v. *343 Illinois (1956), 351 US 12, 19 ( 76 S Ct 585 , 100 L Ed 891 , 55 ALR2d 1055), that `Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.' The Court in Lane went on to observe that Smith had established `that these principles were not to be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions, but extended alike to state post-conviction proceedings.'" Thus, the United States Supreme Court in Lane and Long has extended the Griff | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1969In Burns v. Ohio, 360 US 252 , involving a $20 fee for filing a motion for leave to appeal a felony conviction to the supreme court of Ohio, this Court reaffirmed the Griffin doctrine, saying that ‘once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to- any phase of that procedure because of their poverty. * * * This principle is no less applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that procedure solely 1969In Burns v. Ohio, 360 US 252 , involving a $20 fee for filing a motion for leave to appeal a felony conviction to the supreme court of Ohio, this Court reaffirmed the Griffin doctrine, saying that ‘once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to- any phase of that procedure because of their poverty. * * * This principle is no less applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that procedure solely | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roux v. Department of Transportation
neutral
2 sentences2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili 2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili | 1 | 2006–2006 |
McKee v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili 2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hall v. Department of State Highways
green
2 sentences2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili 2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Van Liere v. State Highway Department
green
2 sentences2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili 2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gregg v. State Highway Department
green
1 sentence2006Dep't., 59 Mich.App. 133, 136 , 229 N.W.2d 369 (1975); Hall v. Dep't of State Hwys., 109 Mich.App. 592 , 602 n. 4, 311 N.W.2d 813 (1981); McKee v. Dep't. of Transportation, 132 Mich.App. 714, 721 , 349 N.W.2d 798 (1984); Roux v. Dep't of Transportation, 169 Mich.App. 582, 586 , 426 N.W.2d 714 (1988). [32] Gregg, supra at 315 , 458 N.W.2d 619 . [33] MCL 257.1 et seq. [34] MCL 257.20. [35] MCL 257.55. [36] Chief Justice Riley wrote a separate dissent concurring in Justice Griffin's analysis. [37] Justice Griffin also discussed at length the importance of the MVC definitions and their applicabili | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Li v. Feldt
green
1 sentence2002Under this analysis, unless the activity of a municipality falls within one of the five narrowly drawn statutory exceptions, the only question remaining in these cases is whether the activity is a "governmental function," as defined by the Legislature. [ Id. at 605, 456 N.W.2d 55 (emphasis in original).] We agree with Justice Griffin's analysis and adopt it today. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance v. Bronson Plating Co.
green
2 sentences1996However, if a suit is brought against the insured, the duty of the insurer to defend is engendered even though the allegations in the complaint may be "groundless, false or fraudulent." * * * Giving the policy language its ordinary, common-sense meaning, I believe it is apparent that the EPA's issuance of a PRP letter is a "claim made," and not a "suit *488 brought." [ Id. at 582-583 , 519 N.W.2d 864 .] The facts in this case confirm Justice Griffin's analysis that a letter from the EPA requesting a remedial investigation is not the same as a "suit." After entering into a consent order with th 1996However, if a suit is brought against the insured, the duty of the insurer to defend is engendered even though the allegations in the complaint may be "groundless, false or fraudulent." * * * Giving the policy language its ordinary, common-sense meaning, I believe it is apparent that the EPA's issuance of a PRP letter is a "claim made," and not a "suit *488 brought." [ Id. at 582-583 , 519 N.W.2d 864 .] The facts in this case confirm Justice Griffin's analysis that a letter from the EPA requesting a remedial investigation is not the same as a "suit." After entering into a consent order with th | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hooper v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.
green
2 sentences1995Accordingly, I submit that instead of creating a "principled distinction," Justice GRIFFIN's test is clearly unprincipled, contrary to traditional interpretations of insurance policies, and obviously contrary to the stricture of the policy itself. [14] See also Reed v Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 345 Mich 586, 590-591 ; 76 NW2d 869 (1956); Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384, 390-391 ; 28 NW2d 331 (1947). [15] See, generally, 72 ALR3d 1090; Rynearson, n 12 supra at 521-522; see also Ashland Oil, supra at 1320. [16] We again note that the insurer could have explicit 1995Accordingly, I submit that instead of creating a "principled distinction," Justice GRIFFIN's test is clearly unprincipled, contrary to traditional interpretations of insurance policies, and obviously contrary to the stricture of the policy itself. [14] See also Reed v Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 345 Mich 586, 590-591 ; 76 NW2d 869 (1956); Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384, 390-391 ; 28 NW2d 331 (1947). [15] See, generally, 72 ALR3d 1090; Rynearson, n 12 supra at 521-522; see also Ashland Oil, supra at 1320. [16] We again note that the insurer could have explicit | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Roberts v. LaVallee
green
2 sentences1971In Roberts v. LaVallee (1967), 389 US 40 ( 88 S Ct 194 , 19 L Ed 2d 41 ), the Court extended the Griffin rule to require that a transcript of a preliminary examination be furnished to an indigent defendant for use on appeal, and in Williams v. Oklahoma City (1969), 395 US 458 ( 89 S Ct 1818 , 23 L Ed 2d 440 ), the rule applied to appeals from convictions on charges of petty offenses. 1971In Roberts v. LaVallee (1967), 389 US 40 ( 88 S Ct 194 , 19 L Ed 2d 41 ), the Court extended the Griffin rule to require that a transcript of a preliminary examination be furnished to an indigent defendant for use on appeal, and in Williams v. Oklahoma City (1969), 395 US 458 ( 89 S Ct 1818 , 23 L Ed 2d 440 ), the rule applied to appeals from convictions on charges of petty offenses. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Long v. District Court of Iowa, Lee Cty.
green
2 sentences1971To be sure, this case does not involve, as did Griffin, a direct appeal from a *342 criminal conviction, but Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle also applies to state collateral proceedings, and Burns leaves no doubt that the principle applies even though the State has already provided one review on the merits." In Long v. District Court of Iowa (1966), 385 US 192 ( 87 S Ct 362 , 17 L Ed 2d 290 ), defendant filed in a state court a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied. 1971To be sure, this case does not involve, as did Griffin, a direct appeal from a *342 criminal conviction, but Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle also applies to state collateral proceedings, and Burns leaves no doubt that the principle applies even though the State has already provided one review on the merits." In Long v. District Court of Iowa (1966), 385 US 192 ( 87 S Ct 362 , 17 L Ed 2d 290 ), defendant filed in a state court a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Williams v. Oklahoma City
green
2 sentences1971In Roberts v. LaVallee (1967), 389 US 40 ( 88 S Ct 194 , 19 L Ed 2d 41 ), the Court extended the Griffin rule to require that a transcript of a preliminary examination be furnished to an indigent defendant for use on appeal, and in Williams v. Oklahoma City (1969), 395 US 458 ( 89 S Ct 1818 , 23 L Ed 2d 440 ), the rule applied to appeals from convictions on charges of petty offenses. 1971In Roberts v. LaVallee (1967), 389 US 40 ( 88 S Ct 194 , 19 L Ed 2d 41 ), the Court extended the Griffin rule to require that a transcript of a preliminary examination be furnished to an indigent defendant for use on appeal, and in Williams v. Oklahoma City (1969), 395 US 458 ( 89 S Ct 1818 , 23 L Ed 2d 440 ), the rule applied to appeals from convictions on charges of petty offenses. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Smith v. Bennett
green
2 sentences1969In Smith v. Bennett (1961), 365 US 708 ( 81 S Ct 895 , 6 L Ed 2d 39 ), the Court made clear that these principles were not to be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions, but extended alike to State postconviction proceedings. ‘Respecting the State’s grant of a right to test their detention,’ the Court said, ‘the Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each.’ Id., at 714 . 1969In Smith v. Bennett (1961), 365 US 708 ( 81 S Ct 895 , 6 L Ed 2d 39 ), the Court made clear that these principles were not to be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions, but extended alike to State postconviction proceedings. ‘Respecting the State’s grant of a right to test their detention,’ the Court said, ‘the Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each.’ Id., at 714 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.