Griffin brief in Alabama

2024Moreover, "[f]or [the appellant] to meet his burden of pleading his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of a certain witness, he must plead, among other things, facts establishing the following: (1) the identity of the witness; (2) the content of the witness's expected testimony; (3) that the testimony was favorable to the defendant; (4) that the witness was available to testify at [the petitioner's] trial and would have testified; and (5) that a reasonable investigation would have led counsel to the witness." Stallworth v. State, 171 So. 3d at 68 .

2024Moreover, "[f]or [the appellant] to meet his burden of pleading his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of a certain witness, he must plead, among other things, facts establishing the following: (1) the identity of the witness; (2) the content of the witness's expected testimony; (3) that the testimony was favorable to the defendant; (4) that the witness was available to testify at [the petitioner's] trial and would have testified; and (5) that a reasonable investigation would have led counsel to the witness." Stallworth v. State, 171 So. 3d at 68 .

2016In United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit aptly observed: “The second issue relating to the exclusion of the McCoys’ out-of-court statements is whether, even though the statements were outside the ambit of Rule 804(b)(3), [Fed.R.Evid.,] the exclusion of them from evidence denied the Thomases their right to a fair trial.

2016In United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit aptly observed: “The second issue relating to the exclusion of the McCoys’ out-of-court statements is whether, even though the statements were outside the ambit of Rule 804(b)(3), [Fed.R.Evid.,] the exclusion of them from evidence denied the Thomases their right to a fair trial.

2000The trial court stated the following in the case action summary with regard to Griffin's motion: "[B]ased on trial court's observation of the voir dire process, including extensive individual voir dire—re death penalty —court holds no prima facie case for *286 discriminatory striking is made by the defense. `Problems' with the death penalty and negative contact with law enforcement are observed as relative [reasons] for state's peremptory strikes." (Supp.R.8-9.) In Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 , (Ala. Cr.App.1997), aff'd, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133 , 119 S.Ct. 18

2000The trial court stated the following in the case action summary with regard to Griffin's motion: "[B]ased on trial court's observation of the voir dire process, including extensive individual voir dire—re death penalty —court holds no prima facie case for *286 discriminatory striking is made by the defense. `Problems' with the death penalty and negative contact with law enforcement are observed as relative [reasons] for state's peremptory strikes." (Supp.R.8-9.) In Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003 , (Ala. Cr.App.1997), aff'd, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133 , 119 S.Ct. 18

2000Griffin claims that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for funds "to send an investigator to New York to gather evidence necessary both for the guilt phase of [his] trial, and to prepare evidence for the potential penalty phase." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 75.) Griffin claims this evidence included "birth records, health records, ... and, more critically, documentary evidence that would have established that [he] was in New York at the time Mr. Davis was killed." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 76.) In Pace v. State, 714 So.2d 320, 331 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), rev'd

2000And, after all we're talking about things that happened some time ago." (R. 889-90)(Emphasis added.) Griffin claims the above instruction "informed the jury that [it] shouldn't disregard the evidence if [it] felt a witness was merely making a mistake" and that the use of the phrase "for that matter" suggested "a total disregard of a witness' testimony would be an extreme remedy if they found a witness to be deceitful." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 128.) In Slaton v. State, 680 So.2d 879, 895 (Ala.Cr.App.1995), aff'd, 680 So.2d 909 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079 , 117 S.Ct. 742

2000Griffin contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine and allowed the state to comment on his alleged affiliation with the Crew because, he says, those comments were "extremely prejudicial and generally inadmissible by the Alabama courts." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 59.) Griffin relies on Ex parte Thomas, 625 So.2d 1156 (Ala.1993), in which the Alabama Supreme Court stated that allowing the state to comment on any possible gang affiliation is equal to allowing the state to introduce evidence of collateral criminal acts.

2000We analyze the allegation under the standard provided by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), Twyman v. State, 293 Ala. 75 , 300 So.2d 124 (1974), and Ireland v. State, 47 Ala. App. 65 , 250 So.2d 602 (Ala.Cr.App.1971).

2000We analyze the allegation under the standard provided by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), Twyman v. State, 293 Ala. 75 , 300 So.2d 124 (1974), and Ireland v. State, 47 Ala. App. 65 , 250 So.2d 602 (Ala.Cr.App.1971).

2000Jackson v. State, 594 So.2d 1289 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991).

2000In May v. State, 710 So.2d 1362, 1369 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte Gingo, 605 So.2d 1237 (Ala.1992), adopted the United States Supreme Court's position in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), regarding the allegations that the state failed to preserve evidence potentially useful to the defense: "`"[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.

2000In May v. State, 710 So.2d 1362, 1369 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte Gingo, 605 So.2d 1237 (Ala.1992), adopted the United States Supreme Court's position in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), regarding the allegations that the state failed to preserve evidence potentially useful to the defense: "`"[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.

2000Griffin correctly argues that Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), establishes that a defendant is entitled to funds to pay for an expert.

2000Griffin correctly argues that Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), establishes that a defendant is entitled to funds to pay for an expert.

2000Her testimony was critical to present Griffin's defense that he was not in Alabama at the time of Davis's murder. [7] See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)(holding that the confession of a non-testifying defendant in a joint trial cannot be used to implicate a non-confessing codefendant by name). [8] Griffin and Bimbo had been scheduled to be tried jointly, but the cases were severed prior to trial.

2000Her testimony was critical to present Griffin's defense that he was not in Alabama at the time of Davis's murder. [7] See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)(holding that the confession of a non-testifying defendant in a joint trial cannot be used to implicate a non-confessing codefendant by name). [8] Griffin and Bimbo had been scheduled to be tried jointly, but the cases were severed prior to trial.

2000Specifically, he argues that the "state failed to meet its burden of proof, and offered no other evidence that [he] committed the capital offense of murder for pecuniary gain besides the unreliable and unverified testimony offered by [his] accomplices." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 25.) Section 12-21-222, Ala.Code 1975, provides that: "A conviction of felony cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and such corroborative evidence, if it merely shows the commission of the of

2000In May v. State, 710 So.2d 1362, 1369 (Ala.Cr.App.1997), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte Gingo, 605 So.2d 1237 (Ala.1992), adopted the United States Supreme Court's position in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), regarding the allegations that the state failed to preserve evidence potentially useful to the defense: "`"[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 , 109 S.

2000Smith v. State, 581 So.2d 497, 526-29 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 581 So.2d 531 (Ala.1991); May v. State, 672 So.2d 1310, 1311 (Ala.1995)." 715 So.2d at 851.

2000Griffin contends that "the trial court erroneously admitted photographs [from Davis's autopsy] and allowed a slide show for no purpose but to inflame the passions of the jury." (Issue XXXVI in Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 143.) This Court has addressed this particular issue in Smith v. State, 581 So.2d 497 *346 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 581 So.2d 531 (Ala.1991).

2000The Ake principles, which are grounded in the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, apply to assistance by nonpsychiatric experts when an indigent defendant makes a proper showing that the requested assistance is needed in order for the defendant to have `a fair opportunity to present his defense.' Dubose, 662 So.2d at 1194 .

2000Griffin claims that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for funds "to send an investigator to New York to gather evidence necessary both for the guilt phase of [his] trial, and to prepare evidence for the potential penalty phase." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 75.) Griffin claims this evidence included "birth records, health records, ... and, more critically, documentary evidence that would have established that [he] was in New York at the time Mr. Davis was killed." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 76.) In Pace v. State, 714 So.2d 320, 331 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), rev'd

2000Griffin argues that the Alabama Supreme Court has "found that disparate sentences and punishment must be evaluated as a mitigating circumstance." (Griffin's brief to this Court at p. 64.) Griffin cites Ex parte Henderson, 616 So.2d 348 (Ala.1992), in support of his position.

2000Fletcher v. State, 291 Ala. 67 , 277 So.2d 882 (1973).

2000Fletcher v. State, 291 Ala. 67 , 277 So.2d 882 (1973).