has followed rule in Montana

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

2009“The central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the reasonableness under all the circumstances of a particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” State v. Clayton, 2002 MT 67, ¶ 12 , 309 Mont. 215 , 45 P.3d 30 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ). ¶9 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, this Court has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 , 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

1991This rule requires the reviewing court to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Wilson (1981), [_Mont._,] 631 P.2d 1273 , [ 38 St.Rep. 1020 ].

1991In reviewing these types of questions, this Court has followed the rule set forth in Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 .

1991In reviewing these types of questions, this Court has followed the rule set forth in Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 .

1988See Lewis v. State, Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 1984], [ 207 Mont. 361 ,] 675 P.2d 107, 114 , 41 St.Rep. 9 , 17; Downs v. Smyk (1979), 185 Mont. 16, 19 , 604 P.2d 307, 309 ; Boise Cascade v. First Sec.

1988See Lewis v. State, Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 1984], [ 207 Mont. 361 ,] 675 P.2d 107, 114 , 41 St.Rep. 9 , 17; Downs v. Smyk (1979), 185 Mont. 16, 19 , 604 P.2d 307, 309 ; Boise Cascade v. First Sec.

1984In Rambur v. Diehl Lumber Co. (1964), 144 Mont. 84 , 394 P.2d 745 , we stated that one of the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to facilitate the decision of cases on their merits and that “it is to be considered a serious matter when a party moves to have a case disposed of on grounds other that [sic] the merits. . . .” 144 Mont, at 90 , 394 P.2d at 749 .

1984In Rambur v. Diehl Lumber Co. (1964), 144 Mont. 84 , 394 P.2d 745 , we stated that one of the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to facilitate the decision of cases on their merits and that “it is to be considered a serious matter when a party moves to have a case disposed of on grounds other that [sic] the merits. . . .” 144 Mont, at 90 , 394 P.2d at 749 .

1984This Court has followed the rule of Foman in Prentice Lumber Co. v. Hu kill (1972), 161 Mont. 8 , 504 P.2d 277 , holding that denial of leave to amend is error where there is no apparent or declared reason for the denial. 161 Mont, at 17-18 , 504 P.2d at 282 .

1984This Court has followed the rule of Foman in Prentice Lumber Co. v. Hu kill (1972), 161 Mont. 8 , 504 P.2d 277 , holding that denial of leave to amend is error where there is no apparent or declared reason for the denial. 161 Mont, at 17-18 , 504 P.2d at 282 .

1982First, in Harris v. New York (1970), 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , the Court held that although evidence is inadmissible in the prosecution’s casein-chief because of Miranda violations, such evidence is hot barred for all purposes.

1982First, in Harris v. New York (1970), 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , the Court held that although evidence is inadmissible in the prosecution’s casein-chief because of Miranda violations, such evidence is hot barred for all purposes.

1978Such a deprivation is particularly significant in view of the frequent misapplication by trial courts of the standards for punishing perjury as criminal contempt.” See also, Scott v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 377 , 419 F.2d 264 , where the problems involved in considering the candor of a defendant, either as perjury or as criminal contempt, are discussed in detail.

1978Such a deprivation is particularly significant in view of the frequent misapplication by trial courts of the standards for punishing perjury as criminal contempt." See also, Scott v. United States, 136 U.S. App.D.C. 377, 419 F.2d 264 , where the problems involved in considering the candor of a defendant, either as perjury or as criminal contempt, are discussed in detail.

1976State Highway Commission v. Manry, 143 Mont. 382 , 390 P.2d 97 .

1976State Highway Commission v. Manry, 143 Mont. 382 , 390 P.2d 97 .