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7 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Throlson v. Backesgreen1 sentence2023See Throlson v. Backes, 466 N.W.2d 124, 126 (N.D. 1991) (observing “[i]t is axiomatic that before there can be a ‘refusal’ to submit to testing under Section 39-20-01, there must be a valid request for testing under the statute”). | 1 | 1 |
City of Devils Lake v. Grovegreen2 sentences2020See also City of Devils Lake v. Grove, 2008 ND 155, ¶ 28 , 755 N.W.2d 485 (The transportation of a defendant from the scene of a traffic stop to the Law Enforcement Center requires probable cause.). [¶16] Whether a driver has refused to take the screening test within the meaning of the statute is a question of fact. 2020See also City of Devils Lake v. Grove, 2008 ND 155, ¶ 28 , 755 N.W.2d 485 (The transportation of a defendant from the scene of a traffic stop to the Law Enforcement Center requires probable cause.). [¶16] Whether a driver has refused to take the screening test within the meaning of the statute is a question of fact. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woytassekgreen1 sentence2020Dep’t of Transp., 2013 ND 131, ¶ 10 , 833 N.W.2d 536 ); Cf. State v. Woytassek, 491 N.W.2d 709, 712 (N.D. 1992) (“Given the test’s purpose, to require that an arrest precede an on-site screening test would render the statute meaningless.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Goemangreen1 sentence1995See State v. Goeman, 431 N.W.2d 290 , 291 n. 1 (N.D.1988); State v. Pitman, 427 N.W.2d 337, 344 (N.D.1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pitmangreen1 sentence1995See State v. Goeman, 431 N.W.2d 290 , 291 n. 1 (N.D.1988); State v. Pitman, 427 N.W.2d 337, 344 (N.D.1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brewer v. Ziegler
green
2 sentences2023Relying on Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207 , 743 N.W.2d 391 , the court also held Nelson failed to show prejudice. [¶10] Nelson argues the implied consent advisory given to him was not “substantively complete” and failed to comply with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(3) because he was not specifically advised taking a screening test was required under North Dakota law and his driving privileges may be revoked for at least 180 days. [¶11] While this case involves refusal of an on-site screening test under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, Nelson argues case law addressing implied consent under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01 for ch 2023Relying on Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207 , 743 N.W.2d 391 , the court also held Nelson failed to show prejudice. [¶10] Nelson argues the implied consent advisory given to him was not “substantively complete” and failed to comply with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(3) because he was not specifically advised taking a screening test was required under North Dakota law and his driving privileges may be revoked for at least 180 days. [¶11] While this case involves refusal of an on-site screening test under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, Nelson argues case law addressing implied consent under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01 for ch | 2 | 2013–2023 |
Yellowbird v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2020Dep’t of Transp., 2013 ND 131, ¶ 10 , 833 N.W.2d 536 ); Cf. State v. Woytassek, 491 N.W.2d 709, 712 (N.D. 1992) (“Given the test’s purpose, to require that an arrest precede an on-site screening test would render the statute meaningless.”). 2020Dep’t of Transp., 2013 ND 131, ¶ 10 , 833 N.W.2d 536 ); Cf. State v. Woytassek, 491 N.W.2d 709, 712 (N.D. 1992) (“Given the test’s purpose, to require that an arrest precede an on-site screening test would render the statute meaningless.”). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2017State v. Stewart, 2006 ND 39, ¶ 6 , 710 N.W.2d 403 . 2017State v. Stewart, 2006 ND 39, ¶ 6 , 710 N.W.2d 403 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2017Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947). [¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a drive 2017Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947). [¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a drive | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2017Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947). [¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a drive 2017Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947). [¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a drive | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Baxter
green
2 sentences2017State v. Baxter, 2015 ND 107, ¶¶ 6-12 , 863 N.W.2d 208 . 2017State v. Baxter, 2015 ND 107, ¶¶ 6-12 , 863 N.W.2d 208 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
City of Jamestown v. Jerome
green
2 sentences2014Further, the arrest was performed with sufficient probable cause without considering the results of the on-site screening test. [¶ 9] “A temporary restraint of a person’s freedom, or a ‘Terry stop,’ is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” City of Jamestown v. Je *774 rome, 2002 ND 34, ¶ 5 , 639 N.W.2d 478 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 2014Further, the arrest was performed with sufficient probable cause without considering the results of the on-site screening test. [¶ 9] “A temporary restraint of a person’s freedom, or a ‘Terry stop,’ is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” City of Jamestown v. Je *774 rome, 2002 ND 34, ¶ 5 , 639 N.W.2d 478 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2014Further, the arrest was performed with sufficient probable cause without considering the results of the on-site screening test. [¶ 9] “A temporary restraint of a person’s freedom, or a ‘Terry stop,’ is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” City of Jamestown v. Je *774 rome, 2002 ND 34, ¶ 5 , 639 N.W.2d 478 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 2014Further, the arrest was performed with sufficient probable cause without considering the results of the on-site screening test. [¶ 9] “A temporary restraint of a person’s freedom, or a ‘Terry stop,’ is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” City of Jamestown v. Je *774 rome, 2002 ND 34, ¶ 5 , 639 N.W.2d 478 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Neset v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner
green
1 sentence2013We noted: “The Legislature has impliedly recognized that not all law enforcement officers in this state will be certified to administer the chemical tests authorized under Chapter 39-20, N.D.C.C.” Id. [¶ 16] Similarly, in N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, there is no provision in the statute that the officer requesting the on-site screening test must be certified to administer the test. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Fasching
green
1 sentence2000Since refusal of the on-site screening test does not result in an incurable revocation of Leno’s license, expanding the current post-arrest statutory right to counsel is not necessary to guarantee protections of due process. [¶ 16] The district court also appeared to rely on State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D.1990), to find a right to consult an attorney exists before arrest when the attorney is a passenger in the ear and to decide the remedy for violation of this right is exclusion of the blood test. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Carlson
red
1 sentence1995While Mayo relies on People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo.1984), to that effect, we have not yet decided whether an on-site screening test may be given by a law enforcement officer without probable cause to believe a detainee has driven under the influence of alcohol. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.