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7 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 491508green2 sentences2000On that basis it held that under federal law, the limitation period commenced running on September 4, 1980, and thus plaintiff's ADEA claim was time barred. [6] The court then turned to the claim under Michigan's Civil Rights Act, saying that it was required to use its best efforts to "divine what the Michigan high court would say if faced with the [statute of limitations] issue." Id. at 948. 2000The court concluded: Our guess is that if it were confronted with the issue before us, the Michigan Supreme Court would veer away from the current federal precedent and declare that the period of limitations for the plaintiff's ... [state] claim began to run the date plaintiff actually stopped working, November 30, 1981. [ Id. at 949.] The court reached that conclusion based on two decisions by the Michigan intermediate appellate court (the Court of Appeals) and dicta from one decision of the State Supreme Court. | 1 | 1 |
Burt N. Sempier v. Johnson & Higginsgreen1 sentence1999Ed.2d at 438-39 (holding that fourth prong of prima facie ADEA claim can be satisfied even if plaintiff is replaced by another person within protected group so long as replacement employee supports inference of discrimination); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729-30 (3d Cir.) (observing that no “particular age difference” is required and that five years has been deemed sufficient to raise inference of age discrimination), cer t. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 , 115 S.Ct. 2611 , 132 L. | 1 | 1 |
Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sislergreen2 sentences1998See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 307 N.J.Super. 333, 342 , 704 A.2d 1017 (1998), certif. granted, 153 N.J. 216 , 708 A.2d 67 (1998) (“a LAD age discrimination claim, unlike a federal ADEA claim, is not limited to persons over the age of forty.”). 1998See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 307 N.J.Super. 333, 342 , 704 A.2d 1017 (1998), certif. granted, 153 N.J. 216 , 708 A.2d 67 (1998) (“a LAD age discrimination claim, unlike a federal ADEA claim, is not limited to persons over the age of forty.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paduanigreen1 sentence1998See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 307 N.J.Super. 333, 342 , 704 A.2d 1017 (1998), certif. granted, 153 N.J. 216 , 708 A.2d 67 (1998) (“a LAD age discrimination claim, unlike a federal ADEA claim, is not limited to persons over the age of forty.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wachstein v. Slocumgreen2 sentences1998See also Wachstein v. Slocum, 265 N.J.Super. 6 , 625 A.2d 527 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 , 636 A.2d 521 (1993). 1998See also Wachstein v. Slocum, 265 N.J.Super. 6 , 625 A.2d 527 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 , 636 A.2d 521 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Catanosogreen2 sentences1998See also Wachstein v. Slocum, 265 N.J.Super. 6 , 625 A.2d 527 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 , 636 A.2d 521 (1993). 1998See also Wachstein v. Slocum, 265 N.J.Super. 6 , 625 A.2d 527 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563 , 636 A.2d 521 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Oubre, 522 U.S. at 428 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ.
green
2 sentences2002Ibid.; Giammario, supra ( 203 N.J.Super. at 361 , 497 A.2d 199 ). 2002Ibid.; Giammario, supra ( 203 N.J.Super. at 361 , 497 A.2d 199 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Stollings v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
green
1 sentence1999Ed.2d at 438-39 (holding that fourth prong of prima facie ADEA claim can be satisfied even if plaintiff is replaced by another person within protected group so long as replacement employee supports inference of discrimination); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729-30 (3d Cir.) (observing that no “particular age difference” is required and that five years has been deemed sufficient to raise inference of age discrimination), cer t. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 , 115 S.Ct. 2611 , 132 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Mill v. Colorado Department of Health
green
1 sentence1999Ed.2d at 438-39 (holding that fourth prong of prima facie ADEA claim can be satisfied even if plaintiff is replaced by another person within protected group so long as replacement employee supports inference of discrimination); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729-30 (3d Cir.) (observing that no “particular age difference” is required and that five years has been deemed sufficient to raise inference of age discrimination), cer t. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 , 115 S.Ct. 2611 , 132 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Saleh v. United States
green
1 sentence1999Ed.2d at 438-39 (holding that fourth prong of prima facie ADEA claim can be satisfied even if plaintiff is replaced by another person within protected group so long as replacement employee supports inference of discrimination); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729-30 (3d Cir.) (observing that no “particular age difference” is required and that five years has been deemed sufficient to raise inference of age discrimination), cer t. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 , 115 S.Ct. 2611 , 132 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commissioner v. Schleier
green
2 sentences1998Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 , 115 S.Ct. 2159 , 132 L.Ed.2d 294 (1995) (holding that amounts received by a taxpayer in settlement of an ADEA claim were not within an exclusion to gross income provided by 26 U.S.C. § 104 (a)(2) for damages on account of personal injuries or sickness). 1998Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 , 115 S.Ct. 2159 , 132 L.Ed.2d 294 (1995) (holding that amounts received by a taxpayer in settlement of an ADEA claim were not within an exclusion to gross income provided by 26 U.S.C. § 104 (a)(2) for damages on account of personal injuries or sickness). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
green
2 sentences1994Therefore, those cases provide no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim. [ 500 U.S. at 35 , 111 S.Ct. at 1657 , 114 L.Ed. 2d at 43 .] Thus, it is clear that Lepore must be confined to claims for arbitration of CEPA claims arising under collective bargaining agreements and does not extend to similar claims arising under private employment agreements. 1994Therefore, those cases provide no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim. [ 500 U.S. at 35 , 111 S.Ct. at 1657 , 114 L.Ed. 2d at 43 .] Thus, it is clear that Lepore must be confined to claims for arbitration of CEPA claims arising under collective bargaining agreements and does not extend to similar claims arising under private employment agreements. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.