harmlessness standard in New York

2025Here, we must apply the harmlessness standard for violations of the Federal Constitution, under which an error may be disregarded only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the convictions, and the error was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 23-24; Fahy v Connecticut , 375 US 85, 86-87; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237, 241).

2025Here, we must apply the harmlessness standard for violations of the Federal Constitution, under which an error may be disregarded only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the convictions, and the error was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 23-24; Fahy v Connecticut , 375 US 85, 86-87; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237, 241).

2025Here, we must apply the harmlessness standard for violations of the Federal Constitution, under which an error may be disregarded only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the convictions, and the error was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 23-24; Fahy v Connecticut , 375 US 85, 86-87; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237, 241).

2025Here, we must apply the harmlessness standard for violations of the Federal Constitution, under which an error may be disregarded only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the convictions, and the error was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 23-24; Fahy v Connecticut , 375 US 85, 86-87; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237, 241).

2025Here, we must apply the harmlessness standard for violations of the Federal Constitution, under which an error may be disregarded only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the convictions, and the error was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 23-24; Fahy v Connecticut , 375 US 85, 86-87; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237, 241).

2025Here, we must apply the harmlessness standard for violations of the Federal Constitution, under which an error may be disregarded only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the convictions, and the error was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Chapman v California , 386 US 18, 23-24; Fahy v Connecticut , 375 US 85, 86-87; People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237, 241).

2018In this context, the doctrine of reviewability is concerned with whether the judgment "ensu[ed]" from the suppression determination (CPL 710.70 [2]); the doctrine of harmlessness, on the other hand, is concerned with whether there is any " reasonable possibility' " that a reviewable suppression determination " contributed to the plea' " ( People v Wells , 21 NY3d 716, 719 [2013], quoting People v Grant , 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]).

1980Significant too, as it was in Grant (supra, at p 379 ), is that in pleading guilty defendant did not waive his right to appeal.

2018In this context, the doctrine of reviewability is concerned with whether the judgment "ensu[ed]" from the suppression determination (CPL 710.70 [2]); the doctrine of harmlessness, on the other hand, is concerned with whether there is any " reasonable possibility' " that a reviewable suppression determination " contributed to the plea' " ( People v Wells , 21 NY3d 716, 719 [2013], quoting People v Grant , 45 NY2d 366, 379 [1978]).

2008In light of this corroboration (which, to reiterate, was unnecessary to entitle the People to take their case to the jury), it is apparent that any initial error in the exclusion of the expert testimony was ultimately revealed not to be error as the evidence unfolded at trial, or, considered otherwise, was harmless (cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001] [stating the harmlessness standard for errors in the admission of proscribed evidence]).