harmlessness inquiry in Kansas

2020He cites State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176, 183 , 224 P.3d 553 (2010), for the proposition that "failure to include elements of instruction [is] subject to constitutional harmless error test, even where not objected to below." The problem with Boeschling's argument on the harmlessness standard is that the district judge did not fail to include the correct mens rea element of burglary in this case.

2020He cites State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176, 183 , 224 P.3d 553 (2010), for the proposition that "failure to include elements of instruction [is] subject to constitutional harmless error test, even where not objected to below." The problem with Boeschling's argument on the harmlessness standard is that the district judge did not fail to include the correct mens rea element of burglary in this case.

2021If the defendant made the jury instruction argument below, the court must apply the test and applicable degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).

2021If the defendant made the jury instruction argument below, the court must apply the test and applicable degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).

2020Reversal for the judge's failure to instruct sua sponte on reckless second-degree murder is not required." 305 Kan. at 164; see also Gentry, 310 Kan. at 730 ("There is no question that if the jury had unanimously found Gentry guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, we would find the instructional error [refusing a requested instruction on unintentional but reckless second-degree murder] harmless under these facts."); State v. Barrett, 309 Kan. 1029 , 1039, 442 P.3d 492 (2019) (the skip rule "is not an automatic harmlessness pass," but "the logical deduction inherent in the skip rule is one

2019Rather, it is "one factor, among many, to be considered as part of the applicable harmlessness test." Barrett, 309 Kan. at 1039, 442 P.3d at 499 . 18 Relying on this reasoning, the State argues it is clear that any error in offering an instruction on the two forms of reckless homicide was harmless because the jury was instructed on second-degree murder and still convicted Gentry of first-degree murder.

2019The harmlessness test the Texas courts applied was whether the omission was "so egregious and created such harm that the defendant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial." 453 S.W.3d at 433 .

2019The harmlessness test the Texas courts applied was whether the omission was "so egregious and created such harm that the defendant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial." 453 S.W.3d at 433 .

2011Before the third factor can override the other two, it must satisfy the harmlessness test from both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 286 Kan. at 79 , 183 P.3d 801 .

2011Before the third factor can override the other two, it must satisfy the harmlessness test from both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 286 Kan. at 79 , 183 P.3d 801 .

2011We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(l). *58 Prosecutorial Misconduct Our review of prosecutorial misconduct claims has followed a now-familiar two-step analysis, which we have described as follows: “ ‘ “First, the court must determine whether the prosecutor’s statements were outside the wide latitude for language and manner a prosecutor is allowed when discussing the evidence; second, it must determine whether the comments constitute plain error, that is, whether the statements were so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the jury against the accused and de

2011We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(l). *58 Prosecutorial Misconduct Our review of prosecutorial misconduct claims has followed a now-familiar two-step analysis, which we have described as follows: “ ‘ “First, the court must determine whether the prosecutor’s statements were outside the wide latitude for language and manner a prosecutor is allowed when discussing the evidence; second, it must determine whether the comments constitute plain error, that is, whether the statements were so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the jury against the accused and de

2026As in Brown, there is nothing in the record that "'could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the element that the defendant was over the age of 18 at the time of the crime.'" State v. Brown, 298 Kan. 1040, 1049 , 318 P.3d 1005 (2014) (quoting Reyna, 290 Kan. at 682 ).

2026As in Brown, there is nothing in the record that "'could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the element that the defendant was over the age of 18 at the time of the crime.'" State v. Brown, 298 Kan. 1040, 1049 , 318 P.3d 1005 (2014) (quoting Reyna, 290 Kan. at 682 ).

2026The majority appropriately recognizes, in contrast to the State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373 , 228 P.3d 394 (2010), language by which the panel felt bound, that a pretrial violation of a defendant's right to counsel or right to self-representation at a critical stage may be subject to a harmlessness analysis under some circumstances.

2026The majority appropriately recognizes, in contrast to the State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373 , 228 P.3d 394 (2010), language by which the panel felt bound, that a pretrial violation of a defendant's right to counsel or right to self-representation at a critical stage may be subject to a harmlessness analysis under some circumstances.

2026State v. Allen, 322 Kan. __ , __, slip op. at 17 (citing State v. Cantu, 318 Kan. 759 , 772, 774, 547 P.3d 477 [2024]).

2026As in Brown, there is nothing in the record that "'could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the element that the defendant was over the age of 18 at the time of the crime.'" State v. Brown, 298 Kan. 1040, 1049 , 318 P.3d 1005 (2014) (quoting Reyna, 290 Kan. at 682 ).

2022In Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220-22 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2022In Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220-22 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2021State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 598-99 , 343 P.3d 1165 (2015).

2021State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 598-99 , 343 P.3d 1165 (2015).

2020If we find error, we move to a harmlessness analysis to "determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial." 311 Kan. at 910 (citing Chandler, 307 Kan. 657 , Syl. ¶ 6).

2020For support, the State cites State v. Butler, 257 Kan. 1043, 1062 , 897 P.2d 1007 (1995), where our Supreme Court held that unless errors at a preliminary hearing stage somehow prejudiced the trial, the errors are rendered harmless by the defendant being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2020For support, the State cites State v. Butler, 257 Kan. 1043, 1062 , 897 P.2d 1007 (1995), where our Supreme Court held that unless errors at a preliminary hearing stage somehow prejudiced the trial, the errors are rendered harmless by the defendant being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2019State v. McCullough , 293 Kan. 970 , 983, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012).

2019State v. McCullough , 293 Kan. 970 , 983, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012).

2016See 302 Kan. at 216 . *768 As we recently said: “Under the constitutional harmless error standard, we may declare an error harmless only if "’tire party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Verser, 299 Kan. at 789 (quoting Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-23 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2016If the constitutional error is reversible, an appellate court need not analyze whether the lower standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261 also has been met. [Citation omitted.] Under both standards, the party benefiting from the error bears the burden to demonstrate harmlessness. [Citation omitted.]" Hudgins, 301 Kan. at 646 - 47.