harmlessness error in Tennessee

2018“In assessing the harmlessness of the error, we do not consider whether the defendant would have testified but for the erroneous ruling—nor whether he would have declined to testify had the trial court excluded the murder and aggravated assault convictions but correctly allowed impeachment via the [aggravated robbery] conviction[].” Thompson, 36 S.W.3d at 112 (citing Galmore, 994 S.W.2d at 124-25 ).

2012Thompson, 36 S.W.3d at 112 (citing State v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Tenn. 1999)).

2015State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (discussing the harmlessness standard for constitutional errors).

2012Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 670 ; Sayles, 49 S.W.3d at 280 ; see also State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn.2008) (discussing the harmlessness standard for constitutional errors).

1997See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445, 450 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (concluding that ultimate question of admissibility of confession is not factual determination entitled to presumption of correctness).

1997See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445, 450 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (concluding that ultimate question of admissibility of confession is not factual determination entitled to presumption of correctness).

2015Whether an error is harmless depends upon various factors, including “„the importance of the witness‟ testimony in the prosecution‟s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross- examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution‟s case.‟” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 670 -71 (quoting Deleware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

2012Whether an error is harmless depends upon various factors, including “ ‘the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.’ ” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 670 -71 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 ).

2018Instead, this Court must examine the “theory of the defense”—gleaned from the arguments of counsel, the evidence presented in the defendant’s case-in-chief, and the cross-examination of the State’s witnesses—to determine “whether the erroneous impeachment would have had an impact on the result of the trial.” Id.; see also State v. Lankford, 298 S.W.3d 176, 182-83 (Tenn. Crim.

2008P. *374 36(b), they must be careful to avoid becoming a second jury 29 by conflating the harmlessness inquiry with their own assessment of the defendant’s guilt. 30 The analysis is more than simply a calculation of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction. 31 It requires a careful examination of the entire record to determine whether the non-constitutional error involving a substantial right “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” See State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d at 231 (finding an error to be harmful even though

2008P. *374 36(b), they must be careful to avoid becoming a second jury 29 by conflating the harmlessness inquiry with their own assessment of the defendant’s guilt. 30 The analysis is more than simply a calculation of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction. 31 It requires a careful examination of the entire record to determine whether the non-constitutional error involving a substantial right “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” See State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d at 231 (finding an error to be harmful even though

2008P. *374 36(b), they must be careful to avoid becoming a second jury 29 by conflating the harmlessness inquiry with their own assessment of the defendant’s guilt. 30 The analysis is more than simply a calculation of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction. 31 It requires a careful examination of the entire record to determine whether the non-constitutional error involving a substantial right “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” See State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d at 231 (finding an error to be harmful even though

2008P. *374 36(b), they must be careful to avoid becoming a second jury 29 by conflating the harmlessness inquiry with their own assessment of the defendant’s guilt. 30 The analysis is more than simply a calculation of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction. 31 It requires a careful examination of the entire record to determine whether the non-constitutional error involving a substantial right “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” See State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d at 231 (finding an error to be harmful even though

2008P. *374 36(b), they must be careful to avoid becoming a second jury 29 by conflating the harmlessness inquiry with their own assessment of the defendant’s guilt. 30 The analysis is more than simply a calculation of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction. 31 It requires a careful examination of the entire record to determine whether the non-constitutional error involving a substantial right “more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process.” See State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d at 231 (finding an error to be harmful even though

2001See Ch apma n v. Californ ia, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (196 7); State v. Jason Thomas Beeler, No. W1999-01417-CC A-R3-C D, slip op. at 31 -32 (Te nn.

2001See Ch apma n v. Californ ia, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (196 7); State v. Jason Thomas Beeler, No. W1999-01417-CC A-R3-C D, slip op. at 31 -32 (Te nn.