harmlessness standard in California

2023Was this BB gun being used as a deadly weapon? 5 Defendant argues, under People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116 and Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46 , the legal error in this case is of the type “generally requiring reversal.” (Guiton, at p. 1128.) Without disputing that general proposition, our Supreme Court in Aledamat noted Guiton, which dealt with purely factual error, simultaneously recognized “that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8 , citing Guiton, at p. 1129.) Aledamat, not Guiton, establishes th

2023While the appeal was pending, we decided Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1 , which addressed the harmlessness standard for alternative-theory error, where the jury was instructed with valid and invalid theories of liability.

2024(See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671 , 683–684 (Saddler) [assessing the harmlessness of an instruction under CALJIC 2.62, the precursor to CALCRIM No. 361].) He failed to do so.

2023(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671 , 683–684 (Saddler) [assessing the harmlessness of an instruction under CALJIC 2.62, the precursor to CALCRIM No. 361].) He failed to do so.

2023(See Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 839-843 [noting that the factual record may not be the same if the aggravating circumstances were tried to a jury, 11 and that for those factors with a “somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court” to conclude a jury would reach the same conclusion as the trial court].) Because not all aggravating factors survive the first step of the harmlessness analysis, we next ask whether it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have imposed a shorter sentence if it had relied only on permissible factors.

2023(Berdoll, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) In Flores, the court concluded that remand was not required under Senate Bill No. 567 where a trial court has imposed an upper-term sentence “ ‘[i]f a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-the-reasonable- doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury.’ ” (Flores, at p. 500, quoting People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839 .) At Flores’s sentencing, which took place after a jury trial, the trial court listed sever

2023Its analysis became erroneous due to Assembly Bill 2361’s retroactive change in the law. 6 favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”’” (Gonzalez, at p. 195, quoting Watson, at p. 837.) T.A. proposes that instead we should apply the harmless error analysis articulated in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Gutierrez).

2023Its analysis became erroneous due to Assembly Bill 2361’s retroactive change in the law. 6 favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”’” (Gonzalez, at p. 195, quoting Watson, at p. 837.) T.A. proposes that instead we should apply the harmless error analysis articulated in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Gutierrez).

2021Chapman asks “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 , italics omitted.) “Thus, to say that [the error] … did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403-404 , overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, fn. 4 .) The People are correct both in the standa

1998As we held in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury verdict that he is guilty of the crime, and absent such a verdict the conviction must be reversed, `no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be.' [Citation.] A jury verdict that he is guilty of the crime means, of course, a verdict that he is guilty of each necessary element of the crime.

2000And of course the foundational constitutional requirement, in determining the harmlessness of such error, is Chapman v. California 's mandate that the `court must be able to declare a belief that [the denial of counsel] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" ( People v. Dagnino, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 989 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 , italics in original.) [7] The trial judge now serves as a member of the federal judiciary. [8] The futility of a remand here is additionally demonstrated by Alcantar, supra, 897 F.2d 436 .

2000And of course the foundational constitutional requirement, in determining the harmlessness of such error, is Chapman v. California 's mandate that the `court must be able to declare a belief that [the denial of counsel] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" ( People v. Dagnino, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 989 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 , italics in original.) [7] The trial judge now serves as a member of the federal judiciary. [8] The futility of a remand here is additionally demonstrated by Alcantar, supra, 897 F.2d 436 .

2000And of course the foundational constitutional requirement, in determining the harmlessness of such error, is Chapman v. California 's mandate that the `court must be able to declare a belief that [the denial of counsel] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" ( People v. Dagnino, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 989 , 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 , italics in original.) [7] The trial judge now serves as a member of the federal judiciary. [8] The futility of a remand here is additionally demonstrated by Alcantar, supra, 897 F.2d 436 .

2000The futility of a remand here is additionally demonstrated by Alcantar, supra, 897 F.2d 436 .

2025(People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793 , 827.) “The ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by “‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’” but rather by evidence from which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.’” [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538 .) “Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 .) Because the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is nonstructural state l

2025(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 428 .) The error, if any, was harmless under this standard.

2025(McNeal, at p. 1203; Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999 .) II.

2025(McNeal, at p. 1203; Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999 .) II.

2025(People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793 , 827.) “The ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by “‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’” but rather by evidence from which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.’” [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538 .) “Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 .) Because the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is nonstructural state l

2025(People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793 , 827.) “The ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by “‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’” but rather by evidence from which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.’” [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538 .) “Speculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 .) Because the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is nonstructural state l

2025(People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203 .) In addition, because the trial court excluded only some of the evidence supporting Monge’s claim of self-defense and did not otherwise preclude him from presenting the 15 defense, we reject Monge’s contention that the claimed error amounted to a federal constitutional error warranting review under the more stringent harmlessness standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .

2024(See F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108 .) Consistent with the foregoing harmlessness analysis, the alleged errors raised here do not belong in that class.

2023Was this BB gun being used as a deadly weapon? 5 Defendant argues, under People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116 and Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46 , the legal error in this case is of the type “generally requiring reversal.” (Guiton, at p. 1128.) Without disputing that general proposition, our Supreme Court in Aledamat noted Guiton, which dealt with purely factual error, simultaneously recognized “that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8 , citing Guiton, at p. 1129.) Aledamat, not Guiton, establishes th

2023Was this BB gun being used as a deadly weapon? 5 Defendant argues, under People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116 and Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46 , the legal error in this case is of the type “generally requiring reversal.” (Guiton, at p. 1128.) Without disputing that general proposition, our Supreme Court in Aledamat noted Guiton, which dealt with purely factual error, simultaneously recognized “that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8 , citing Guiton, at p. 1129.) Aledamat, not Guiton, establishes th

2023Was this BB gun being used as a deadly weapon? 5 Defendant argues, under People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116 and Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46 , the legal error in this case is of the type “generally requiring reversal.” (Guiton, at p. 1128.) Without disputing that general proposition, our Supreme Court in Aledamat noted Guiton, which dealt with purely factual error, simultaneously recognized “that this does not mean that reversal is always required when the error is legal.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8 , citing Guiton, at p. 1129.) Aledamat, not Guiton, establishes th

2023Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s assertions are the “statements of advocates.” Thus, argument should “not be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131 .) Again relying on the harmlessness analysis in Letner and Tobin, the Attorney General also argues it is unlikely the jury felt compelled to resolve any possible ambiguity with regard to the intent required for an aider and abettor.