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7 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1899–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thomson v. Wadegreen2 sentences1999In this case, the court declined to follow the third-party beneficiary doctrine set forth in Zamiarski , concluding that it was in direct contravention to the long-accepted rule in this State “that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called ‘stranger to the deed’, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party” (Matter of Estate of Thomson v Wade, supra, at 573-574; see, Tuscarora Club v Brown, 215 NY 543 ). 1993(Matter of Estate of Thompson v Wade, 69 NY2d 570 , supra.) . | 1 | 2 |
Tuscarora Club of Millbrook v. Browngreen2 sentences1999In this case, the court declined to follow the third-party beneficiary doctrine set forth in Zamiarski , concluding that it was in direct contravention to the long-accepted rule in this State “that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called ‘stranger to the deed’, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party” (Matter of Estate of Thomson v Wade, supra, at 573-574; see, Tuscarora Club v Brown, 215 NY 543 ). 1987The long-accepted rule in this State holds that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called "stranger to the deed”, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party (see, Tuscarora Club v Brown, 215 NY 543 ; Beardslee v New Berlin Light & Power Co., 207 NY 34, 39 ; see generally, 3 Powell, Real Property, Easements by Express Conveyance, If 407; 2 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property, Easements § 4.02 [4th ed]). | 1 | 2 |
Riggs v. . Palmergreen1 sentence2013In Riggs v Palmer ( 115 NY 506, 511 [1889]), the Court of Appeals articulated the long-accepted principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” The principle appears to be an adaptation of the equity maxim “ex turpi causa non oritur actio,” or in other words, that persons may not rely upon their own violations of law as a basis for a claim. | 1 | 1 |
MATTER OF ANDRIOLA v. Ortizgreen1 sentence1995The "one-in-three” rule currently set forth in Civil Service Law § 61 embodies the long-accepted principle that, within the constraints of the constitutional merit and fitness requirements (NY Const, art V, § 6), appointing authorities are to be accorded complete discretion in their choice of civil service appointees (see, Matter of Andriola v Ortiz, supra, at 324; Matter of Berger v Walsh, 291 NY 220, 223 ; People ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People Ex Rel. Balcom v. . Mosher
green
1 sentence1995Balcom v Mosher, 163 NY 32 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Matter of Berger v. Walsh
green
1 sentence1995The "one-in-three” rule currently set forth in Civil Service Law § 61 embodies the long-accepted principle that, within the constraints of the constitutional merit and fitness requirements (NY Const, art V, § 6), appointing authorities are to be accorded complete discretion in their choice of civil service appointees (see, Matter of Andriola v Ortiz, supra, at 324; Matter of Berger v Walsh, 291 NY 220, 223 ; People ex rel. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
James v. Alderton Dock Yards, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1990But additionally, it seems plain that the purpose of those words in section 3 is to differentiate mechanics’ liens from equitable liens created by contract (see, James v Alderton Dock Yards, 256 NY 298, 303 ) and common-law liens on personal property (see, Deeley v Dwight, 132 NY 59, 63 ). 1990But additionally, it seems plain that the purpose of those words in section 3 is to differentiate mechanics' liens from equitable liens created by contract ( see , James v Alderton Dock Yards , 256 N.Y. 298, 303 ) and common-law liens on personal property ( see , Deeley v Dwight , 132 N.Y. 59, 63 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Deeley v. . Dwight
neutral
2 sentences1990But additionally, it seems plain that the purpose of those words in section 3 is to differentiate mechanics’ liens from equitable liens created by contract (see, James v Alderton Dock Yards, 256 NY 298, 303 ) and common-law liens on personal property (see, Deeley v Dwight, 132 NY 59, 63 ). 1990But additionally, it seems plain that the purpose of those words in section 3 is to differentiate mechanics' liens from equitable liens created by contract ( see , James v Alderton Dock Yards , 256 N.Y. 298, 303 ) and common-law liens on personal property ( see , Deeley v Dwight , 132 N.Y. 59, 63 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist
green
1 sentence1987Plaintiff invites us to abandon this rule and adopt the minority view which would recognize an interest reserved or excepted in favor of a stranger to the deed, if such was the clearly discernible intent of the grantor (see, e.g., Willard v First Church of Christ, 7 Cal 3d 473, 476-479, 498 P2d 987 ; Townsend v Cable, 378 SW2d 806 [Ky]; Medhus v Dutter, 184 Mont 437, 444 , 603 P2d 669 ; Restatement of Property § 472, comment [b]). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Medhus v. Dutter
green
2 sentences1987Plaintiff invites us to abandon this rule and adopt the minority view which would recognize an interest reserved or excepted in favor of a stranger to the deed, if such was the clearly discernible intent of the grantor (see, e.g., Willard v First Church of Christ, 7 Cal 3d 473, 476-479, 498 P2d 987 ; Townsend v Cable, 378 SW2d 806 [Ky]; Medhus v Dutter, 184 Mont 437, 444 , 603 P2d 669 ; Restatement of Property § 472, comment [b]). 1987Plaintiff invites us to abandon this rule and adopt the minority view which would recognize an interest reserved or excepted in favor of a stranger to the deed, if such was the clearly discernible intent of the grantor (see, e.g., Willard v First Church of Christ, 7 Cal 3d 473, 476-479, 498 P2d 987 ; Townsend v Cable, 378 SW2d 806 [Ky]; Medhus v Dutter, 184 Mont 437, 444 , 603 P2d 669 ; Restatement of Property § 472, comment [b]). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Beardslee v. New Berlin Light & Power Co.
green
1 sentence1987The long-accepted rule in this State holds that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called "stranger to the deed”, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party (see, Tuscarora Club v Brown, 215 NY 543 ; Beardslee v New Berlin Light & Power Co., 207 NY 34, 39 ; see generally, 3 Powell, Real Property, Easements by Express Conveyance, If 407; 2 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property, Easements § 4.02 [4th ed]). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Townsend v. Cable
green
1 sentence1987Plaintiff invites us to abandon this rule and adopt the minority view which would recognize an interest reserved or excepted in favor of a stranger to the deed, if such was the clearly discernible intent of the grantor (see, e.g., Willard v First Church of Christ, 7 Cal 3d 473, 476-479, 498 P2d 987 ; Townsend v Cable, 378 SW2d 806 [Ky]; Medhus v Dutter, 184 Mont 437, 444 , 603 P2d 669 ; Restatement of Property § 472, comment [b]). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Bryan v. Cattell
green
1 sentence1899Corp. In Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538 , the rule was laid down that: “Incompatibility in offices exists where the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one incumbent to retain both.” This seems to have been the long-accepted rule; for in 7 Bac. | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.