three-tiered analysis in New York

2004In 1996 the Court of Appeals dispensed with the three tiered test and held that "each relocation request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child." Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 at 739 , 665 NE2d 145 at 150 , 642 NYS2d 575 at 580 .

2004In 1996 the Court of Appeals dispensed with the three tiered test and held that "each relocation request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child." Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 at 739 , 665 NE2d 145 at 150 , 642 NYS2d 575 at 580 .

2006The Nassau County Supreme Court adopted a three-tiered test that “escapes the inconsistency flowing from a dry and literal application of the language, in favor of one that meets the legislative goal[ ]” that “all constituent elements [of a statute] ... be harmonized with the general intent of the whole.” (Gabberty v Pisarz, 10 Misc 3d 1010, 1015, 1017 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2005], citing McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 98.) The court, in the nature of dicta, opined that the phrase means “(1) a deliberate misstatement or misstatements in a fully completed and timely delivered st

1996The lower courts have not settled on a uniform method of defining "meaningful access” (compare, Bennett v Bennett, supra, at 1043 [ability to maintain "close and meaningful relationship with * * * children], with Matter of Radford v Propper, supra, at 99 ["frequent and regular access”]), and even the distance of the move has not been a reliable indicator of whether the "meaningful access” test has been satisfied (compare, Rybicki v Rybicki, supra [disapproving 84-mile move], with Matter of Schouten v Schouten, 155 AD2d 461 , supra [approving 258-mile move]; Murphy v Murphy, 145 AD2d 857 , supr

1996The lower courts have not settled on a uniform method of defining "meaningful access” (compare, Bennett v Bennett, supra, at 1043 [ability to maintain "close and meaningful relationship with * * * children], with Matter of Radford v Propper, supra, at 99 ["frequent and regular access”]), and even the distance of the move has not been a reliable indicator of whether the "meaningful access” test has been satisfied (compare, Rybicki v Rybicki, supra [disapproving 84-mile move], with Matter of Schouten v Schouten, 155 AD2d 461 , supra [approving 258-mile move]; Murphy v Murphy, 145 AD2d 857 , supr

1996Under the Tropea standard, "each relocation request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances * * * with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child” (Matter of Tropea v Tropea, supra, at 739; see, Matter of Harder v Yandoh, 228 AD2d 814 ).

1996We note that the hearing and motion to dismiss the subsequent modification petition were decided under the three-tiered analysis formerly applied in relocation cases, "under which courts would first consider whether the proposed relocation would deprive the noncustodial parent of 'regular and meaningful access to the child’ ” (Matter of King v Mitchell, 229 AD2d 710, 711 , quoting Matter of Lake v Lake, 192 AD2d 751, 753 ).

1996After Family Court rendered its decisions, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 ) embraced an open-ended balancing approach (see, Matter of King v Mitchell, supra, at 711) and enunciated a new standard where "each relocation request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances * * * with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child” (Matter of Tropea v Tropea, supra, at 739).

1990Therefore, guided by the First Department’s Porter decision (supra) and the Court of Appeals trend of placing an absolute duty on the prosecutor to disclose all witnesses’ prior statements to the defense (People v Jones, 70 NY2d 547, 550 [1987]; People v Novoa, 70 NY2d 490, 498-499 [1987]), this court ruled that failure to turn over specifically requested Brady material was per se reversible error.

1990Therefore, guided by the First Department’s Porter decision (supra) and the Court of Appeals trend of placing an absolute duty on the prosecutor to disclose all witnesses’ prior statements to the defense (People v Jones, 70 NY2d 547, 550 [1987]; People v Novoa, 70 NY2d 490, 498-499 [1987]), this court ruled that failure to turn over specifically requested Brady material was per se reversible error.