indirect claim (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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indirect claim in Ohio

7 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Comer v. Risko green
ohio · 2005
2 sentences

2020"Agency by estoppel is not a direct claim against a hospital, but an indirect claim for the vicarious liability of an independent contractor with whom the hospital contracted for professional services." Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005-Ohio-4559 , ¶ 27.

2012Agency by Estoppel {¶ 16} “Agency by estoppel is not a direct claim against a hospital, but an indirect claim for the vicarious liability of an independent contractor with whom the hospital contracted for professional services.” Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005-Ohio-4559 , 833 N.E.2d 712 , ¶ 27.

62010–2020
Albain v. Flower Hospital green
ohio · 1990
2 sentences

2012(Albain v. Flower Hosp. [1990], 50 Ohio St.3d 251 , 553 N.E.2d 1038 , paragraph four of the syllabus, overruled.) {¶54} Subsequently, in Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 833 N.E.2d 712 , 2005-Ohio-4559 , ¶ 27–28, the Supreme Court explained: Agency by estoppel is not a direct claim against a hospital, but an indirect claim for the vicarious liability of an independent contractor with whom the hospital contracted for professional services.

2012(Albain v. Flower Hosp. [1990], 50 Ohio St.3d 251 , 553 N.E.2d 1038 , paragraph four of the syllabus, overruled.) {¶54} Subsequently, in Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 833 N.E.2d 712 , 2005-Ohio-4559 , ¶ 27–28, the Supreme Court explained: Agency by estoppel is not a direct claim against a hospital, but an indirect claim for the vicarious liability of an independent contractor with whom the hospital contracted for professional services.

22010–2012
Tausch v. Riverview Health Institute, L.L.C. green
ohioctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2011Relying on these cases, in Tausch v. Riverview Health Inst., L.L.C., 187 Ohio App.3d 173 , 2010-Ohio-502 , 931 N.E.2d 613 , this court observed that “ ‘agency by estoppel is a derivative claim of vicarious liability whereby the liability of the hospital must flow through the independent-contractor physician.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Comer v. Risko at ¶ 28. {¶ 31} Here, the Copes properly alleged this agency theory in their motion to reconsider as an avenue by which agency might be proven.

2011Relying on these cases, in Tausch v. Riverview Health Inst., L.L.C., 187 Ohio App.3d 173 , 2010-Ohio-502 , 931 N.E.2d 613 , this court observed that “ ‘agency by estoppel is a derivative claim of vicarious liability whereby the liability of the hospital must flow through the independent-contractor physician.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Comer v. Risko at ¶ 28. {¶ 31} Here, the Copes properly alleged this agency theory in their motion to reconsider as an avenue by which agency might be proven.

12011–2011
Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Center green
ohio · 1994
1 sentence

2011Thus, this argument is properly before this court. {¶ 29} “A hospital may be held liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the negligence of independent medical practitioners practicing in the hospital when: (1) it holds itself out to the public as a provider of medical services; and (2) in the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to the individual practitioner, to provide competent medical care.” Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 435 , 628 N.E.2d 46 , syllabus. {¶ 30} “Agency by estoppel is n

12011–2011
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

2000Mauzy v. Kelly Serv., Inc. , 75 Ohio St.3d at 582 , citing Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146 , 147-48 , and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792 , 802 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 677 .

2000Mauzy v. Kelly Serv., Inc. , 75 Ohio St.3d at 582 , citing Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146 , 147-48 , and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792 , 802 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 677 .

12000–2000
Barker v. Scovill, Inc. green
ohio · 1983
1 sentence

2000Mauzy v. Kelly Serv., Inc. , 75 Ohio St.3d at 582 , citing Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146 , 147-48 , and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792 , 802 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 677 .

12000–2000
Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. green
ohio · 1996
1 sentence

2000Mauzy v. Kelly Serv., Inc. , 75 Ohio St.3d at 582 , citing Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146 , 147-48 , and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792 , 802 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 677 .

12000–2000

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.113 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NJ 8 (1981–2020) CA 8 (1925–2025) OH 7 (2000–2020) IA 6 (1907–2025) FL 5 (1930–2002) IL 4 (1974–2025) DE 3 (1992–2015) TN 3 (1923–2009) VA 3 (2014–2023) TX 3 (1980–2023) AR 2 (1997–2017) MN 2 (1985–2011) AL 2 (1987–2007) PA 2 (1981–1987) IN 2 (2004–2019) HI 2 (1989–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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