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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garcia v. Laceygreen1 sentence2025(See Garcia, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 407, fn. 5 [a litigation “is finally determined when avenues for direct review (appeal) have been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired”].) Madhu contends the trial court made erroneous or false statements of fact by finding Madhu (1) engaged in relitigation by filing four lawsuits against Moreno and (2) allowed one case to remain unprosecuted for five years. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Clairgreen1 sentence2022(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339-1340 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662 (Clair).) When the prosecutor’s comments are claimed to be an indirect violation of Griffin, the standard of review is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury misconstrued or misapplied the prosecutor’s comment to refer to the defendant’s failure to testify. | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1965That contention is merely an indirect claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict exonerating said defendant of negligence. ‘ ‘ Such contention requires defendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.” (Nichols v. Mitchell, 32 Cal.2d 598, 600 [ 197 P.2d 550 ].) This entails the further burden of setting forth in appellants’ brief “all material evidence upon the point, not merely his own proofs ... ; if this is not done the point is deemed waived. ...” (Davis v. Lucas, 180 Cal.App.2d 407, 409 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 479 ].) Appellants 1965That contention is merely an indirect claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict exonerating said defendant of negligence. ‘ ‘ Such contention requires defendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.” (Nichols v. Mitchell, 32 Cal.2d 598, 600 [ 197 P.2d 550 ].) This entails the further burden of setting forth in appellants’ brief “all material evidence upon the point, not merely his own proofs ... ; if this is not done the point is deemed waived. ...” (Davis v. Lucas, 180 Cal.App.2d 407, 409 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 479 ].) Appellants | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Lucasgreen2 sentences1965That contention is merely an indirect claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict exonerating said defendant of negligence. ‘ ‘ Such contention requires defendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.” (Nichols v. Mitchell, 32 Cal.2d 598, 600 [ 197 P.2d 550 ].) This entails the further burden of setting forth in appellants’ brief “all material evidence upon the point, not merely his own proofs ... ; if this is not done the point is deemed waived. ...” (Davis v. Lucas, 180 Cal.App.2d 407, 409 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 479 ].) Appellants 1965That contention is merely an indirect claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict exonerating said defendant of negligence. ‘ ‘ Such contention requires defendants to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.” (Nichols v. Mitchell, 32 Cal.2d 598, 600 [ 197 P.2d 550 ].) This entails the further burden of setting forth in appellants’ brief “all material evidence upon the point, not merely his own proofs ... ; if this is not done the point is deemed waived. ...” (Davis v. Lucas, 180 Cal.App.2d 407, 409 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 479 ].) Appellants | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Estate of Burton
green
1 sentence2024In In re Estate of Burton (1892) 93 Cal. 459 (Burton), the court held that the enactment of former Code of Civil Procedure section 1664, a predecessor to section 11700, was an express authorization and requirement that the probate court determine the interest of persons with an indirect claim to ownership of the estate. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2022(Tomlinson v. Qualcomm (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 934, 940-941 .) In the absence of an arbitrary and capricious decision, we will defer to the agency’s expertise (Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 355 ), and “will not . . . venture into an independent determination of the wisdom of the challenged regulation” or “substitute our judgment for that of the agency with respect to such things as the existence and weight to be accorded the facts and policy considerations . . . .” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 9 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Bradford
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339-1340 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662 (Clair).) When the prosecutor’s comments are claimed to be an indirect violation of Griffin, the standard of review is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury misconstrued or misapplied the prosecutor’s comment to refer to the defendant’s failure to testify. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Western States Petroleum Ass'n v. State Department of Health Serverces
green
1 sentence2022(Tomlinson v. Qualcomm (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 934, 940-941 .) In the absence of an arbitrary and capricious decision, we will defer to the agency’s expertise (Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 355 ), and “will not . . . venture into an independent determination of the wisdom of the challenged regulation” or “substitute our judgment for that of the agency with respect to such things as the existence and weight to be accorded the facts and policy considerations . . . .” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 9 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022(Tomlinson v. Qualcomm (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 934, 940-941 .) In the absence of an arbitrary and capricious decision, we will defer to the agency’s expertise (Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 355 ), and “will not . . . venture into an independent determination of the wisdom of the challenged regulation” or “substitute our judgment for that of the agency with respect to such things as the existence and weight to be accorded the facts and policy considerations . . . .” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 9 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Herring
green
1 sentence2020The defendant’s indirect challenge to this evidence as prosecutorial misconduct is thus misplaced. 31 Cal.3d at p. 866; People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1074 .) The principal witnesses, defendant and N.J., had wildly divergent accounts of their financial dealings. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Van Houten
green
2 sentences2009(Citing Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 ; In re McClendon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 315 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 278 ] (hereafter McClendon); and In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] (hereafter Van Houten).) We are not persuaded. 2009(Citing Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 ; In re McClendon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 315 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 278 ] (hereafter McClendon); and In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] (hereafter Van Houten).) We are not persuaded. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re McClendon
green
2 sentences2009(Citing Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 ; In re McClendon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 315 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 278 ] (hereafter McClendon); and In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] (hereafter Van Houten).) We are not persuaded. 2009(Citing Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 ; In re McClendon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 315 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 278 ] (hereafter McClendon); and In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] (hereafter Van Houten).) We are not persuaded. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In re Shaputis
green
2 sentences2009(Citing Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 ; In re McClendon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 315 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 278 ] (hereafter McClendon ); and In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] (hereafter Van Houten ).) We are not persuaded. 2009(Citing Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241 ; In re McClendon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 315 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 278 ] (hereafter McClendon); and In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 ] (hereafter Van Houten).) We are not persuaded. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Christensen v. . Eno
green
1 sentence1925Rep. 429 , 12 N. E. 648 ].) It is only the ‘capital stock’ in this strict sense of the term, and not the other capital or assets of the corporation, which may not be withdrawn or divided without indirectly frustrating the purpose of section 11 of article XII—assuming, without deciding, that the withdrawal or distribution of any of the capital stock would be tantamount to an indirect violation of that provision of our organic law. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.