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7 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1924–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 720639green1 sentence2017In a sense, the presumption language ... means that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the peer review process was not reasonable." Matthews, 87 F.3d at 633 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hankin v. Harbison
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Chamberlain
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Austin v. McNamara
green
1 sentence1996This court, citing Austin, supra, said that the “reasonableness” requirements of section 11112(a) create an objective standard and that this section’s rebuttable presumption creates an unusual standard of review for summary judgment because the inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that he has overcome, by a preponderance of the evidence, the presumption that physicians in the defendants’ position would reasonably have believed that their actions were warranted by the facts. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
McDonald v. Keystone Insurance
green
2 sentences1986Co., 313 Pa.Super. 404 , 459 A.2d 1292 (1983), the argument that defendant insurer is es-topped from raising the defense of non-permission because the insurer failed to warn him of the limitation makes no sense as applied to this case. 1986Co., 313 Pa.Super. 404 , 459 A.2d 1292 (1983), the argument that defendant insurer is es-topped from raising the defense of non-permission because the insurer failed to warn him of the limitation makes no sense as applied to this case. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Damon v. Berger
green
2 sentences1967Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417 , 211 A. 2d 503 (1965); Damon & Foster v. Berger, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 155 A. 2d 388 (1959). 5 When relating to the time of doing something, “shall” has usually been considered directory. 1967Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417 , 211 A. 2d 503 (1965); Damon & Foster v. Berger, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 155 A. 2d 388 (1959). 5 When relating to the time of doing something, “shall” has usually been considered directory. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Francis v. Corleto
green
2 sentences1967Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417 , 211 A. 2d 503 (1965); Damon & Foster v. Berger, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 155 A. 2d 388 (1959). 5 When relating to the time of doing something, “shall” has usually been considered directory. 1967Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417 , 211 A. 2d 503 (1965); Damon & Foster v. Berger, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 155 A. 2d 388 (1959). 5 When relating to the time of doing something, “shall” has usually been considered directory. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Sharpless v. Boldt
neutral
1 sentence1924As was said by Chief Justice Mitchell, in Sharpless v. Boldt, 218 Pa. 372 : “Party walls are creatures of statutes. [In effect] they are provisions for taking one man’s property for the private use of another; which, in general, is beyond the legislative power even for police purposes. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.