unusual factors in California

2021(Beltran, at p. 949.) 4 Nevertheless, a killing reaction “is [an] extraordinary reaction, the unusual exception to the general expectation that the ordinary person will not kill even when provoked.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 949 .) 17 The trial court instructed the jury on the correct analysis to employ in assessing provocation and heat of passion, and that it was to follow the court’s instructions, not the attorneys’ description of the law, to the extent there was any conflict.

2014Such a killing is not justified but understandable in light of ‘the frailty of human nature.’ [Citation.] The killing reaction therefore is the extraordinary reaction, the unusual exception to the general expectation that the 14 ordinary person will not kill even when provoked.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 949 .) In the instant case, there is no prosecutorial misconduct.

2013Such a killing is not justified but understandable in light of “the frailty of human nature.” (Maher, supra, 10 Mich. at p. 219 .) The killing reaction therefore is the extraordinary reaction, the unusual exception to the general expectation that the ordinary person will not kill even when provoked.

2013Such a killing is not justified but understandable in light of “the frailty of human nature.” (Maher, supra, 10 Mich. at p. 219 .) The killing reaction therefore is the extraordinary reaction, the unusual exception to the general expectation that the ordinary person will not kill even when provoked.

2024As an aggravating factor, victim vulnerability means “defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.” (People v. Smith (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 433, 436 .) “[A]ggravating a sentence due to ‘particular vulnerability,’ where vulnerability is based solely on age, is improper when age is an element of the offense. [Citations.] However, ‘particular vulnerability’ is determined in light of the ‘total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred . . . .’ ” (People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1693-1694 , disapproved on

2024As an aggravating factor, victim vulnerability means “defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.” (People v. Smith (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 433, 436 .) “[A]ggravating a sentence due to ‘particular vulnerability,’ where vulnerability is based solely on age, is improper when age is an element of the offense. [Citations.] However, ‘particular vulnerability’ is determined in light of the ‘total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred . . . .’ ” (People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1693-1694 , disapproved on

2024As an aggravating factor, victim vulnerability means “defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.” (People v. Smith (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 433, 436 .) “[A]ggravating a sentence due to ‘particular vulnerability,’ where vulnerability is based solely on age, is improper when age is an element of the offense. [Citations.] However, ‘particular vulnerability’ is determined in light of the ‘total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred . . . .’ ” (People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1693-1694 , disapproved on

2007In the absence of any of the unusual factors present in Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th 121 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132 , 980 P.2d 846 , or any compelling United States Supreme Court authority, it is inescapable that the injunction here is an impermissible prior restraint on defendant's speech.

2007In the absence of any of the unusual factors present in Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th 121 , or any compelling United States Supreme Court authority, it is inescapable that the injunction here is an impermissible prior restraint on defendant’s speech.

2006Respirable asbestos fibers may be released from friable asbestos-containing materials when these materials are disturbed.” (Ibid.) “Thus, the timing problem unique to asbestos cases leads us to the unusual inquiry posed by this appeal—when does ‘injury’ occur such that a strict liability or negligence cause of action accrues and the limitations period commences in an asbestos-in-building case?” (Ibid.) The First District acknowledged that a “threat of future harm not yet realized . . . normally does not suffice to create a cause of action.” (SFUSD, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 .) “The dang

2006Respirable asbestos fibers may be released from friable asbestos-containing materials when these materials are disturbed.” (Ibid.) “Thus, the timing problem unique to asbestos cases leads us to the unusual inquiry posed by this appeal—when does ‘injury’ occur such that a strict liability or negligence cause of action accrues and the limitations period commences in an asbestos-in-building case?” (Ibid.) The First District acknowledged that a “threat of future harm not yet realized . . . normally does not suffice to create a cause of action.” (SFUSD, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 .) “The dang

2004This the court did, using the term ‘exclusive prescriptive easement,’ an unusual doctrine which does not apply.” (Silacci, at p. 564.) Little more than a month after the Silacci decision, another appellate court reached the same result under similar facts in Mehdizadeh v. Mincer, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th 1296 .

2003Offering an alternative to insurance does not mean that the alternative is insurance. 6 The Department’s reliance on Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 , 18 P.3d 29 ], to support its contention is misplaced.

2003Offering an alternative to insurance does not mean that the alternative is insurance. 6 The Department’s reliance on Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 , 18 P.3d 29 ], to support its contention is misplaced.

1988McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) Defendant complains of trial counsel’s undue candor regarding the heinous nature of the offense, the unusual defense theory, and counsel’s (and his wife’s) own initial skepticism and aversion.

1988McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) Defendant complains of trial counsel’s undue candor regarding the heinous nature of the offense, the unusual defense theory, and counsel’s (and his wife’s) own initial skepticism and aversion.

1985The court acknowledged the potential prejudice but concluded that the probative value of the evidence was sufficient to warrant its admission in light of the unusual factors of the cutting off of the victim's head and hands: "The circumstances are about as unique and different as any case that I have ever seen, and there are certain earmarks of the case that seem to be closely related with the possibility that the defendant may have intended to do something along the same lines to some other person who was standing in his way; that is, who was a threat to him as far as his liberty was concerne

1985The court acknowledged the potential prejudice but concluded that the probative value of the evidence was sufficient to warrant its admission in light of the unusual factors of the cutting off of the victim's head and hands: "The circumstances are about as unique and different as any case that I have ever seen, and there are certain earmarks of the case that seem to be closely related with the possibility that the defendant may have intended to do something along the same lines to some other person who was standing in his way; that is, who was a threat to him as far as his liberty was concerne

1985The court acknowledged the potential prejudice but concluded that the probative value of the evidence was sufficient to warrant its admission in light of the unusual factors of the cutting off of the victim's head and hands: "The circumstances are about as unique and different as any case that I have ever seen, and there are certain earmarks of the case that seem to be closely related with the possibility that the defendant may have intended to do something along the same lines to some other person who was standing in his way; that is, who was a threat to him as far as his liberty was concerne

1985The court acknowledged the potential prejudice but concluded that the probative value of the evidence was sufficient to warrant its admission in light of the unusual factors of the cutting off of the victim's head and hands: "The circumstances are about as unique and different as any case that I have ever seen, and there are certain earmarks of the case that seem to be closely related with the possibility that the defendant may have intended to do something along the same lines to some other person who was standing in his way; that is, who was a threat to him as far as his liberty was concerne

1962Hence, the Davises and Bethel Howry, as nonresidents of El Dorado County, are entitled to a change of venue based on the analogy of the application of section 394, found in City of Oakland v. Darbee, 102 Cal.App.2d 493 [ 227 P.2d 909 ].

1962Hence, the Davises and Bethel Howry, as nonresidents of El Dorado County, are entitled to a change of venue based on the analogy of the application of section 394, found in City of Oakland v. Darbee, 102 Cal.App.2d 493 [ 227 P.2d 909 ].

1959In Leiter v. Handelsman, 125 Cal.App.2d 243, 247 [ 270 P.2d 563 ], the court had under consideration a land sale contract providing that ‘ ‘ evidence of title was to be in form of a policy of title insurance issued by a responsible title company.” The court, in this connection, observed: “This is not an unusual requirement, as indicated by King v. Stanley, 32 Cal.2d *222 584, 590 [ 197 P.2d 321 ], in which the court said that title insurance ‘is a reasonable method by which a vendee may determine the merchantability of the vendor’s title . . .’ ” Respondent relies on the decision in Pitt v. Ma

1959In Leiter v. Handelsman, 125 Cal.App.2d 243, 247 [ 270 P.2d 563 ], the court had under consideration a land sale contract providing that ‘ ‘ evidence of title was to be in form of a policy of title insurance issued by a responsible title company.” The court, in this connection, observed: “This is not an unusual requirement, as indicated by King v. Stanley, 32 Cal.2d *222 584, 590 [ 197 P.2d 321 ], in which the court said that title insurance ‘is a reasonable method by which a vendee may determine the merchantability of the vendor’s title . . .’ ” Respondent relies on the decision in Pitt v. Ma

1954Further, they did not contemplate validity of title to be ascertained only by .the Land Title Law but “evidence of title was to be in form of a policy of title insurance issued by a responsible title company.” This is not an unusual requirement, as indicated by King v. Stanley, 32 Cal.2d 584, 590 [ 197 P.2d 321 ], in which the court said that title insurance “is a reasonable method by which a vendee may determine the merchantability of the vendor’s title ...” *248 In Ward v. Downey, 95 Cal.App.2d 680 [ 213 P.2d 523 ], there is a remarkable factual similarity.

1954Further, they did not contemplate validity of title to be ascertained only by .the Land Title Law but “evidence of title was to be in form of a policy of title insurance issued by a responsible title company.” This is not an unusual requirement, as indicated by King v. Stanley, 32 Cal.2d 584, 590 [ 197 P.2d 321 ], in which the court said that title insurance “is a reasonable method by which a vendee may determine the merchantability of the vendor’s title ...” *248 In Ward v. Downey, 95 Cal.App.2d 680 [ 213 P.2d 523 ], there is a remarkable factual similarity.