bare presumption in Tennessee

1948Co., 128 Tenn. 213 , 159 S. W. 733 , L.

1941Noting that we have a number of decisions holding that a bare presumption disappears upon the introduction of circumstantial rebutting evidence (Marquet v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 128 Tenn., 213 , 159 S. W., 733 , L.

1948Co., supra ( 174 Tenn. 602 , 130 S. W. (2d) [85], 89), reading as follows: ‘We have a number of decisions that a bare presumption disappears upon the introduction of circumstantial rebutting evidence’, citing Marquet v. Aetna [Life] Ins.

1941Co., supra [ 174 Tenn., 602 , 130 S. W. (2d), 89 ], reading as follows: “We have a number of decisions that a bare presumption disappears upon the introduction of circumstantial rebutting evidence, ’ ’ citing Marquet v. Aetna Ins.

1974Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed. 2d 142 [1970], noted that conduct less than “willful” can result in the award of punitive damages: “To recover punitive damages, I believe a plaintiff must show more than a bare violation of (42 U.S.C.) § 1983.

1974Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed. 2d 142 [1970], noted that conduct less than “willful” can result in the award of punitive damages: “To recover punitive damages, I believe a plaintiff must show more than a bare violation of (42 U.S.C.) § 1983.

1941Co., supra [ 174 Tenn., 602 , 130 S. W. (2d), 89 ], reading as follows: “We have a number of decisions that a bare presumption disappears upon the introduction of circumstantial rebutting evidence, ’ ’ citing Marquet v. Aetna Ins.

1939Marquet v. Ætna Insurance Co., supra; Brown v. Hows, 163 Tenn., 138, 155 , 40 S. W. (2d), 1017 ; Central of Georgia R.

1939Marquet v. Ætna Insurance Co., supra; Brown v. Hows, 163 Tenn., 138, 155 , 40 S. W. (2d), 1017 ; Central of Georgia R.

1926Co., 32 S. E., 392 , 124 N. C., 100 , it was said: “In the vast majority of the cases, . . . the principle is recognized that in some way the company must authorize or approve the tortious act of its agent, and ... it would he unreasonable to hold the company liable on a bare presumption, in the absence of allegation or any proof of authority or ratification.” In Mulligan v. Railway Co. the New York court of appeals, in an opinion reported in 29 N. E., 952 , 129 N. Y., 506 , 14 L.

1926Co., 32 S. E., 392 , 124 N. C., 100 , it was said: “In the vast majority of the cases, . . . the principle is recognized that in some way the company must authorize or approve the tortious act of its agent, and ... it would he unreasonable to hold the company liable on a bare presumption, in the absence of allegation or any proof of authority or ratification.” In Mulligan v. Railway Co. the New York court of appeals, in an opinion reported in 29 N. E., 952 , 129 N. Y., 506 , 14 L.

1926Co., 32 S. E., 392 , 124 N. C., 100 , it was said: “In the vast majority of the cases, . . . the principle is recognized that in some way the company must authorize or approve the tortious act of its agent, and ... it would he unreasonable to hold the company liable on a bare presumption, in the absence of allegation or any proof of authority or ratification.” In Mulligan v. Railway Co. the New York court of appeals, in an opinion reported in 29 N. E., 952 , 129 N. Y., 506 , 14 L.

1926Co., 32 S. E., 392 , 124 N. C., 100 , it was said: “In the vast majority of the cases, . . . the principle is recognized that in some way the company must authorize or approve the tortious act of its agent, and ... it would he unreasonable to hold the company liable on a bare presumption, in the absence of allegation or any proof of authority or ratification.” In Mulligan v. Railway Co. the New York court of appeals, in an opinion reported in 29 N. E., 952 , 129 N. Y., 506 , 14 L.

1918But by various legislative enactments, as held in Ables v. Ables, 86 Tenn., 333 , 9 S. W., 692 , the common-law estate jure uxoris has been so materially modified that only a bare privilege is left to the husband to rent out his wife’s lands and to collect the rents for the benefit of the family in the capacity of governor of the family, but for the family and not for himself individually.

1918But by various legislative enactments, as held in Ables v. Ables, 86 Tenn., 333 , 9 S. W., 692 , the common-law estate jure uxoris has been so materially modified that only a bare privilege is left to the husband to rent out his wife’s lands and to collect the rents for the benefit of the family in the capacity of governor of the family, but for the family and not for himself individually.

1918And in Parlow v. Turner, 132 Tenn., 339 , 178 S. W., 766 , it was held that, under and by virtue of the act of 1913, the wife had a right to rent out her lands and to collect the rents accruing from same, thus depriving the husband of the last vestige of his common-law estate, jure uxoris.