bare claim in California

2021Such a bare claim falls far short of ‘rais[ing] a reasonable inference that the opposing party has challenged the jurors because of their race or other group association.’ ” (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 442 .) Further, defendant does not contend that the prosecutor engaged A.H. in “only desultory voir dire,” and the record reflects that A.H. was subject to voir dire similar to that of other prospective jurors.

2016Such a bare claim falls far short of ‘rais[ing] a reasonable inference that the opposing party has challenged the jurors because of their race or other group association.’ [Citation.]” (Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 442 .) Here, the record clearly establishes nondiscriminatory reasons to excuse C., J., and A. that dispel any inference of discrimination.

2024Alliance cites no evidence in the record regarding the addendum and insufficient analysis to support its argument that the addendum is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the amendments, as required in Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 396 .14 Alliance’s 14 The trial court also declined to analyze the Alliance’s segmentation argument as to the coordinated operations addendum because Alliance did not cite or submit evidence concerning the addendum, including its scope or purpose. 23 contention is therefore forfeited.

2024Alliance cites no evidence in the record regarding the addendum and insufficient analysis to support its argument that the addendum is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the amendments, as required in Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 396 . 14 Alliance’s 14 The trial court also declined to analyze the Alliance’s segmentation argument as to the coordinated operations addendum because Alliance did not cite or submit evidence concerning the addendum, including its scope or purpose. 23 contention is therefore forfeited.

2023As the trial court correctly noted, the bare claim that more security personnel could have prevented a criminal attack shows only “abstract negligence.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 773 .) There must be direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse or omission “in the course of committing his attack, and that the omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” (Id. at p. 779.) When the claimed lapse or omission is insufficient security personnel, this can be a difficult burden to meet because “ ‘[n]o one can reasonably cont

2023As the trial court correctly noted, the bare claim that more security personnel could have prevented a criminal attack shows only “abstract negligence.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 773 .) There must be direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse or omission “in the course of committing his attack, and that the omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” (Id. at p. 779.) When the claimed lapse or omission is insufficient security personnel, this can be a difficult burden to meet because “ ‘[n]o one can reasonably cont

2023As the trial court correctly noted, the bare claim that more security personnel could have prevented a criminal attack shows only “abstract negligence.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 773 .) There must be direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse or omission “in the course of committing his attack, and that the omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” (Id. at p. 779.) When the claimed lapse or omission is insufficient security personnel, this can be a difficult burden to meet because “ ‘[n]o one can reasonably cont

2023As the trial court correctly noted, the bare claim that more security personnel could have prevented a criminal attack shows only “abstract negligence.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 773 .) There must be direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse or omission “in the course of committing his attack, and that the omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” (Id. at p. 779.) When the claimed lapse or omission is insufficient security personnel, this can be a difficult burden to meet because “ ‘[n]o one can reasonably cont

2021Code] section 627” does not provide for “exclusion as a remedy.” (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1170 .) He also cites Welfare and Institutions Code section 625.6, a statute enacted after I.S.’s interrogation in this case, which now provides that “[p]rior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights,” minors under the age of 17 “shall consult with legal counsel. . . .” (Welf. & Inst.

2021Code] section 627” does not provide for “exclusion as a remedy.” (Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1170 .) He also cites Welfare and Institutions Code section 625.6, a statute enacted after I.S.’s interrogation in this case, which now provides that “[p]rior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights,” minors under the age of 17 “shall consult with legal counsel. . . .” (Welf. & Inst.

2023While no prospective juror may be struck on improper grounds, our Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘[a]s a practical matter, . . . the challenge of one or two jurors can rarely suggest a pattern of impermissible exclusion.’ ” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598 (Bell), overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, fn. 13 ; accord, Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 747 ; Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343 .) A bare claim 14 consisting of “little more than an assertion that a number of prospective jurors from a cognizable group ha[ve] been excused”

2023While no prospective juror may be struck on improper grounds, our Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘[a]s a practical matter, . . . the challenge of one or two jurors can rarely suggest a pattern of impermissible exclusion.’ ” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598 (Bell), overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, fn. 13 ; accord, Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 747 ; Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343 .) A bare claim 14 consisting of “little more than an assertion that a number of prospective jurors from a cognizable group ha[ve] been excused”

2023(People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 442 .) The weakness in this case is compounded because defendant has failed to show how many of the prospective jurors had Hispanic surnames or whether any jurors with Hispanic surnames ultimately were impaneled on the jury.7 (Garcia, at p. 747; People v. Neuman, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 582 ; Bell, supra, at p. 599 ; see People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 906 [fact that impaneled jury included a member of the identified group is indication of nondiscriminatory intent].) Fourth, defendant has not shown that the prosecution’s questioning of jurors

2013(Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 835 .) In this case, the trial court noted that Hispanic prospective jurors made up the majority of the venire, which numbered at least 54.

1949Although counsel for appellant states that there are no California cases in point it would appear that since the early cases of Tewksbury v. Laffan (1850), 1 Cal. 129 , and Gaven v. Hagen (1860), 15 Cal. 208 , the mere existence of an executory contract for the sale of real property does not give rise to an “implication of a license to enter.” ( 15 Cal. 212 .) And while subsequent cases have observed that courts will not be guided alone by the bare principle that possession follows the legal title, nevertheless if from all the facts and circumstances it cannot be said that there exists an impl

1949Although counsel for appellant states that there are no California cases in point it would appear that since the early cases of Tewksbury v. Laffan (1850), 1 Cal. 129 , and Gaven v. Hagen (1860), 15 Cal. 208 , the mere existence of an executory contract for the sale of real property does not give rise to an “implication of a license to enter.” ( 15 Cal. 212 .) And while subsequent cases have observed that courts will not be guided alone by the bare principle that possession follows the legal title, nevertheless if from all the facts and circumstances it cannot be said that there exists an impl

1932It is almost inconceivable that there would be no evidence at all to show sanity, or, at least, that a case would go beyond the trial court if the prosecution has nothing but the bare presumption of sanity on which to base its claim that the defendant was sane and consequently responsible for his acts. ...” To the same effect are Thomson v. State, 78 Fla. 400 [ 83 South. 291 ]; People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508 [ 145 N. E. 207 ].

1932It is almost inconceivable that there would be no evidence at all to show sanity, or, at least, that a case would go beyond the trial court if the prosecution has nothing but the bare presumption of sanity on which to base its claim that the defendant was sane and consequently responsible for his acts. ...” To the same effect are Thomson v. State, 78 Fla. 400 [ 83 South. 291 ]; People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508 [ 145 N. E. 207 ].

1932It is almost inconceivable that there would be no evidence at all to show sanity, or, at least, that a case would go beyond the trial court if the prosecution has nothing but the bare presumption of sanity on which to base its claim that the defendant was sane and consequently responsible for his acts. ...” To the same effect are Thomson v. State, 78 Fla. 400 [ 83 South. 291 ]; People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508 [ 145 N. E. 207 ].

1932It is almost inconceivable that there would be no evidence at all to show sanity, or, at least, that a case would go beyond the trial court if the prosecution has nothing but the bare presumption of sanity on which to base its claim that the defendant was sane and consequently responsible for his acts. ...” To the same effect are Thomson v. State, 78 Fla. 400 [ 83 South. 291 ]; People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508 [ 145 N. E. 207 ].