7 Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2007Thus, we determine de novo whether appellant initiated the discussion that resulted in his statements to the police. 3 In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant, who had previously invoked his right to counsel, initiated further conversation with the police by asking, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” The Court wrote: While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word “initiate” in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare 2007Thus, we determine de novo whether appellant initiated the discussion that resulted in his statements to the police. 3 In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant, who had previously invoked his right to counsel, initiated further conversation with the police by asking, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” The Court wrote: While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word “initiate” in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare | 2 | 3 |
Franklin Lee Thomason, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2025Instead, Hardy’s trial counsel made only a vague reference to “the evidence that was provided to me in police reports and video” and suggested that the Commonwealth’s evidence “will certainly be drawn into question.” However, “a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness” is not a reasonable defense that would “permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 96 (2018) (quoting Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249 ); see also Coleman v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 284, 292-93 (2008) (holding that the defendant’s claim of misidentification was “merely di 2023Accordingly, we have held that “a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness” is not a reasonable defense that would “permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 96 (2018) (quoting Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249 ). | 2 | 2 |
Coleman v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025Instead, Hardy’s trial counsel made only a vague reference to “the evidence that was provided to me in police reports and video” and suggested that the Commonwealth’s evidence “will certainly be drawn into question.” However, “a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness” is not a reasonable defense that would “permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 96 (2018) (quoting Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249 ); see also Coleman v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 284, 292-93 (2008) (holding that the defendant’s claim of misidentification was “merely di | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2025Instead, Hardy’s trial counsel made only a vague reference to “the evidence that was provided to me in police reports and video” and suggested that the Commonwealth’s evidence “will certainly be drawn into question.” However, “a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness” is not a reasonable defense that would “permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 96 (2018) (quoting Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249 ); see also Coleman v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 284, 292-93 (2008) (holding that the defendant’s claim of misidentification was “merely di 2023Accordingly, we have held that “a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness” is not a reasonable defense that would “permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 96 (2018) (quoting Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249 ). | 2 | 2023–2025 |
Walter Delany Booker, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
1 sentence2025Rather, a defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea must proffer a “defense beyond simply making the prosecution prove its case.” Booker, 61 Va. App. at 335 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2023Indeed, “potential impeachment of witness testimony” is not a reasonable defense even when “newly discovered impeachment evidence is potentially exculpatory” under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),1 because whether evidence is 1 There is no allegation in this case that the Commonwealth failed to comply with its obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady. -6- exculpatory “is not the proper standard for setting aside a guilty plea.” Thomason, 69 Va. App. at 96 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Justus v. Com.
green
1 sentence2022Accordingly, we have held that “a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness” is not a reasonable defense that would “‘permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.’” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Parris v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2018We stated that to allow such a withdrawal would “raise a bare challenge to the credibility of a victim or witness to that standard, one ‘sustained by proofs,’ necessary to permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.