bare claim in Texas

2024As stated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “a bare claim of fear does not demonstrate sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim.

2023On the other hand, “a bare claim of ‘fear’ does not demonstrate ‘sudden passion arising from adequate cause.’” Id.

2022“Establishing a bare claim of actual innocence is a Herculean task.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2022“Establishing a bare claim of actual innocence is a Herculean task.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2015See alsoEx parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (articulating the standard for a bare claim of actual innocence in post-conviction habeas proceedings); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.2011) (false testimony can constitute a violation of due process whether used by the State knowingly or unknowingly when there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the outcome). 14 Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 460, 463. 15 Ex Parte Oranday–Garcia, 410 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.2013) (expanding the requirement that a subsequent writ application must alleg

2014See also Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (articulating the standard for a bare claim of actual innocence in post-conviction habeas proceedings); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.2011) (false testimony can constitute a violation of due process whether used by the State knowingly or unknowingly when there is a "reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the outcome). .

2014Henderson, 384 S.W.3d at 835 (Price, J., concurring) ("as the particular due process claim moves from the fairness end of the continuum toward the accuracy end, the standard for materiality should rise concomí- tantly, culminating in the Herculean burden associated with a bare claim of actual innocence”); id. (quoting Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 465 : "when it comes to claims of the inadvertent use of false evidence, we must not be overly liberal in how we characterize 'false' evidence.”); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 216 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) ("But in the ‘unknowing use’ context, the culpability of

2014App. 2011) (Price, J., concurring); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 216 (Keller, P.J., dissenting). 32 Henderson, 384 S.W.3d at 835 (Price, J., concurring) (“as the particular due process claim moves from the fairness end of the continuum toward the accuracy end, the standard for materiality should rise concomitantly, culminating in the Herculean burden associated with a bare claim of actual innocence”); id. (quoting Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 465 : “when it comes to claims of the inadvertent use of false evidence, we must not be overly liberal in how we characterize ‘false’ evidence.”); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d

2005A sudden passion charge should be given if there is some evidence that the mental state of the defendant “rose beyond a bare claim of fear or was so strong and overpowering that it rendered him incapable of rational thought and collected action . . . .” Jones v. State , 963 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d).

2004The only evidence of appellant’s state of mind at the time when he fired his gun was his statement “I was in fear of my life and I panicked.” For a sudden passion charge, the evidence must show that appellant’s mental state “rose beyond a bare claim of fear or was so strong and overpowering that it rendered him incapable of rational thought and collected action.” Jones v. State , 963 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d).

2022App. 2006). “[T]o succeed in an actual innocence claim the applicant must show ‘by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.’” Id. (quoting Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2013To grant relief on a bare claim of actual innocence, a court must conclude by “clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted the applicant in light of the new evidence.”1 To determine whether this actual-innocence standard is met, “the convicting court 1 Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim.

2015See alsoEx parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (articulating the standard for a bare claim of actual innocence in post-conviction habeas proceedings); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.2011) (false testimony can constitute a violation of due process whether used by the State knowingly or unknowingly when there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the outcome). 14 Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 460, 463. 15 Ex Parte Oranday–Garcia, 410 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.2013) (expanding the requirement that a subsequent writ application must alleg

2014See also Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (articulating the standard for a bare claim of actual innocence in post-conviction habeas proceedings); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.2011) (false testimony can constitute a violation of due process whether used by the State knowingly or unknowingly when there is a "reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the outcome). .

2025Id. at 208 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 ); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 .

2007It is possible that the Supreme Court, were it to recognize a bare claim of "actual innocence of the death penalty," would find it appropriate to impose a burden on the petitioner even more "extraordinarily high" than the petitioner who brings a bare claim of actual innocence. [34] Id. at 324-25 , 115 S.Ct. 851 . [35] Herrera, supra, at 417 , 113 S.Ct. 853 ; Schlup, supra, at 315-16 , 115 S.Ct. 851 ; House, supra, at 2086-87 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 . [36] One federal circuit court of appeals has recently noted "grave constitutional concerns" in the event that the statute of limitations enacted by the

2023McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571 ; see also Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 606–07 (“a bare claim of” fear will not necessarily support a claim of sudden passion, but that fear that “rises to the level of ‘terror’” will suffice (if the cause is adequate) to invoke an instruction on the issue.” (quoting Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim.

2014Even if appellant had testified that he was frightened by the shotgun, “a bare claim of” fear does not demonstrate “sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” Id.; Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601 , 606–607 (Tex. Crim.

2015See alsoEx parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (articulating the standard for a bare claim of actual innocence in post-conviction habeas proceedings); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.2011) (false testimony can constitute a violation of due process whether used by the State knowingly or unknowingly when there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the outcome). 14 Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 460, 463. 15 Ex Parte Oranday–Garcia, 410 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.2013) (expanding the requirement that a subsequent writ application must alleg

2014Henderson, 384 S.W.3d at 835 (Price, J., concurring) ("as the particular due process claim moves from the fairness end of the continuum toward the accuracy end, the standard for materiality should rise concomí- tantly, culminating in the Herculean burden associated with a bare claim of actual innocence”); id. (quoting Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 465 : "when it comes to claims of the inadvertent use of false evidence, we must not be overly liberal in how we characterize 'false' evidence.”); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 216 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) ("But in the ‘unknowing use’ context, the culpability of

2014Henderson, 384 S.W.3d at 835 (Price, J., concurring) ("as the particular due process claim moves from the fairness end of the continuum toward the accuracy end, the standard for materiality should rise concomí- tantly, culminating in the Herculean burden associated with a bare claim of actual innocence”); id. (quoting Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 465 : "when it comes to claims of the inadvertent use of false evidence, we must not be overly liberal in how we characterize 'false' evidence.”); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 216 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) ("But in the ‘unknowing use’ context, the culpability of

2014App. 2011) (Price, J., concurring); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 216 (Keller, P.J., dissenting). 32 Henderson, 384 S.W.3d at 835 (Price, J., concurring) (“as the particular due process claim moves from the fairness end of the continuum toward the accuracy end, the standard for materiality should rise concomitantly, culminating in the Herculean burden associated with a bare claim of actual innocence”); id. (quoting Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 465 : “when it comes to claims of the inadvertent use of false evidence, we must not be overly liberal in how we characterize ‘false’ evidence.”); Chavez, 371 S.W.3d

2004A sudden passion charge should be given if there is some evidence showing that appellant’s mental state “rose beyond a bare claim of fear or was so strong and overpowering that it rendered him incapable of rational thought and collected action.” Jones v. State , 963 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d); see also Trevino v. State , 100 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. Crim.

2004A sudden passion charge should be given if there is some evidence showing that appellant’s mental state “rose beyond a bare claim of fear or was so strong and overpowering that it rendered him incapable of rational thought and collected action.” Jones v. State , 963 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d); see also Trevino , 100 S.W.3d at 238 .

2001See Jenkins v. State , 740 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tex. Crim.

2001See Jenkins v. State , 740 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tex. Crim.

2007It is possible that the Supreme Court, were it to recognize a bare claim of "actual innocence of the death penalty," would find it appropriate to impose a burden on the petitioner even more "extraordinarily high" than the petitioner who brings a bare claim of actual innocence. [34] Id. at 324-25 , 115 S.Ct. 851 . [35] Herrera, supra, at 417 , 113 S.Ct. 853 ; Schlup, supra, at 315-16 , 115 S.Ct. 851 ; House, supra, at 2086-87 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 . [36] One federal circuit court of appeals has recently noted "grave constitutional concerns" in the event that the statute of limitations enacted by the

2007It is possible that the Supreme Court, were it to recognize a bare claim of "actual innocence of the death penalty," would find it appropriate to impose a burden on the petitioner even more "extraordinarily high" than the petitioner who brings a bare claim of actual innocence. [34] Id. at 324-25 , 115 S.Ct. 851 . [35] Herrera, supra, at 417 , 113 S.Ct. 853 ; Schlup, supra, at 315-16 , 115 S.Ct. 851 ; House, supra, at 2086-87 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 . [36] One federal circuit court of appeals has recently noted "grave constitutional concerns" in the event that the statute of limitations enacted by the

2019However, “a bare claim of ‘fear’ ” does not establish “sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” See Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d); see also Griffin v. State, 461 S.W.3d 188 , 193–94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim.

2015But see Grffen v. State, 2014 WL 7474076 (Tex. App.—Houston (1st Dist.) 2014). (observing that “a bare claim of ‘fear’ ” does not demonstrate “sudden passion arising from adequate cause”).

2024See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570 (“There is no evidence that the verbal taunting and physical pushing by [the victim] produced a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in Appellant, sufficient to render his mind incapable of cool reflection.”); Kennedy v. State, 193 S.W.3d 645 , 653–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (some evidence must show that “Appellant’s mental state rose beyond a bare claim of fear to render him incapable of rational thought and collected action”).

2023McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571 ; see also Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 606–07 (“a bare claim of” fear will not necessarily support a claim of sudden passion, but that fear that “rises to the level of ‘terror’” will suffice (if the cause is adequate) to invoke an instruction on the issue.” (quoting Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim.

2024See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570 (“There is no evidence that the verbal taunting and physical pushing by [the victim] produced a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in Appellant, sufficient to render his mind incapable of cool reflection.”); Kennedy v. State, 193 S.W.3d 645 , 653–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (some evidence must show that “Appellant’s mental state rose beyond a bare claim of fear to render him incapable of rational thought and collected action”).

2024See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570 (“There is no evidence that the verbal taunting and physical pushing by [the victim] produced a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in Appellant, sufficient to render his mind incapable of cool reflection.”); Kennedy v. State, 193 S.W.3d 645 , 653–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (some evidence must show that “Appellant’s mental state rose beyond a bare claim of fear to render him incapable of rational thought and collected action”).

2015App. 1983) (explaining that a bare claim of “fear” does not show sudden passion arising from 9 adequate cause); Merchant v. State, 810 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (holding that evidence of prior provocation alone is not enough to warrant sudden passion).

1997Merchant, 810 S.W.2d at 310 .

2024For purposes of this analysis, we assume but do not decide that Jimenez preserved this issue by requesting an alternative jury instruction. 14 general verdict of guilty if the evidence supports a conviction under any one of them.” Id. (citing Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim.

2022Our holding that a bare challenge to an illegal cumulation order cannot be raised for the first time in a writ application only funneled such claims through the nozzle of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7 It did not clarify 4 Id. at 350 . 5 Id. at 354 (Newell, J. concurring) (“Given that Applicant is not challenging the improper cumulation order as a subset of his ineffective assistance claim, I agree with the Court’s decision to deny relief on that ground as well.

2022Our holding that a bare challenge to an illegal cumulation order cannot be raised for the first time in a writ application only funneled such claims through the nozzle of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7 It did not clarify 4 Id. at 350 . 5 Id. at 354 (Newell, J. concurring) (“Given that Applicant is not challenging the improper cumulation order as a subset of his ineffective assistance claim, I agree with the Court’s decision to deny relief on that ground as well.

2022A bare claim of a due process violation, “with nothing else, is conclusory,” Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 179 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Deaver v. Desai, 483 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding that the movant had failed to satisfy his initial burden of proving that a bare claim was subject to the TCPA).

2019However, “a bare claim of ‘fear’ ” does not establish “sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” See Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d); see also Griffin v. State, 461 S.W.3d 188 , 193–94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim.

2015See alsoEx parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (articulating the standard for a bare claim of actual innocence in post-conviction habeas proceedings); Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.2011) (false testimony can constitute a violation of due process whether used by the State knowingly or unknowingly when there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony affected the outcome). 14 Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 460, 463. 15 Ex Parte Oranday–Garcia, 410 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.2013) (expanding the requirement that a subsequent writ application must alleg