non-exhaustive list factors in Tennessee

2025The following non-exhaustive list of factors are applicable to this action: (i) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest of the child . . . the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following: (1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian; (2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for

2025The following non-exhaustive list of factors are applicable to this action: (i) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest of the child . . . the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following: (1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian; (2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for

2022Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i).7 “This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require a trial court to find the existence of each enumerated factor before it may conclude that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of a child.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2009In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State 12 The statute’s non-exhaustive list of factors is as follows: (1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian; (2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible; (3) Whether the parent or guardian has m

2014In State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2000), the Tennessee Supreme Court created a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether deterrence was a proper basis to deny alternative sentencing: (1) whether other incidents of the charged offense are increasingly present in the community, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole; (2) whether the defendant’s crime was the result of intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct or was otherwise motivated by a desire to profit or gain from the criminal behavior; (3) whether the defendant’s crime and conviction have received substa

2014In State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court outlined a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining whether a need for deterrence is present and whether incarceration is “particularly suited” to achieve that goal.

2022Making a determination concerning a child’s best interest “does not call for a rote examination of each of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i)’s . . . factors and then a determination of whether the sum of factors tips in favor of or against the parent.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 .

2013See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2010State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 349 (Tenn. 2005).

2008Thus, our first objective is determining if Freeman’s statement is “testimonial.” In Maclin, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider: (1) whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) whether contact was initiated by the declarant or by law-enforcement officials; (3) the degree of formality attending the circumstances in which the statement was made; (4) whether the statement was given in response to questioning, whether the questioning was structured, and the scope of such questioning; (5) whether the statement was recorded (either in writing

2016Id. at 888 (citing Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1999)).

2013Carpenter, 126 S.W.3d at 888 (citing Mopes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427 (6th Cir. 1999)).

2016In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d at 573 .

2016In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).

2024See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (c) (including eleven specific factors and a twelfth factor directing the court to consider “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties”); see also Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4 - -13- 121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence”).

2024See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i); In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

2001Others can be probative, provided their possible prejudicial impact is adequately weighed under applicable evidentiary rules: e.g., (b) prior convictions of the person who owns or controls an object under federal or state drug laws ....”) (emphasis added); Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 933 (6th Cir.1980), vacated and reversed on other grounds, 709 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.1983) ("The drafters of the Model Act set forth this list to minimize the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

2001See Levas v. Village of Antioch, 684 F.2d 446, 454 (7th Cir.1982) ("There is a non-exhaustive list of factors that 'a court or other authority should consider.’ Some are obviously highly probative ....