non-exhaustive list factors (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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non-exhaustive list factors in Indiana

11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Principal Life Insurance Co. v. Needlergreen
indctapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Co. v. Needler, 816 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the Court discussed a non-exhaustive list of factors typically considered by a trial court entertaining a voluntary motion to dismiss: [T]he factors most commonly considered on a motion for a voluntary dismissal are: (1) the extent to which the suit has progressed, including the defendant’s effort and expense in preparing for trial, (2) the plaintiff’s diligence in prosecuting the action or in bringing the motion, (3) the duplicative expense of relitigation, and (4) the adequacy of plaintiff’s explanation for the need to dismiss.

2014Co. v. Needler, 816 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), the Court discussed a non-exhaustive list of factors typically considered by a trial court entertaining a voluntary motion to dismiss: [T]he factors most commonly considered on a motion for a voluntary dismissal are: (1) the extent to which the suit has progressed, including the defendant’s effort and expense in preparing for trial, (2) the plaintiffs diligence in prosecuting the action or in bringing the motion, (3) the duplicative expense of relitigation, and (4) the adequacy of plaintiffs explanation for the need to dismiss.

22
Kubsch v. Stategreen
ind · 2003 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2012
2 sentences

2012Kubsch, 784 N.E.2d at 921 .

2011DaubeH, 509 U.S. at 593-94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ; Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 921 (Ind.2003).

12
Scalissi v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006Such factors may include the nature of the prior crime, the length of the person’s criminal record, the witness’s age and circumstances, the likelihood that the person would not testify, the degree of remoteness of the prior crime, the witness’s subsequent career, the centrality of the credibility issue, the need for the person’s testimony, and (if the witness is the defendant) the crime’s similarity to the crime charged. 13 Miller § 609.202 at 171; see also Scalissi 759 N.E.2d at 625 (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors appropriate to consider when the defendant is the witness to be im

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

2012Daubert refers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which outlined a non-exhaustive list of factors that might be considered when assessing the reliability of scientific evidence.

2012Daubert refers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which outlined a non-exhaustive list of factors that might be considered when assessing the reliability of scientific evidence.

22011–2012
State of Indiana v. David Brown green
ind · 2017
1 sentence

2019Although courts have compiled a non-exhaustive list of factors which may be taken into account to determine whether a person is in custody, ultimately, the inquiry is whether there has been a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Brown , 70 N.E.3d at 335 . [12] When Officer Wright arrived on the scene, he was faced with a report of domestic disturbance, three individuals, and the allegation that a gun was possibly involved.

12019–2019
Young v. State green
ind · 1998
1 sentence

2017Id. [19] Whitelow’s evidence before the post-conviction court addressed none of these factors, nor does his argument on appeal address them.

12017–2017
Steven M. Sandleben v. State of Indiana green
indctapp · 2015
1 sentence

2017A defendant alleging “that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor” is required “to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 136 . [16] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(b) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the trial court may consider as mitigating circumstances in formulating an appropriate sentence.

12017–2017
Meredith v. State green
ind · 2009
1 sentence

2014Id. at 873-74 .

12014–2014
Willis v. State green
ind · 2008
2 sentences

2008Our Supreme Court cautioned that the relevant factors "should be balanced against each other, giving appropriate weight as the circumstances dictate, in determining whether the force is reasonable." 888 N.E.2d at 182 .

2008Our Supreme Court cautioned that the relevant factors “should be balanced against each other, giving appropriate weight as the circumstances dictate, in determining whether the force is reasonable.” 888 N.E.2d at 182 .

12008–2008
Dowdy v. State green
indctapp · 1996
1 sentence

2006Such factors may include the nature of the prior crime, the length of the person’s criminal record, the witness’s age and circumstances, the likelihood that the person would not testify, the degree of remoteness of the prior crime, the witness’s subsequent career, the centrality of the credibility issue, the need for the person’s testimony, and (if the witness is the defendant) the crime’s similarity to the crime charged. 13 Miller § 609.202 at 171; see also Scalissi 759 N.E.2d at 625 (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors appropriate to consider when the defendant is the witness to be im

12006–2006
Barker v. Wingo green
scotus · 1972
1 sentence

1995Id.

11995–1995

Where else courts name it

TX 350 (1993–2026) OH 98 (1999–2026) TN 53 (2001–2025) PA 43 (1985–2025) MI 31 (1990–2026) NJ 28 (1991–2025) MD 27 (2000–2026) CO 20 (2005–2025) CA 12 (2022–2025) IN 11 (1995–2019) MS 10 (2006–2021) WI 10 (2011–2024) GA 9 (1996–2021) FL 9 (2001–2026) DE 8 (2016–2026) ID 8 (2002–2026) NY 7 (2013–2025) AZ 6 (2003–2021) NM 5 (2011–2025) SC 5 (2023–2026) WA 5 (2006–2024) KY 5 (2014–2026) NC 5 (2016–2023) NV 4 (1991–2018) IA 4 (2020–2022) MT 4 (2020–2025) WY 4 (2008–2018) IL 4 (2021–2025) MO 3 (1992–2010) HI 3 (2020–2025) OR 3 (2017–2025) ND 2 (2023–2024) RI 2 (2012–2012) UT 2 (2022–2023) ME 2 (2009–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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