non-exhaustive list factors in Texas

2026In Holley v. Adams, the Supreme Court of Texas promulgated a non-exhaustive list of factors for assessing a child’s best interests, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976).

2025Trial courts may use a non-exhaustive list of factors to aid in the determination, as set out in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).

2023See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

2012These include the statutory factors set forth in section 263.307 of the Family Code4 that are relevant in the particular case, and the non-exhaustive list of factors described by the supreme court in Holley v. Adams.5 In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116 (citing TEX. 4 These factors include: (1) a child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after an initial report and intervention; (5) whether the child is

2010In Vinson v. State, the court of criminal appeals suggested a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether the statements were testimonial: 1) whether the situation was still in progress; 2) whether the questions sought to determine what is presently happening as opposed to what has happened in the past; 3) whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was to render aid rather than to memorialize a possible crime; 4) whether the questioning was conducted in a separate room, away from the alleged attacker; and 5) whether the events were deliberately recounted in a step-b

2010In Vinson v. State, the court of criminal appeals suggested a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether the statements were testimonial: 1) whether the situation was still in progress; 2) whether the questions sought to determine what is presently happening as opposed to what has happened in the past; 3) whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was to render aid rather than to memorialize a possible crime; 4) whether the questioning was conducted in a separate room, away from the alleged attacker; and 5) whether the events were deliberately recounted in a step-b

2024Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12).

2011Courts have identified a non-exhaustive list of factors that may help show an accused is linked to a controlled substance or illegal firearms, including (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to f

2005See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) (en banc).

2005See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) (en banc).

2023Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim.

2018Id. at 204 (citing Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223 ). 16 such as Texas, a spouse is presumed to have an ownership interest in any business owned by his spouse during the marriage.

2012Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). "'Best interest' does not require proof of any unique set of factors, nor does it limit proof to any specific factors." In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 814 .

2012Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). "'Best interest' does not require proof of any unique set of factors, nor does it limit proof to any specific factors." In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d at 814 .

2014The Family Code does not specify the factors to be used in determining best interest, but courts in numerous contexts involving a “best interest” analysis have looked to the factors set forth in Holley , a parental rights termination case in which the supreme court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining a child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 ; see also In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (applying Holley factors in judicial bypass case); Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 595 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (applying Holley factors in suit involving modificatio

2010In a custody determination, “[s]o long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be 4 The family code does not define the factors to apply in determining whether a modification is in the child’s best interest, but in other contexts involving “best interest” analyses, courts look to Holley v. Adams, a termination case in which the supreme court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining a child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); see In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000) (applying Holley factors in judicial bypass

2025Trial courts generally have wide latitude in determining what is in a child’s best interest, Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451 , and may use a non-exhaustive list of factors to aid in the determination.

2024Trial courts have broad discretion in determining what is in the child’s best interest, see Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982), and they may use the non-exhaustive list of factors in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976), in making that determination.

2014The Family Code does not specify the factors to be used in determining best interest, but courts in numerous contexts involving a “best interest” analysis have looked to the factors set forth in Holley , a parental rights termination case in which the supreme court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining a child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 ; see also In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (applying Holley factors in judicial bypass case); Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 595 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (applying Holley factors in suit involving modificatio

2010In a custody determination, “[s]o long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be 4 The family code does not define the factors to apply in determining whether a modification is in the child’s best interest, but in other contexts involving “best interest” analyses, courts look to Holley v. Adams, a termination case in which the supreme court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining a child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); see In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000) (applying Holley factors in judicial bypass

2023In addition to the factors listed in section 263.307(b), we also consider the non-exhaustive list of factors set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 5 “The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

2023CODE § 263.307(b). -3- 04-23-00634-CV consider the non-exhaustive list of factors set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 3 “[P]roof of acts or omissions under section 161.001(1) does not relieve the [Department] from proving the best interest of the child, but the same evidence may be probative of both issues.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002).

2012See id.

2012See id.

2002S ee Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); accord Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) and Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 710 .

2002S ee Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); accord Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) and Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 710 .

2002S ee Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); accord Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) and Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 710 .

2002S ee Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 173 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); accord Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) and Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 710 .

2021“Although we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo.” Id. (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223 . '"Although we defer to the trial court's factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo.'" Betts, 397 S.W.3d at 204 (quotingKothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim.

2014The Family Code does not specify the factors to be used in determining best interest, but courts in numerous contexts involving a “best interest” analysis have looked to the factors set forth in Holley , a parental rights termination case in which the supreme court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining a child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 ; see also In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (applying Holley factors in judicial bypass case); Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 595 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (applying Holley factors in suit involving modificatio

2010In a custody determination, “[s]o long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be 4 The family code does not define the factors to apply in determining whether a modification is in the child’s best interest, but in other contexts involving “best interest” analyses, courts look to Holley v. Adams, a termination case in which the supreme court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors for determining a child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); see In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000) (applying Holley factors in judicial bypass

2015See Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223 . '"Although we defer to the trial court's factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo.'" Betts, 397 S.W.3d at 204 (quotingKothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 223 . “‘Although we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo.’” Betts, 397 S.W.3d at 204 (quoting Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim.

2019Aschbacher, 61 S.W.3d at 535 (discussing a non-exhaustive list of factors fact finder may consider in assessing insanity).

2015Id.; see also Aschbacher v. State, 61 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. ref’d) (discussing a non-exhaustive list of factors a fact-finder may consider in assessing the issue of insanity: “the person’s demeanor before and after the offense, any attempts to evade police or to conceal incriminating evidence, a person’s expressions of regret or fear of the consequences of his or her actions, and possible motives for the offense.”). 2.

2024Usually, 911 calls initiated to summon police assistance are “nontestimonial because they are ‘a cry for help’ or ‘the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation.’” Guzman v. State, No. 02-18-00332-CR, 2019 WL 2223213 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 ) (other citations omitted). 38 We consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors when determining whether statements were made during an ongoing emergency: 1) whether the situation was still in progress;

2010In Vinson v. State, the court of criminal appeals suggested a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether the statements were testimonial: 1) whether the situation was still in progress; 2) whether the questions sought to determine what is presently happening as opposed to what has happened in the past; 3) whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was to render aid rather than to memorialize a possible crime; 4) whether the questioning was conducted in a separate room, away from the alleged attacker; and 5) whether the events were deliberately recounted in a step-b

2016Id. at 606-07 . [A review of reasonable expectation of privacy is] guided by a non-exhaustive list of factors: • whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the place invaded; • whether he was legitimately in the place invaded; • whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to exclude others; • whether, before the intrusion, he took normal precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy; • whether he put the place to some private use; and • whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy.

2016Id. at 606–07. [A review of reasonable expectation of privacy is] guided by a non- exhaustive list of factors:  whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the place invaded; 5  whether he was legitimately in the place invaded;  whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to exclude others;  whether, before the intrusion, he took normal precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy;  whether he put the place to some private use; and  whether his claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy.

2015Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) The Confidential Informant was a Material Witness If an informant “was an eyewitness to an alleged offense then that informant can testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issues of guilt or innocence.” Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex.App.—Houston[14th], pet ref’d); Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)(en banc).

2011Courts have identified a non-exhaustive list of factors that may help show an accused is linked to a controlled substance or illegal firearms, including (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to f

2013In making a threshold determination of admissibility under Rule 702, the trial court may consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; 20 (4) the technique's potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made o

1999In light of the supreme court’s holding in Gammill , appellants argue that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Johnston’s testimony under Robinson because the Robinson “factors” do not apply to testimony based upon an expert’s knowledge and experience. *242 While Robinson gave us a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in assessing the admissibility of expert testimony, Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 , it further provided such testimony must meet a specified standard of reliability and relevance under rule 702. 4 Id. at 556 .