non-exhaustive list factors in Colorado

2025Id. (alterations in original) (quoting McIntyre , ¶ 17, 325 P.3d at 587 ). ¶19 Third, even if the conduct was coercive, a final step remains.

2019Id. (alterations in original) (quoting McIntyre , ¶ 17, 325 P.3d at 587 ). ¶24 Here, eight factors appear to support a finding of involuntariness: Cardman was in custody at the time of the interrogation (factor 1); he was not free to leave because he was in custody (factor 2); he did not have an opportunity to confer with counsel beforehand (factor 6); he made incriminating statements during the interrogation (factor 7); the detective made promises to him to induce his incriminating statements (factor 8); the method of the interrogation was coercive given the detective's repeated promises (fac

2021Recognizing that "in many cases express agreements [to be married] will not exist," id. at 664 , we set out a non-exhaustive list of factors that trial courts can consider to infer the parties ' agreement to be married; namely, "maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership of property; the use of the man's surname by the woman; the use of the man's surname by children born to the parties ; and the filing of joint tax returns," id. at 665 .

2021Recognizing that "in many cases express agreements [to be married] will not exist," id. at 664 , we set out a non-exhaustive list of factors that trial courts can consider to infer the parties ' agreement to be married; namely, "maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership of property; the use of the man's surname by the woman; the use of the man's surname by children born to the parties ; and the filing of joint tax returns," id. at 665 .

2021Close v. People , 180 P.3d 1015, 1019-20 ( Colo. 2008 ) ( noting the non-exhaustive list of factors that courts should consider in addressing the issue of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect under section 16-5-402 ) . ¶67 Here, for two reasons, I believe that any untimeliness by Hunsaker was the product of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. ¶68 First, in filing when he did, Hunsaker relied on our unequivocal conclusion in Leyva , 184 P.3d at 50 -51 , that "when an illegal sentence is corrected pursuant to Crim.

2021Close v. People , 180 P.3d 1015 , 1019–20 ( Colo. 2008 ) ( noting the non-exhaustive list of factors that courts should consider in addressing the issue of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect under section 16-5-402 ) . ¶67 Here, for two reasons, I believe that any untimeliness by Hunsaker was the product of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. ¶68 First, in filing when he did, Hunsaker relied on our unequivocal conclusion in Leyva , 184 P.3d at 50–51 , that "when an illegal sentence is corrected pursuant to Crim.

2016People v. Al-Yousif , 206 P.3d 824 , 834 (Colo.App.2006) (citing People v. Gennings , 808 P.2d 839 , 844 (Colo.1991) ). *1067 ¶ 60 However, critical to any finding of involuntariness is the existence of coercive governmental conduct, either physical or mental, that plays a significant role in inducing a confession or an inculpatory statement.

2010Id.

2025People v. Chavez-Torres, 2016 COA 169M , ¶ 14, aff’d, 2019 CO 59 ; People v. Clouse, 74 P.3d 336, 340 (Colo. App. 2002).1 ¶ 13 We review a postconviction court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.

2025Id. at 293-94 .

2025Id. (quoting People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo. 2002)). ¶ 21 Review of a “trial court’s suppression order presents a mixed question of law and fact.” People v. Moreno, 2022 CO 19, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 13 ).

2019I further agree that, after determining whether a written waiver was obtained from both the juvenile and his guardian prior to questioning, we must also assess the reliability of that waiver by examining the non-exhaustive list of factors set forth in Grant , including: (1) where, when, and at what stage in the proceedings the writing appeared; (2) whether the juvenile and guardian agreed to the writing simultaneously or separately; (3) whether their consent was gathered in person; *1226 (4) whether they were offered ample opportunity to consult; (5) whether they did consult, privately or with

2019Specifically, we presented the following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) "where, when, and at what stage in the proceedings the writing appeared"; (2) "whether the juvenile and parent agreed to the writing simultaneously or separately"; (3) "whether their consent was garnered in person"; (4) "whether they were offered ample opportunity to consult" with one another; (5) "whether they did consult, privately or with the police present"; (6) "whether the [juvenile and the guardian] were aware that the written waiver was a statutory requirement"; (7) "whether there existed any evidence that sig

2019People v. Howard , 92 P.3d 445 , 448 (Colo. 2004).

2016People v. Al-Yousif , 206 P.3d 824 , 834 (Colo.App.2006) (citing People v. Gennings , 808 P.2d 839 , 844 (Colo.1991) ). *1067 ¶ 60 However, critical to any finding of involuntariness is the existence of coercive governmental conduct, either physical or mental, that plays a significant role in inducing a confession or an inculpatory statement.

2012Id. (citing Matheny, 46 P.3d at 465-66 ). 149 Here, the interrogation occurred in broad daylight and took no more than fifteen to twenty minutes.

2012Although not categorically protected by absolute immunity in the same way that judges and prosecutors are, officials engaged in quasi-judicial decision-making may be absolutely shielded from liability for acts that are " functionally comparable' to that of a judge." Id. at 513 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 . 46 To assist lower courts in determining whether a public official's quasi-judicial actions "share[ ] enough of the characteristics of the judicial process" to merit absolute immunity, id., the Supreme Court has enumerated a non-exhaustive list of factors: (a) [The need to assure that the individual can

2012Although not categorically protected by absolute immunity in the same way that judges and prosecutors are, officials engaged in quasi-judicial decision-making may be absolutely shielded from liability for acts that are " functionally comparable' to that of a judge." Id. at 513 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 . 46 To assist lower courts in determining whether a public official's quasi-judicial actions "share[ ] enough of the characteristics of the judicial process" to merit absolute immunity, id., the Supreme Court has enumerated a non-exhaustive list of factors: (a) [The need to assure that the individual can

2012Cleavinger v. Saxner, 11 474 U.S. 193, 202 , 106 S.Ct. 496 , 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (summariz ing the factors set forth in Butz, 12 488 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894 ).

2012Cleavinger v. Saxner, 11 474 U.S. 193, 202 , 106 S.Ct. 496 , 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (summariz ing the factors set forth in Butz, 12 488 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894 ).

2005See Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991); State v. Hamilton, 791 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); Lillard v. State, 528 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tenn.Crim.App.1975); State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d 582 , 335 N.W.2d 583 , 592 n. 6 (1983); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Wyo.1979); see also State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Tenn.2001) (listing similar factors).

2005See Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991); State v. Hamilton, 791 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); Lillard v. State, 528 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tenn.Crim.App.1975); State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d 582 , 335 N.W.2d 583 , 592 n. 6 (1983); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Wyo.1979); see also State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Tenn.2001) (listing similar factors).