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7 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1951–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Brocegreen2 sentences2000See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 , 109 S.Ct. 757, 764 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (holding defendants relinquished double jeopardy rights by pleading guilty to two separate indictments, thereby conceding guilt to two separate offenses). 2000See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 , 109 S.Ct. 757, 764 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (holding defendants relinquished double jeopardy rights by pleading guilty to two separate indictments, thereby conceding guilt to two separate offenses). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rogers v. Blake
green
2 sentences1957In the case of Rogers v. Blake, 150 Tex. 373 , 240 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 , a guest case in which it was contended that the conscious failure to stop at a stop sign was gross negligence, our Supreme Court, in reversing the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals, stated: “We think the fallacy of petitioner’s reasoning is that she contends a conscious failure to stop at the stop sign; i. e., a conscious violation of the law requiring one to stop at the stop sign, ■constitutes gross negligence on the part of the respondent, whereas the law is that there must be a ‘heedlessness and 1957In the case of Rogers v. Blake, 150 Tex. 373 , 240 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 , a guest case in which it was contended that the conscious failure to stop at a stop sign was gross negligence, our Supreme Court, in reversing the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals, stated: “We think the fallacy of petitioner’s reasoning is that she contends a conscious failure to stop at the stop sign; i. e., a conscious violation of the law requiring one to stop at the stop sign, ■constitutes gross negligence on the part of the respondent, whereas the law is that there must be a ‘heedlessness and | 2 | 1957–1962 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
red
2 sentences1985Appellants' failure to raise this issue is not dispositive, given the bereft state of the law on parent-child immunity in Texas; it was not, in other words, a conscious waiver in the sense of an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 1985Appellants' failure to raise this issue is not dispositive, given the bereft state of the law on parent-child immunity in Texas; it was not, in other words, a conscious waiver in the sense of an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Harbin v. Seale
green
1 sentence1973The indifference is to the rights or welfare of the person or persons who may he affected by the act or omission. * * * * * * From this unbroken line of decisions, it is now the settled law of this *952 state that momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment do not constitute 'heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others’ within the meaning of this statute; * * * We think the fallacy of petitioner’s reasoning is that she contends a conscious failure to stop at the stop sign; i. e., a conscious violation of the law requiring one to stop at the stop sign, constitut | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Bullock v. Atlantic Refining Company
neutral
1 sentence1957In the case of Rogers v. Blake, 150 Tex. 373 , 240 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 , a guest case in which it was contended that the conscious failure to stop at a stop sign was gross negligence, our Supreme Court, in reversing the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals, stated: “We think the fallacy of petitioner’s reasoning is that she contends a conscious failure to stop at the stop sign; i. e., a conscious violation of the law requiring one to stop at the stop sign, ■constitutes gross negligence on the part of the respondent, whereas the law is that there must be a ‘heedlessness and | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Mayer v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1957In the case of Mayer v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 454, 459 , error dismissed, judgment correct,- there was an appeal from a directed verdict for the defendant in a guest statute case. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Wood v. Orts
green
1 sentence1957McCarty v. Moss, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W.2d 883 ; Wood v. Orts, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W.2d 139 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
McCarty v. Moss
green
1 sentence1957McCarty v. Moss, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W.2d 883 ; Wood v. Orts, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W.2d 139 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Bowman v. Puckett
green
2 sentences1951The case of Bowman v. Puckett, 144 Texas 125 , 188 S.W. 2d 571 , requires that there must be a continued and persistent course of action in order for the driver to be liable. 1951The case of Bowman v. Puckett, 144 Texas 125 , 188 S.W. 2d 571 , requires that there must be a continued and persistent course of action in order for the driver to be liable. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.