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7 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alamo Heights Independent School District v. Catherine Clarkgreen2 sentences2026Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 786 (“An employee engages in a protected activity by . . . making a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.”). 2026Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 786 (“An employee engages in a protected activity by . . . making a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.”). | 2 | 2 |
Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility Management, Inc.green1 sentence2024Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164 , 168 (5th Cir. 1999) (“If an employer is unaware of an employee’s protected conduct at the time of the adverse employment action, the employer plainly could not have retaliated against the employee based on that conduct.”). | 1 | 1 |
Rosenbush v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Fuller relies on Rosenbush v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 50 , 122 S.W.2d 1071, 1072 (1938), in support of her position that she did not unlawfully appropriate Hughes' trust fund monies. 2015Fuller relies on Rosenbush v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 50 , 122 S.W.2d 1071, 1072 (1938), in support of her position that she did not unlawfully appropriate Hughes' trust fund monies. | 1 | 1 |
Igal v. Brightstar Information Technology Group, Inc.red1 sentence2010City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 396 (observing that statute did not contain explicit language indicating that requirement was jurisdictional nor did it provide a consequence for noncompliance); accord Igal, 250 S.W.3d at 84 (noting that statutory language did not indicate that statute was intended to address jurisdiction, as it merely “established] a procedural bar similar to a statute of limitations and does not prescribe the boundaries of jurisdiction”); see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394 , 102 S.Ct. 1127 (noting that statutory time period for filing EEOC claim under Title VII “does not speak in | 1 | 1 |
City of DeSoto v. Whitegreen1 sentence2010City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 396 (observing that statute did not contain explicit language indicating that requirement was jurisdictional nor did it provide a consequence for noncompliance); accord Igal, 250 S.W.3d at 84 (noting that statutory language did not indicate that statute was intended to address jurisdiction, as it merely “established] a procedural bar similar to a statute of limitations and does not prescribe the boundaries of jurisdiction”); see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394 , 102 S.Ct. 1127 (noting that statutory time period for filing EEOC claim under Title VII “does not speak in | 1 | 1 |
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.green2 sentences2010City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 396 (observing that statute did not contain explicit language indicating that requirement was jurisdictional nor did it provide a consequence for noncompliance); accord Igal, 250 S.W.3d at 84 (noting that statutory language did not indicate that statute was intended to address jurisdiction, as it merely “established] a procedural bar similar to a statute of limitations and does not prescribe the boundaries of jurisdiction”); see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394 , 102 S.Ct. 1127 (noting that statutory time period for filing EEOC claim under Title VII “does not speak in 2010City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 396 (observing that statute did not contain explicit language indicating that requirement was jurisdictional nor did it provide a consequence for noncompliance); accord Igal, 250 S.W.3d at 84 (noting that statutory language did not indicate that statute was intended to address jurisdiction, as it merely “established] a procedural bar similar to a statute of limitations and does not prescribe the boundaries of jurisdiction”); see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394 , 102 S.Ct. 1127 (noting that statutory time period for filing EEOC claim under Title VII “does not speak in | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Richardson Independent School Districtgreen1 sentence2001See Turner v. Richardson I.S.D., 885 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.1996). [8] A related "absurd result" would occur if a plaintiff pursued a claim under the TCHRA after being forced to dismiss her filing with the EEOC by an application of section 21.211, and then had the statute of limitations run on any EEOC claim she may have had. | 1 | 1 |
Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp.green1 sentence2001See Turner v. Richardson I.S.D., 885 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.1996). [8] A related "absurd result" would occur if a plaintiff pursued a claim under the TCHRA after being forced to dismiss her filing with the EEOC by an application of section 21.211, and then had the statute of limitations run on any EEOC claim she may have had. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patton Boggs LLP v. Moseley
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 566–67. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.