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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estelle v. Smithgreen2 sentences2004Although the case upon which he was relying, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), was decided the same year as his trial, he waited nine years after Estelle v. Smith was decided before first asserting an Estelle v. Smith claim in his second writ application in June 1990. 2004Although the case upon which he was relying, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 1866 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), was decided the same year as his trial, he waited nine years after Estelle v. Smith was decided before first asserting an Estelle v. Smith claim in his second writ application in June 1990. | 1 | 5 |
Ex Parte Gardnergreen2 sentences2004Ex Parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d at 191 . 2004Ex Parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d at 191 . | 1 | 3 |
Ex Parte Bravogreen1 sentence1998Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), cer t. denied, 474 U.S. 864 , 106 S.Ct. 181 , 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985), and Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Tex.Cr.App.1985)(op. on reh’g). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Crispengreen1 sentence1998Ex parte Crispen, supra, at 108-09 (Clinton, J., concurring); Ex parte Dutchover, supra, at 79 ; Ex parte Goodman, supra, at 387-88 . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Dutchovergreen2 sentences1998Ex parte Crispen, supra, at 108-09 (Clinton, J., concurring); Ex parte Dutchover, supra, at 79 ; Ex parte Goodman, supra, at 387-88 . 1998See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); 2 Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-39 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (liberal allowance of the writ encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Carrgreen2 sentences1998For this proposition the plurality cites only Ex parte Carr, 511 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). 5 In Carr, drawing from the federal analog, this Court did indeed hold that a habeas applicant’s claims may be “waived or abandoned by his abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.” Id,., at 526. 1998See Ex parte Carr, 511 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974) (if petitioner has grounds which would justify granting habeas corpus relief, he should present them with dispatch for determination, rather than doling them out one-by-one in repeated attempts to have both the benefits of relief and the fleeting pleasures of harassing those who confine him); cf. Article 11.071, Section 5(a), V.A.C.C.P.; Tex.R.App. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Grovesgreen2 sentences1998It is well-settled “that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.” Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); see Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (habeas corpus does not lie as a substitute for an appeal). 1998It is well-settled "that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal." Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); see Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (habeas corpus does not lie as a substitute for an appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Drakegreen2 sentences1998See Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (habeas corpus relief is underscored by elements of fairness and equity). 1998See Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1 |
Crabtree v. Aetna Life Insurancegreen1 sentence1998Ex parte Crispen, supra, at 108-09 (Clinton, J., concurring); Ex parte Dutchover, supra, at 79 ; Ex parte Goodman, supra, at 387-88 . | 1 | 1 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsonred2 sentences1998See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); 2 Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-39 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (liberal allowance of the writ encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review). 1998See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); 2 Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-39 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (liberal allowance of the writ encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Goodmangreen2 sentences1998Ex parte Crispen, supra, at 108-09 (Clinton, J., concurring); Ex parte Dutchover, supra, at 79 ; Ex parte Goodman, supra, at 387-88 . 1998See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); 2 Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-39 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (liberal allowance of the writ encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review). | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); 2 Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-39 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (liberal allowance of the writ encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review). 1998See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); [2] Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex. Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex. Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-39 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (liberal allowance of the writ encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
red
2 sentences1998The plurality does not really mean to say that applicant "waived” his Estelle v. Smith claim, at least not in the constitutional sense of waiver, viz: the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 1998The plurality does not really mean to say that applicant "waived” his Estelle v. Smith claim, at least not in the constitutional sense of waiver, viz: the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ex Parte Chambers
green
2 sentences1998Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Campbell, J., concurring). . 1998Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Campbell, J., concurring). [2] The plurality does not really mean to say that applicant "waived" his Estelle v. Smith claim, at least not in the constitutional sense of waiver, viz: the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Texas v. Chambers
green
2 sentences1998Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), cer t. denied, 474 U.S. 864 , 106 S.Ct. 181 , 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985), and Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Tex.Cr.App.1985)(op. on reh’g). 1998Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), cer t. denied, 474 U.S. 864 , 106 S.Ct. 181 , 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985), and Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Tex.Cr.App.1985)(op. on reh’g). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wainwright v. Sykes
green
2 sentences1998Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 1998Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hill v. State
green
2 sentences1994The applicant's attorneys could have raised the Estelle v. Smith issue on the direct appeal in the appellant's brief, or in the alternative, they could have requested the court to consider applicant's writ application concomitant with the appeal, Hill, supra. Unfortunately, applicant's attorneys pursued neither course of action and instead allowed this constitutional issue to go unchallenged before this Court. 1994The applicant’s attorneys could have raised the Estelle v. Smith issue on the direct appeal in the appellant’s brief, or in the alternative, they could have requested the court to consider applicant's writ application concomitant with the appeal, Hill, supra. Unfortunately, applicant’s attorneys pursued neither course of action and instead allowed this constitutional issue to go unchallenged before this Court. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Satterwhite v. State
red
2 sentences1989In finding the Estelle v. Smith error harmless the majority in Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), introduced its analysis with the observation that "Dr. Grigson's testimony was not the only evidence offered by the State during the punishment phase of the trial," id, at 93. 1989In finding the Estelle v. Smith error harmless the majority in Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), introduced its analysis with the observation that “Dr. Grigson’s testimony was not the only evidence offered by the State during the punishment phase of the trial,” id, at 93. | 1 | 1989–1989 |