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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Graham Central Station, Inc. v. Jesus Peñagreen2 sentences2018See Cty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 556 ; cf. Peña, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on ownership or control and absence of any such evidence is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim); Allen Keller, 343 S.W.3d at 426 (“As a general rule, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.’” (citations omitted)). 4. 2017See Cty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 556 ; cf. Peña, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on ownership or control and absence of any such evidence is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim); Allen Keller, 343 S.W.3d at 426 (“As a general rule, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.’” (citations omitted)). 4. | 2 | 2 |
County of Cameron v. Browngreen2 sentences2018See Cty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 556 ; cf. Peña, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on ownership or control and absence of any such evidence is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim); Allen Keller, 343 S.W.3d at 426 (“As a general rule, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.’” (citations omitted)). 4. 2017See Cty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 556 ; cf. Peña, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on ownership or control and absence of any such evidence is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim); Allen Keller, 343 S.W.3d at 426 (“As a general rule, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.’” (citations omitted)). 4. | 2 | 2 |
Allen Keller Co. v. Foremangreen2 sentences2018See Cty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 556 ; cf. Peña, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on ownership or control and absence of any such evidence is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim); Allen Keller, 343 S.W.3d at 426 (“As a general rule, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.’” (citations omitted)). 4. 2017See Cty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 556 ; cf. Peña, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on ownership or control and absence of any such evidence is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim); Allen Keller, 343 S.W.3d at 426 (“As a general rule, ‘a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.’” (citations omitted)). 4. | 2 | 2 |
Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Sieglergreen2 sentences2017And though “the character of Levine’s claim” may be a “legal question,” ante at ___ n.1, we must answer the question based on “the facts surrounding the occurrence in question.” Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added). 2017And though “the character of Levine’s claim” may be a “legal question,” ante, at 470 n.1, we must answer the question based on “the facts surrounding the occurrence in question.” Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
John Sampson v. the University of Texas at Austingreen2 sentences2017The Court asserts that whether Levine’s claim sounds in ordinary negligence or premises liability is a “legal question” we review de novo, because the question of whether “a condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injury is a premises defect is a legal question.” Ante at ___ (emphasis added) (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex. 2016)). 2017The Court asserts-that whether Levine’s claim sounds in ordinary negligence or premises liability is a “legal question” we review de novo, because the question of whether “a condition that allegedly caused the plaintiffs injury is a premises defect is a legal question.” Ante at 469 (emphasis added) (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex. 2016)). | 2 | 2 |
Reliance National Indemnity Co. v. Advance'd Temporaries, Inc.green2 sentences2018But s ee Reliance Nat’l, 227 S.W.3d at 50 (“Appellate courts review legal determinations de novo, whereas factual determinations receive more deferential review based on the sufficiency of the evidence.”). 2017But see Reliance Nat'l, 227 S.W.3d at 50 ("Appellate courts, review legal determinations de novo, whereas factual determinations' receive more deferential review based on ’the sufficiency of the evidence.’.'). | 1 | 2 |
Strakos v. Gehringgreen1 sentence2018We do not read t he law to impose premises liability duties on contractors only when the owner has relinquished all right to control or restrict access to its property. 6 T he dissent seems to contend that Levine’s claim sounds in general negligence based on a line of cas es originating with our 1962 decision in Str ak os v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1962), in which we rejected the accepted-work doctrine and held that a contractor whose work created a dangerous condit ion on t he property that ultimately caused injury is not immune from liability solely because his work was completed | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Departmentgreen1 sentence2017See also Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 8 S.W.3d 634, 635 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) ("As a rule, to prevail on a premises liability-claim a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.”) (citing City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1986)). . | 1 | 1 |
City of Denton v. Van Pagegreen1 sentence2017See also Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 8 S.W.3d 634, 635 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) ("As a rule, to prevail on a premises liability-claim a plaintiff must prove that the defendant possessed—that is, owned, occupied, or controlled—the premises where injury occurred.”) (citing City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1986)). . | 1 | 1 |
in Re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Viscount Properties II, L.P., D/B/A Hoy Fox toyota/lexusgreen2 sentences2015See In re Toyota, 407 S.W.3d 746, 759 (Tex. 2013) (orig.proceeding). 2015See In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 759 (Tex. 2013) (orig.proceeding) 6 . | 1 | 1 |
Retail Clerks International Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorngreen2 sentences2015First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 , 84 S.Ct. 219 , 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). 2015First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 , 84 S.Ct. 219 , 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
In Re United Scaffolding, Inc.green2 sentences2012In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex. 2010) (“We direct the trial court to specify its reasons for disregarding the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.”). 2012In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex.2010) (“We direct the trial court to specify its reasons for disregarding the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.”). | 1 | 1 |
General Motors Corp. v. Gaylegreen1 sentence1999See General Motors, Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex.1997) (review of denial of continuance subject to abuse of discretion standard). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reliance National Indemnity Co. v. Advance'd Temporaries, Inc.green2 sentences2018But s ee Reliance Nat’l, 227 S.W.3d at 50 (“Appellate courts review legal determinations de novo, whereas factual determinations receive more deferential review based on the sufficiency of the evidence.”). 2017But see Reliance Nat'l, 227 S.W.3d at 50 ("Appellate courts, review legal determinations de novo, whereas factual determinations' receive more deferential review based on ’the sufficiency of the evidence.’.'). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Redinger v. Living, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Id. at ___. 2017Id. at ___. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo
green
2 sentences2018As we have held for two decades, a premises defect case improperly submitted to the jury under only a general-negligence question, without the elements of premises liability as instructions or definitions, causes the rendition of an improper judgment.1 Olivo, 952 S.W.2d at 529 . 1 The dissent suggests that we apply the improper standard of review because we do not review the legal question of the character of Levine’s claim under some sort of sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. ___ S.W.3d at ___ (Boyd, J., dissenting). 2018Id. at ___. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
United Scaffolding, Inc. v. James Levine
green
2 sentences2017The court of appeals considered USI’s control, over the premises to be the central inquiry in determining the character of Levine’s claim. 520 S.W.3d at 635-36 , 2015 WL 5157837 . 2017The court of appeals considered USI’s control, over the premises to be the central inquiry in determining the character of Levine’s claim. 520 S.W.3d at 635-36 , 2015 WL 5157837 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lefmark Management Co. v. Old
green
1 sentence2017The Court asserts that the “only fair reading of Levine’s pleadings” necessarily “requires the determination that Levine did in fact allege that USI assumed and retained the right to control the scaffolding it constructed.” Ante at ___ (emphasis added).5 Based on this “fair reading” of Levine’s petition, the Court concludes that Levine’s claim necessarily sounds only “in premises liability.” Id. at ___. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
green
2 sentences2015First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 , 84 S.Ct. 219 , 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). 2015First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 , 84 S.Ct. 219 , 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.