Longoria motion in Texas

2025Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Texas law does not permit Zuniga to sue Essex directly for a declaration of Essex’s duty to indemnify SDT before SDT’s lia- bility to Zuniga has been determined.”); cf. In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1 , 27 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding) (“Shire is not entitled to mandamus relief in this case because the law it relies upon [for dismissal of relator’s qui tam action] is clearly not settled by any standard.”).

2025Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Texas law does not permit Zuniga to sue Essex directly for a declaration of Essex’s duty to indemnify SDT before SDT’s lia- bility to Zuniga has been determined.”); cf. In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 27 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding) (“Shire is not entitled to mandamus relief in this case because the law it relies upon [for dismissal of relator’s qui tam action] is clearly not settled by any standard.”).

2025Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Texas law does not permit Zuniga to sue Essex directly for a declaration of Essex’s duty to indemnify SDT before SDT’s lia- bility to Zuniga has been determined.”); cf. In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1 , 27 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding) (“Shire is not entitled to mandamus relief in this case because the law it relies upon [for dismissal of relator’s qui tam action] is clearly not settled by any standard.”).

2025Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Texas law does not permit Zuniga to sue Essex directly for a declaration of Essex’s duty to indemnify SDT before SDT’s lia- bility to Zuniga has been determined.”); cf. In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 27 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding) (“Shire is not entitled to mandamus relief in this case because the law it relies upon [for dismissal of relator’s qui tam action] is clearly not settled by any standard.”).

2023“The trial judge reviewed the recording of the interrogation and could measure the officer’s perceptions with respect to the voluntariness of the appellant’s waiver for himself.” Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 352 (Tex. Crim.

2018See Ernst & Young LLP v. Martin, 278 S.W.3d 497, 500-01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding) (where the arbitration clause stated that the parties agreed to arbitrate “any contention that all or part of these procedures are invalid or unenforceable,” appellees’ challenge to contract’s validity was subject to arbitration).

2015See Lindsey, 980 S.W.2d at 237 . fighter or police officer.” Therefore, the City's argument that the hearing examiner relied on the incorrect “part” of section Because no genuine issue of material fact remained that 143.052(h) is without merit. the hearing examiner lacked jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction to render an award, the trial court properly The City next argued the hearing examiner exceeded his granted Longoria's motion for summary judgment. authority and/or jurisdiction “in deciding that the SAFD had not taken disciplinary action in a timely fashion when, in fact, it had.” 2

2015Id. § 143.057(j). the City asserted the hearing examiner's analysis was flawed because he determined it was required to take disciplinary *2 The standard set forth in section 143.057(j) has been action within 180 days of “learning” of the infraction.

2015See Nuchia, 973 S.W.2d at 786; City court may hear an appeal of a hearing examiner's award of Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex.App.- only on the grounds that: (1) the hearing examiner was Dallas 1991, no writ). without jurisdiction; (2) the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction; or (3) the order was procured by fraud, collusion, In its response to Longoria's motion for summary judgment, or other unlawful means.