7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Griggs v. Capitol MacHine Works, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). 2009See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). | 2 | 2 |
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. McGlamorygreen2 sentences1973This situation comes squarely within the holding of Patrizi v. McAninch, supra, where the Supreme Court, in rejecting a similar contention, cited with approval the oft-repeated rule from Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Tex. 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1896), as follows: “. . . that a promise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” See also: Yost v. Justin Belt Co., Inc., supra; Funkhouser v. Capps, 174 S.W. 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d); Jarrett v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d 1954Having reached the conclusion that the provision for royalty payments and the illegal provisions are indivisible and inseparable, we are confronted with the oft-repeated rule: “That a prom ise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Texas 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 ; W. | 1 | 2 |
Leach v. TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITYgreen1 sentence2025Leach v. Texas Tech Univ., 335 S.W.3d 386, 401 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied) (“If the highest civil court 35 in Texas truly means what it said, then the holding in State Street simply is wrong.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lassaint v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Lassaint v. State , 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (citing Carvajal v. State , 529 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Carvajal v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Lassaint v. State , 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (citing Carvajal v. State , 529 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Edwards County v. Jennings
green
2 sentences1973This situation comes squarely within the holding of Patrizi v. McAninch, supra, where the Supreme Court, in rejecting a similar contention, cited with approval the oft-repeated rule from Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Tex. 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1896), as follows: “. . . that a promise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” See also: Yost v. Justin Belt Co., Inc., supra; Funkhouser v. Capps, 174 S.W. 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d); Jarrett v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d 1954Having reached the conclusion that the provision for royalty payments and the illegal provisions are indivisible and inseparable, we are confronted with the oft-repeated rule: “That a prom ise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Texas 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 ; W. | 2 | 1954–1973 |
Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
green
1 sentence1973This situation comes squarely within the holding of Patrizi v. McAninch, supra, where the Supreme Court, in rejecting a similar contention, cited with approval the oft-repeated rule from Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Tex. 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1896), as follows: “. . . that a promise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” See also: Yost v. Justin Belt Co., Inc., supra; Funkhouser v. Capps, 174 S.W. 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d); Jarrett v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Yost v. Justin Belt Co.
green
1 sentence1973This situation comes squarely within the holding of Patrizi v. McAninch, supra, where the Supreme Court, in rejecting a similar contention, cited with approval the oft-repeated rule from Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Tex. 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1896), as follows: “. . . that a promise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” See also: Yost v. Justin Belt Co., Inc., supra; Funkhouser v. Capps, 174 S.W. 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d); Jarrett v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Funkhouser v. Capps
neutral
1 sentence1973This situation comes squarely within the holding of Patrizi v. McAninch, supra, where the Supreme Court, in rejecting a similar contention, cited with approval the oft-repeated rule from Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Tex. 618 , 35 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1896), as follows: “. . . that a promise made upon several considerations, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.” See also: Yost v. Justin Belt Co., Inc., supra; Funkhouser v. Capps, 174 S.W. 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1915, writ ref’d); Jarrett v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Bettinger v. North Fort Worth Ice Co.
green
1 sentence1937The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed because appellants did not show any reasonable excuse for failing to appear or answer; and they failed to show any excuse for not filing their motion to set aside or vacate the default judgment until three weeks after they had notice of such default judgment, which they must do under the oft repeated rule that “a motion to vacate or set aside a judgment by default is addressed to the sound discretion of the court rendering the judgment, and its action thereon will be sustained, unless it is clearly shown that the discretion has been abused.” 3 Tex. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.