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30 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1905–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mager v. Bultenagreen2 sentences2016Surely, to accept the argument of appellant would be to impose a penalty on the exercise of that right.[Footnote 14] [Footnote 14] In fact, Mr. Fox, counsel for ML & W argued to the trial court that “the client had a right to leave, but the client has to leave with the consequences of leaving.” Mager, 797 A.2d at 958 (footnote 13 omitted). 13 However, - an important aspect of Judge Joyce’s concurrence in Mager is the idea that a quantum, meruit recovery need not be limited to an hours and expenses analysis: As discussed by Judge Joyce, quantum meruit is an equitable action and principles of fa 2012Id., at 957-958 (citations and footnotes omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Dorsett v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2016To rule otherwise would make fiction of the oft-repeated rule that' a client always has a right to discharge his attorney, for any reason or for no reason, Richette v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 410 Pa. 6, 19 , 187 A.2d 910, 917 (1963); Dorsett v. Hughes, 353 Pa.Super. 129 , 509 A.2d 369, 373 (1986). 2016To rule otherwise would make fiction of the oft-repeated rule that' a client always has a right to discharge his attorney, for any reason or for no reason, Richette v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 410 Pa. 6, 19 , 187 A.2d 910, 917 (1963); Dorsett v. Hughes, 353 Pa.Super. 129 , 509 A.2d 369, 373 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Richette v. Pennsylvania Railroadgreen2 sentences2016To rule otherwise would make fiction of the oft-repeated rule that' a client always has a right to discharge his attorney, for any reason or for no reason, Richette v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 410 Pa. 6, 19 , 187 A.2d 910, 917 (1963); Dorsett v. Hughes, 353 Pa.Super. 129 , 509 A.2d 369, 373 (1986). 2016To rule otherwise would make fiction of the oft-repeated rule that' a client always has a right to discharge his attorney, for any reason or for no reason, Richette v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 410 Pa. 6, 19 , 187 A.2d 910, 917 (1963); Dorsett v. Hughes, 353 Pa.Super. 129 , 509 A.2d 369, 373 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Gumpert's Estategreen2 sentences1984Gumpert’s Estate, 343 Pa. 405, 407 , 23 A.2d 479, 480 (1942). 1946In Gumpert’s Estate, 343 Pa. 405, 407 , Mr. Justice Horace Stern stated the principle governing the constitutional question here presented, as follows: “It is unnecessary to elaborate upon the oft-repeated principle that all the Constitution requires is that the title should put persons of a reasonably inquiring state of mind on notice of the general subject matter of the act. | 1 | 3 |
Mescanti v. Mescantigreen1 sentence2024See Mescanti, 956 A.2d at 1019–20. - 10 - J-A15008-24 arguing that the court erred in not blindly accepting her testimony, Ms. Larsen ignores the well-settled and oft-repeated standard that this Court may not make its own credibility determinations when it is the trial court who has heard the witnesses’ testimony and observed their demeanor. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millnergreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). 2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. DeJesusgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). 2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Spaulding v. Butlergreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fultongreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). 2009See, e.g., *260 Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 782 A.2d 1167, 1176 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65 , 876 A.2d 342, 345 (2002); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 581 Pa. 632 , 868 A.2d 379, 382-83 (2005); Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237 , 888 A.2d 680, 688 (2005); see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1192 (Castille, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Berkowitz v. Kassgreen2 sentences1984See Berkowitz v. Kass, 351 Pa. 263 , 40 A.2d 691 (1945). *173 Having placed in perspective the treatment to be accorded record (deposition) evidence, we now turn to the oft-repeated factors that must coalesce to justify the opening of a default judgment in assumpsit cases. 1984See Berkowitz v. Kass, 351 Pa. 263 , 40 A.2d 691 (1945). *173 Having placed in perspective the treatment to be accorded record (deposition) evidence, we now turn to the oft-repeated factors that must coalesce to justify the opening of a default judgment in assumpsit cases. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wooleygreen2 sentences1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 | 1 | 1 |
Logan, to Use v. Bethlehem Citygreen2 sentences1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 | 1 | 1 |
Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 | 1 | 1 |
Supler v. Sonntaggreen1 sentence1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 | 1 | 1 |
Reiter v. Reitergreen1 sentence1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 | 1 | 1 |
| Kane v. D'Oraziogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thorndell v. Munngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Connery v. Brooke
green
2 sentences1954To ascertain the intention we must look to the circumstances attending the grant: Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80, 83 ; Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 235 Pa. 5, 11 , 83 A. 592 .” The chancellor noted that the Tommarelli deed referred to a “plan of lots.” The plan was not offered in evidence, and there was nothing to indicate that it is in existence. 1939To ascertain the intention we must look to the circumstances attending the grant: Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80, 83 ; Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 235 Pa. 5, 11 , 83 A. 592 . | 2 | 1939–1954 |
Mercantile Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1954To ascertain the intention we must look to the circumstances attending the grant: Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80, 83 ; Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 235 Pa. 5, 11 , 83 A. 592 .” The chancellor noted that the Tommarelli deed referred to a “plan of lots.” The plan was not offered in evidence, and there was nothing to indicate that it is in existence. 1954To ascertain the intention we must look to the circumstances attending the grant: Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80, 83 ; Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 235 Pa. 5, 11 , 83 A. 592 .” The chancellor noted that the Tommarelli deed referred to a “plan of lots.” The plan was not offered in evidence, and there was nothing to indicate that it is in existence. | 2 | 1939–1954 |
Elliott v. McGoun
neutral
2 sentences1933This appeal, accordingly, falls within the oft-repeated rule that in doubtful cases, and especially in those requiring broad inquiry into the facts, the refusal of the lower court to enter judgment on the pleadings will be sustained in this court: Elliott v. MeGoun, 307 Pa. 185 ; Rodgers v. Mann, 307 Pa. 452 . 1933This appeal, accordingly, falls within the oft-repeated rule that in doubtful cases, and especially in those requiring broad inquiry into the facts, the refusal of the lower court to enter judgment on the pleadings will be sustained in this court: Elliott v. McGoun, 307 Pa. 185 ; Rodgers v. Mann, 307 Pa. 452 . | 2 | 1933–1933 |
Rodgers v. Mann
neutral
2 sentences1933This appeal, accordingly, falls within the oft-repeated rule that in doubtful cases, and especially in those requiring broad inquiry into the facts, the refusal of the lower court to enter judgment on the pleadings will be sustained in this court: Elliott v. MeGoun, 307 Pa. 185 ; Rodgers v. Mann, 307 Pa. 452 . 1933This appeal, accordingly, falls within the oft-repeated rule that in doubtful cases, and especially in those requiring broad inquiry into the facts, the refusal of the lower court to enter judgment on the pleadings will be sustained in this court: Elliott v. McGoun, 307 Pa. 185 ; Rodgers v. Mann, 307 Pa. 452 . | 2 | 1933–1933 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences1988However, as the oft-repeated doctrine of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), makes clear, the concept of "place", while of relevance to a *149 determination as to whether an area shall be recognized as constitutionally protected, is not dispositive of the question: "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 1988However, as the oft-repeated doctrine of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), makes clear, the concept of "place", while of relevance to a *149 determination as to whether an area shall be recognized as constitutionally protected, is not dispositive of the question: "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Borman v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1981Borman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 241 , 316 A.2d 679 (1974). 1981Borman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 241 , 316 A.2d 679 (1974). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Vogel Et Ux. v. Suburban Const. Co.
green
2 sentences1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 1981Accord Logan v. Bethlehem City, 324 Pa. 7, 13 , 187 A. 389, 391 (1936) (where it is impossible to determine which instruction the jury followed,—those contained in the general charge, or in plaintiff’s point, which was read in error, the only recourse is to remand the case for a new trial); see Reiter v. Reiter, 159 Pa.Super. 344, 350 , 48 A.2d 66, 70 (1946); Vogel v. Suburban Construction Co., supra, 144 Pa.Super. at 591 , 20 A.2d at 907 ; Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Pa.Super. 260, 263 , 5 A.2d 423, 424 (1939); see also Commonwealth v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 253 , 102 A. 947 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Hornberger
green
2 sentences1975In Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 441 Pa. 57 , 270 A.2d 195 (1970), we reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “ [1] egal malice exists not only where there is a particular ill will, but also whenever there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty. 1975In Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 441 Pa. 57 , 270 A.2d 195 (1970), we reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “ [1] egal malice exists not only where there is a particular ill will, but also whenever there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp.
green
2 sentences1969Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350 , 237 A. 2d 342 (1968); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corporation, 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561 , 192 A. 674 (1937). 1969Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350 , 237 A. 2d 342 (1968); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corporation, 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561 , 192 A. 674 (1937). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences1969Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350 , 237 A. 2d 342 (1968); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corporation, 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561 , 192 A. 674 (1937). 1969Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350 , 237 A. 2d 342 (1968); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corporation, 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561 , 192 A. 674 (1937). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
McCown v. Fraser
green
2 sentences1969Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350 , 237 A. 2d 342 (1968); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corporation, 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561 , 192 A. 674 (1937). 1969Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350 , 237 A. 2d 342 (1968); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corporation, 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967); McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561 , 192 A. 674 (1937). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Schuster v. Largman
green
1 sentence1963The oft repeated rule is, as stated in Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520 , namely, that “The fundamental requisite of a partnership is co-ownership of a business.” As held in Kingsley Clothing Mfg. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Kingsley Clothing Manufacturing Co. v. Jacobs
green
1 sentence1963Co. v. Jacobs, 344 Pa. 551 : “The fact that one is entitled by agreement to a share of the profits of an enterprise does not necessarily constitute him a partner.” The Act of March 26, 1915, P. L. 18, part II, §7, 59 P.S. §12, expressly provides: “(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment (b) As wages of an employe . . . .” (Emphasis supplied) It is equally incorrect for the City to argue that the Green buyers were independent con | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Hoffman v. Howell
neutral
2 sentences1960The oft-repeated rule with respect to the narrowly restricted scope of review upon an appeal from the grant or refusal of a preliminary injunction was recently reiterated in Rubin v. Bailey, 398 Pa. 271, 274 , 157 A. 2d 882 , where we quoted from Hoffman v. Howell, 242 Pa. 112, 114 , 88 A. 877 , as follows: “Our established practice on appeals from the awarding or refusing of preliminary injunctions is not to consider the merits of the case, but only to determine whether under the facts presented in the common pleas there was reasonable ground for the action of the court.” See also Aldrich v. 1960The oft-repeated rule with respect to the narrowly restricted scope of review upon an appeal from the grant or refusal of a preliminary injunction was recently reiterated in Rubin v. Bailey, 398 Pa. 271, 274 , 157 A. 2d 882 , where we quoted from Hoffman v. Howell, 242 Pa. 112, 114 , 88 A. 877 , as follows: “Our established practice on appeals from the awarding or refusing of preliminary injunctions is not to consider the merits of the case, but only to determine whether under the facts presented in the common pleas there was reasonable ground for the action of the court.” See also Aldrich v. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Rubin v. Bailey green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| National Automobile Service Inc. v. Barfod green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Aldrich v. Geahry green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Annenberg v. Roberts green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Pro v. Pennsylvania Railroad green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co. green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Fine v. Fine green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| McFadden Estate green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Earle Estate green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Catalano's Estate neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Custis v. Serrill neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Stern v. Gorson neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Barnes Foundation v. Keely green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Dyba Et Ux. v. Borowitz green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Adelman, Trustee v. J. McShain, Inc. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Conway Will green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Lewis Will green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Sturgeon Will green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Belmont Laboratories, Inc. v. Heist green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Commonwealth v. American Gas Co. green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Roush v. Northumberland County neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| County Commissioners' Petition for the Construction of a Public Highway Tunnel neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Hegele v. Reynolds neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Soldiers and Sailors Memorial Bridge green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Lyndall v. Fidelity Storage & Warehouse Co. neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Commonwealth v. Gerade green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.