oft-repeated principle in Illinois

1967See: Myers v. City of Elmhurst, 12 Ill2d 537, 543, 544, 147 NE2d 300 (1958); La Salle Nat.

1967See: Myers v. City of Elmhurst, 12 Ill2d 537, 543, 544, 147 NE 2d 300 (1958); La Salle Nat.

2006See People v. Brooks, 221 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2006) (“When a term used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to other aids of construction”); Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d at 364-65 ; People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1988).

2006See People v. Brooks, 221 Ill.2d 381, 390 , 303 Ill.Dec. 161 , 851 N.E.2d 59 (2006) ("When a term used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to other aids of construction"); Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill.2d at 364-65 , 198 Ill.

1986App. 3d 671, 679 , 410 N.E.2d 1017 ), and the trial court’s determination of the propriety of such an argument will not be disturbed on review absent extreme error (People v. Maldonado (1981), 101 Ill.

1984App. 3d 671, 679 , 410 N.E.2d 1017 ), and the trial court’s determination of the propriety of such an argument will not be disturbed on review absent extreme error (People v. Maldonado (1981) , 101 Ill.

1986“It is an oft-repeated principle that a prosecutor is to be permitted great latitude in his closing argument (People v. Hine (1980), 88 Ill.

1984If it is not in evidence, the jury will disregard it.” It is an oft-repeated principle that a prosecutor is to be permitted great latitude in his closing argument (People v. Hine (1980) , 88 Ill.

1988(Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 330 , 371 N.E.2d 634 .) Here, giving up his Quikduc interest was a disadvantage to Adams and, therefore, sufficient consideration to support the parties’ employment contract.

1988(Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 330 , 371 N.E.2d 634 .) Here, giving up his Quikduc interest was a disadvantage to Adams and, therefore, sufficient consideration to support the parties’ employment contract.

1987“We are aware of the oft-repeated rule that a jury verdict is to be given great weight; nevertheless, when a jury verdict is returned which is not supported by the evidence, it is the duty of *** the reviewing court to act as a check upon the jury and reverse that verdict.” (Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill.

1987App. 3d 389, 392 , 406 N.E.2d 927, 930 .) Therefore, on appeal the court will examine the record to determine a basis upon which the verdict can be supported.

1983Defendant relies on People v. Goodwin (1979), 69 Ill.

1975The reason for this rule is that a trial judge is in a superior position to determine whether or not a fair trial was had and substantial justice accomplished. * * The trial judge, however, should not set aside a verdict and grant a new trial merely because he would have decided the case differently if he had been the trier of fact. * * or because he feels that inferences or conclusions other than those drawn by the jury might be more reasonable. [Citations.] In Dailey v. Hill, 99 Ill.App.2d 474, 479 , 241 N.E.2d 683, 685 , (1st Dist. 1968), the court said: “Defendant was entitled to have thes

1975The reason for this rule is that a trial judge is in a superior position to determine whether or not a fair trial was had and substantial justice accomplished. * * The trial judge, however, should not set aside a verdict and grant a new trial merely because he would have decided the case differently if he had been the trier of fact. * * or because he feels that inferences or conclusions other than those drawn by the jury might be more reasonable. [Citations.] In Dailey v. Hill, 99 Ill.App.2d 474, 479 , 241 N.E.2d 683, 685 , (1st Dist. 1968), the court said: “Defendant was entitled to have thes

1975The applicable rule was stated in Foster v. VanGilder, 65 Ill.App.2d 373, 376-7 , 213 N.E.2d 421 (3rd Dist. 1965): “The oft repeated rule is that a court of review will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial unless the record clearly shows that the trial court abused its discretion.

1975The applicable rule was stated in Foster v. VanGilder, 65 Ill.App.2d 373, 376-7 , 213 N.E.2d 421 (3rd Dist. 1965): “The oft repeated rule is that a court of review will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial unless the record clearly shows that the trial court abused its discretion.

1971Plaintiff's argument is a repetition of the one it advanced to meet defendant's contention concerning the affirmative defenses: that Keefe, the receiver, did not complain about plaintiff's performance of the demolition contracts; therefore, defendants are bound by this failure. • 13-15 It is an oft-repeated principle that "[w]here the trial court has seen and heard the witnesses and the testimony is contradictory, this court will not substitute its judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that of the trial court and will not disturb the findings unless they are manifestly against the we

1971Plaintiff's argument is a repetition of the one it advanced to meet defendant's contention concerning the affirmative defenses: that Keefe, the receiver, did not complain about plaintiff's performance of the demolition contracts; therefore, defendants are bound by this failure. • 13-15 It is an oft-repeated principle that "[w]here the trial court has seen and heard the witnesses and the testimony is contradictory, this court will not substitute its judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that of the trial court and will not disturb the findings unless they are manifestly against the we

1971Co. v. Solar Sales, Inc., 86 Ill.

1967In Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 76 Ill App2d 62, at page 67, 221 NE2d 323 , the court said: “It would serve no useful purpose to reiterate here the oft-repeated factors to be considered in determining whether a given zoning ordinance is invalid as applied to particular property.

1951(Maupin v. Maupin, 403 Ill. 316 ; Economy Dairy Co. v. Kerner, 371 Ill. 261 .) The record here meets the latter two requirements but falls short of raising a fairly debatable constitutional question.

1951(Maupin v. Maupin, 403 Ill. 316 ; Economy Dairy Co. v. Kerner, 371 Ill. 261 .) The record here meets the latter two requirements but falls short of raising a fairly debatable constitutional question.

1938In People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 355 Ill. 605 , the railroad company sought to defend against the application for judgment for delinquent taxes and the oft-repeated rule was again announced, that in the absence of specific statutory grant of other review, errors in judgment of the taxing authorities not amounting to fraud, “the objector’s remedy lies in an application to such agencies as have been provided by the statute for hearing complaints of that character, and resort to the courts may not be had before such remedy has been exhausted,” citing Kinderman v. Harding, 345 Ill. 237 ,

1938In People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 355 Ill. 605 , the railroad company sought to defend against the application for judgment for delinquent taxes and the oft-repeated rule was again announced, that in the absence of specific statutory grant of other review, errors in judgment of the taxing authorities not amounting to fraud, “the objector’s remedy lies in an application to such agencies as have been provided by the statute for hearing complaints of that character, and resort to the courts may not be had before such remedy has been exhausted,” citing Kinderman v. Harding, 345 Ill. 237 ,

1938Counsel for appellant cite Department of Finance v. Player, 365 Ill. 215 .

1937This rule was also announced in People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 310 Ill. 212 , where it is stated that “The power of the legislature to validate by a curative law any proceeding which it might have authorized in advance is limited to the case of the irregular exercise of power.

1936The case of DeWolf v. Bowley, supra, did not involve the question of vested property rights but announced the oft-repeated doctrine under which pensions to retired officers are sustained — i. e., that a public benefit accrues in two ways: by encouraging such officers or employees to remain in the service, and by retiring from public service those who have become incapacitated from performing the duties as well as they might be performed by younger or more vigorous persons.