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7 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex parte Chaddockgreen1 sentence2024The double-jeopardy right against successive prosecutions protects the accused from the “embarrassment, expense and ordeal of repetitive trials, compelling the accused to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, and creating a risk of conviction through sheer governmental 8 perseverance.” Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d at 886 (cleaned up) (first quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 187-88 (1957); and then quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Cervantes v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Ex parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“There was no issue of successive prosecutions because the defendant was convicted of two offenses in one trial.”); Cervantes v. State, 815 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that “the issue in this cause is limited to whether appellant was subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause” because “appellant was subjected to only one trial”). 27 offense—aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—consequently, he could not have been punished for the same conduct twice. . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2024See Ex parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“There was no issue of successive prosecutions because the defendant was convicted of two offenses in one trial.”); Cervantes v. State, 815 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that “the issue in this cause is limited to whether appellant was subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause” because “appellant was subjected to only one trial”). 27 offense—aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—consequently, he could not have been punished for the same conduct twice. . | 1 | 1 |
Tibbs v. Floridagreen1 sentence2024The double-jeopardy right against successive prosecutions protects the accused from the “embarrassment, expense and ordeal of repetitive trials, compelling the accused to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, and creating a risk of conviction through sheer governmental 8 perseverance.” Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d at 886 (cleaned up) (first quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 187-88 (1957); and then quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Castillo, Ex Parte Thomas Edwardgreen1 sentence2017Ex parte Castillo, 469 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Broce
green
2 sentences2007The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who pleads guilty to "two counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses" may not raise a successive prosecution claim for the first time on collateral attack primarily because this would have required "further proceedings at which to expand the record with new evidence." United States v. Broce , 488 U.S. 563 (1989). 2005The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who pleads guilty to “two counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses” may not raise a successive prosecution claim for the first time on collateral attack primarily because this would have required “further proceedings at which to expand the record with new evidence.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). | 3 | 2005–2007 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
1 sentence2025Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 & n.6 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brown v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2025Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 & n.6 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Green v. United States
green
1 sentence2024The double-jeopardy right against successive prosecutions protects the accused from the “embarrassment, expense and ordeal of repetitive trials, compelling the accused to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, and creating a risk of conviction through sheer governmental 8 perseverance.” Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d at 886 (cleaned up) (first quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 187-88 (1957); and then quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.