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7 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1945–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fafordgreen2 sentences2008As we have previously stated, "[t]he mere possibility that interception of the communication is technologically feasible does not render public a communication that is otherwise private." Id.; see also Faford, 128 Wash.2d at 486 , 910 P.2d 447 ("We will not permit the mere introduction of new communications technology to defeat the traditional expectation of privacy in telephone conversations."). ¶ 19 That telephone conversations from detained individuals are intended to be protected by the privacy act is demonstrated by the legislature's enactment of an exception for state prisons. 2008As we have previously stated, “The mere possibility that interception of the communication is technologically feasible does not render public a communication that is otherwise private.” Id.) see also Faford, 128 Wn.2d at 486 (“We will not permit the mere introduction of new communications technology to defeat the traditional expectation of privacy in telephone conversations.”). ¶19 That telephone conversations from detained individuals are intended to be protected by the privacy act is demonstrated by the legislature’s enactment of an exception for state prisons. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Fafordgreen1 sentence2008As we have previously stated, "[t]he mere possibility that interception of the communication is technologically feasible does not render public a communication that is otherwise private." Id.; see also Faford, 128 Wash.2d at 486 , 910 P.2d 447 ("We will not permit the mere introduction of new communications technology to defeat the traditional expectation of privacy in telephone conversations."). ¶ 19 That telephone conversations from detained individuals are intended to be protected by the privacy act is demonstrated by the legislature's enactment of an exception for state prisons. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Erhart v. Hummonds
green
2 sentences2011As one commentator noted prior to the enactment of immunity statutes, such as RCW 51.24.035, [t]he problem caused by workers' compensation statutes is illustrated by Erhart v. Hummonds, [ 232 Ark. 133, 134 , 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960)] where the court used a strained interpretation of the contract to uphold a jury verdict against an architect in a wrongful death case.... 2011As one commentator noted prior to the enactment of immunity statutes, such as RCW 51.24.035, [t]he problem caused by workers' compensation statutes is illustrated by Erhart v. Hummonds, [ 232 Ark. 133, 134 , 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960)] where the court used a strained interpretation of the contract to uphold a jury verdict against an architect in a wrongful death case.... | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. White
green
1 sentence1987State v. White, 23 Wn. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Sullivan v. Watson
green
2 sentences1969As pointed out by Professor Trautman, in the 10 years following the enactment of the rule, the Supreme Court reversed nearly all orders granting new trial which it reviewed. 2 The results in these cases no doubt prompted King County Superior Court Judge Henry Clay Agnew to state: "... a trial judge no longer has the right to grant a new trial because he believes substantial justice has not been done because the verdict is overwhelmingly contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Sullivan v. Watson, 60 Wn.2d 759 , 765 n.2, 375 P.2d 501 (1962). 1969As pointed out by Professor Trautman, in the 10 years following the enactment of the rule, the Supreme Court reversed nearly all orders granting new trial which it reviewed. 2 The results in these cases no doubt prompted King County Superior Court Judge Henry Clay Agnew to state: "... a trial judge no longer has the right to grant a new trial because he believes substantial justice has not been done because the verdict is overwhelmingly contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Sullivan v. Watson, 60 Wn.2d 759 , 765 n.2, 375 P.2d 501 (1962). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
In Re Van Bever
green
2 sentences1945The supreme court of Arizona, In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368 , 101 P. (2d) 790 , held that a member of the bar of that state who left Arizona prior to the enactment of the state bar act (the statute being very similar to our own) and thereafter returned to Arizona was entitled to resume the practice of law in that state upon again taking up his residence therein. 1945The supreme court of Arizona, In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368 , 101 P. (2d) 790 , held that a member of the bar of that state who left Arizona prior to the enactment of the state bar act (the statute being very similar to our own) and thereafter returned to Arizona was entitled to resume the practice of law in that state upon again taking up his residence therein. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.