enactment rule in Florida

2011“The rule in this State is that denial of application for habeas corpus precludes a subsequent application for ha-beas corpus in the same cause on the same facts and issues.” Moat v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 591 (Fla.1955); § 79.10, Fla. Stat. (1951); see also Scaldeferri, 285 So.2d at 411 ; D'Alessandro v. Tippins, 102 Fla. 10 , 137 So. 231 (1931).

2011“The rule in this State is that denial of application for habeas corpus precludes a subsequent application for ha-beas corpus in the same cause on the same facts and issues.” Moat v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 591 (Fla.1955); § 79.10, Fla. Stat. (1951); see also Scaldeferri, 285 So.2d at 411 ; D'Alessandro v. Tippins, 102 Fla. 10 , 137 So. 231 (1931).

2011“The rule in this State is that denial of application for habeas corpus precludes a subsequent application for ha-beas corpus in the same cause on the same facts and issues.” Moat v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 591 (Fla.1955); § 79.10, Fla. Stat. (1951); see also Scaldeferri, 285 So.2d at 411 ; D'Alessandro v. Tippins, 102 Fla. 10 , 137 So. 231 (1931).

2011Ex parte Bowen, 25 Fla. 214, 6 So. 65 (1889) (explaining that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to raise mere irregularities or procedural errors, which can be raised in a direct appeal, and concluding the writ properly issues only where the error renders the judgment or order causing detention void).

2009We answered this question in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006).

2009We answered this question in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006).

1998Branham, 92 Fla. 515 , 109 So. 442 (1926), where the statute governing the licenses provides a method of revocation, that method must be followed.

1998Branham, 92 Fla. 515 , 109 So. 442 (1926), where the statute governing the licenses provides a method of revocation, that method must be followed.

1998Finally, the Commission’s enactment of rule 61J2-3.009(5)(f) itself shows that the approval of the course is “an authorization required by law.” In all these respects, the Commission has treated course approvals as governmental authorizations within the meaning of “license.” Although generally speaking, a license may be revoked without violating any vested rights of the licensee, Towns v. City of Tallahassee, 11 Fla. 130 (1866); Prettyman v. Florida Real Estate Comm’n ex rel.

1987The applicable statute of limitations, section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), provided that: ... all rights for remedial attention under this section pursuant to the terms of an award shall be barred unless a further claim therefor is filed with the Division within two years after the entry of such award, except that, if payment of compensation has been made or remedial attention has been furnished by the employer under the terms of the award, a further claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment of compensation or within two years after the date of the last

1987That opinion, however, related to an order based on a 1983 hearing on new benefits, at which claimant orally sought re-adjudication of liability for the 1976 medical costs in question which “at that time had not been, nor have they yet been, according to the record, submitted ... for payment or reimbursement.” 439 So.2d 990 .

1985U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 , 10 S.Ct. 453 (1980); School Board of Escambia County v. State, 353 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1977).

1985The strict construction placed upon section 768.30 by the majority is, moreover, at variance with the provisions of 768.28(5), subjecting the state to liability "in the same manner and the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ..."; a provision, which, as acknowledged by the supreme court in Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979), "evinces the intent of our legislature to waive sovereign immunity on a broad basis...." While not specifically addressing a situation in which the negligent act of the defendant occurred before

1985Greenberg v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, supra. Thus, the powers of administrative agencies must affirmatively appear from the enactment under which they claim to act.

1985U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 , 10 S.Ct. 453 (1980); School Board of Escambia County v. State, 353 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1977).

1983This Court, in Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla.1969), established the principle that a plaintiff, as a third-party beneficiary of a motor vehicle liability policy, had a direct cause of action against the insurer and could join the insurer as a party defendant along with the insured. 2 Shingleton also stated that it is better to have “all the cards ... on the table,” Id. at 720 , because the stage has now been reached where juries are more mature.

1983This Court, in Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla.1969), established the principle that a plaintiff, as a third-party beneficiary of a motor vehicle liability policy, had a direct cause of action against the insurer and could join the insurer as a party defendant along with the insured. 2 Shingleton also stated that it is better to have “all the cards ... on the table,” Id. at 720 , because the stage has now been reached where juries are more mature.