race-neutral explanation challenge in Washington

2017Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral."!341 Bowman's argument that the State's proffered reasons were pretextual and mere proxies for race concerns the third step, which requires the trial court to consider the State's explanations and determine whether the defendant has demonstrated purposeful discrimination.35 The State's explanations "must be viewed in the totality of 31 State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 699 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 ). 32 Suppl.

2013The second step of the process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or plausible: "'At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial 26 No. 86257-5, 2013 WL 3946038 , at *12 (Wash. Aug. 1, 2013) (indicating it would consider changing the Batson framework based on a future fully-briefed appeal advocating a new standard, or by court rule or statute). 27 kL 28 See.e.g., State v. Luvene. 127 Wn.2d 690, 699 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 ).

2017Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral."!341 Bowman's argument that the State's proffered reasons were pretextual and mere proxies for race concerns the third step, which requires the trial court to consider the State's explanations and determine whether the defendant has demonstrated purposeful discrimination.35 The State's explanations "must be viewed in the totality of 31 State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 699 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 ). 32 Suppl.

2013The second step of the process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or plausible: "'At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial 26 No. 86257-5, 2013 WL 3946038 , at *12 (Wash. Aug. 1, 2013) (indicating it would consider changing the Batson framework based on a future fully-briefed appeal advocating a new standard, or by court rule or statute). 27 kL 28 See.e.g., State v. Luvene. 127 Wn.2d 690, 699 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 ).

2017Further, deference is important because trial judges must have some assurance that the rest of the trial will not be an exercise in futility if it turns out an appellate court would have ruled on a Batson challenge differently.1301 Under the existing Batson standard, where the State articulates a race-neutral explanation for its challenge, the trial court is not required to analyze the first step 27 178 Wn.2d 34, 52-55 , 309 P.3d 326 (2013). 28 id, at 46. 29 Id, at 48. 30 Id. at 55-56 . 13 No. 73069-0-1/14 whether the defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.31 Her

2017Further, deference is important because trial judges must have some assurance that the rest of the trial will not be an exercise in futility if it turns out an appellate court would have ruled on a Batson challenge differently.1301 Under the existing Batson standard, where the State articulates a race-neutral explanation for its challenge, the trial court is not required to analyze the first step 27 178 Wn.2d 34, 52-55 , 309 P.3d 326 (2013). 28 id, at 46. 29 Id, at 48. 30 Id. at 55-56 . 13 No. 73069-0-1/14 whether the defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.31 Her

2017Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral."!341 Bowman's argument that the State's proffered reasons were pretextual and mere proxies for race concerns the third step, which requires the trial court to consider the State's explanations and determine whether the defendant has demonstrated purposeful discrimination.35 The State's explanations "must be viewed in the totality of 31 State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 699 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 ). 32 Suppl.

2013The second step of the process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or plausible: "'At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial 26 No. 86257-5, 2013 WL 3946038 , at *12 (Wash. Aug. 1, 2013) (indicating it would consider changing the Batson framework based on a future fully-briefed appeal advocating a new standard, or by court rule or statute). 27 kL 28 See.e.g., State v. Luvene. 127 Wn.2d 690, 699 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 ).

2021Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 .

2011The dissenters recognized that, under an earlier precedent, [7] a trial court has discretion to find a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination where the only venire member from a constitutionally cognizable group is peremptorily challenged; however, the dissenters were persuaded to depart from this precedent because "the benefits of [a bright-line rule] far outweigh the State's minimal burden to provide a race-neutral explanation for its challenge during venire." Rhone, 168 Wash.2d at 661 , 229 P.3d 752 (Alexander, J., dissenting).

2000Rhodes, 82 Wn.